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| Asian
Economic and Business Outlook for the New Millennium Keynote
Address to The Eight Pacific Basin Finance Economics and Accounting
and the Second ADSGM International Conference by Mr. Anand
Panyarachun June 1, 2000 Dean
of the Southeast Asian Graduate Schools of Management, Honoured Guests, I
must confess to feeling somewhat intimidated at the prospect of speaking to so
many deans and PhDs. When I saw Dr. Chirayu’s invitation to talk about
the economic and business outlook for the new millennium, I felt even worse. With
the volatility in today’s economies and markets it is hard enough to predict what
will happen next week, much less in the next millennium. You have set me a very
tough examination. I hope I don’t flunk. The only saving grace I can see in making
predictions for a thousand years is that despite the best efforts of my doctors,
I am not likely to be around long enough to see how wrong I was. So, let me tell
you not what the future will be, but what I realistically hope it
will be. As we look forward to the new
millennium, the first obvious thing to note is that it is starting off with a
huge increase in the amount of information available and with fantastic new technologies
to deliver it all over the world in seconds. This is very exciting and it is,
potentially, of great benefit, but we must not forget that people, not information
or technology, remain the key to the future. People will decide how to use the
technology. People must learn to receive, organise, understand and act on all
that information. I heard a joke about
this, the other day. It seems there was a senior citizen - meaning someone much
older than I am - driving for the first time on the new expressway north of Bangkok
when he got a call from his daughter on his mobile phone. “Father - please be
careful. I just heard on Jor Sor 100 (that’s the traffic radio station) that some
idiot is driving the wrong way on the express way.” “It’s
even worse than that,” the senior citizen replied. “Its not just one car; its
hundreds of them - all going the wrong way and blowing their horns at me.” The
situation in Asia in 1996 and 97 demonstrates this lag in understanding warning
information. We should have seen lagging stock markets, sagging property prices,
declining export figures, current account deficits and pressure on our currency
as warnings we were going the wrong way. I am afraid we were so sure we were going
the right way and so proud of our high-speed economy that we were not ready to
listen to warnings. In this analogy, I suppose, that mobile phone call would have
come from George Soros. Now we are left
to clear up the wreckage from the financial crisis, make sure we get headed in
the right direction, re-train the drivers, slow down a bit and set up systems
to ensure that the information we need to correct course gets to us more quickly
and effectively. This work is largely the
responsibility of the people in Asia and, of course, you, as the leaders of Asian
institutions of management, have a major role to play. There are many local institutions,
rules, attitudes and management practices that need to be changed. I’ll
get back to our responsibilities in a minute, but first I want to note that world
leaders and global institutions also have a responsibility to adjust. Part of
the problem we faced in Asia was with an international financial system that did
not develop in sync with systems of regulation to moderate volatility. The new
millennium will bring changes in the international financial system, including
the major institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, that are part of that system.
These institutions need to get better information. They need to interpret it more
accurately and act on it more quickly. Most importantly, they need to involve
local people, so they better understand local situations, rather than applying
the solutions that worked in other places, in other circumstances. So,
I think and hope that the first years of the new millennium will begin with these
changes needed to prevent even more serious crashes further down the road. Existing
multi-lateral institutions, for instance, need to be more open and more responsive.
At a time when the pace of change is frightening many people, the IMF, ADB, and
WTO seem like isolated bureaucracies unresponsive to human concerns. That is why
we see protests and demonstrations, however irrational some of them may be. I
believe we will see these multi-lateral institutions become more open, more accessible
and more responsive in the years to come, even though they will not change their
main objectives. Other institutions should simply be discarded. The G-8, for instance,
is now outdated, ineffective and perceived to be elitist. More nations and more
institutions need to be included in global strategizing. A members-only club of
a few developed countries, however wealthy, cannot provide effective global leadership
in the new millennium. Tinkering with international
systems and developing new information hardware, however, will not be sufficient.
In the recent past, we may have been diverted by great technical achievements
from the importance of the human side of development. We in Asia need to find
ways to help our people change and develop so that those directing the new technology
will remain focused on the needs of people. That is a great responsibility that
you have as educators. I am afraid we will never be able to eliminate human greed,
but, as educators of business and management, we can find ways to steer the power
of greed in directions that help rather than harm people. In
environmental management, for instance, there is a simple and powerful principle,
that “polluters pay” for the real costs of the damage they inflict on society
and the natural ecology. We introduced this principle in Thailand nearly a decade
ago, but it is still not being implemented. The main reason for this slowness
is a shortage of the political courage to explain to the people that they too
are polluters and will have to pay. I believe that people are willing to pay,
but only if those in authority involve communities and businesses in the decision-making.
Our leaders need to engage the people in two-way communication on the benefits
as well as the costs of pollution prevention and reduction. Sometimes, our leaders
underestimate the good sense of our people and fear they will be punished at the
polls if they propose any sacrifice, even if it is in everyone’s best interest. Once
the “polluters pay” concept and its application are accepted, business managers
focused on the bottom line will rush to find the management tools needed to prevent
pollution, to reduce waste, and to account for full environmental costs. Management
schools must be ready to provide the managers of the future with the skill-sets
needed. This just one example. I believe
there are other ways that markets in the new millennium will be re-structured
to serve human needs rather than changing people to serve imperfect markets. Business
schools and business school professors have an absolutely crucial role to play
in this process. We need to undertake research that helps us understand the complex
and rapid changes underway in the global economy that have brought different societies,
different institutions and different world views into much closer contact. Business
schools have the duty to train a new generation of business leaders who see the
necessity of ethical, effective, environmentally-conscious business, that ultimately
serves the greater, long-term ends of human society. These
tasks do not belong exclusively to business schools, of course. Systemic change
is part of the task, and that is the joint responsibility of government, business,
academia, civil society, labour and mass media. Let me quote Joseph Stiglitz,
the recently retired chief economist of the World Bank. “Development
entails not only creating market institutions, but also political institutions,
and the two are intimately inter-twined.” In
the millennium ahead, I predict, or at least I hope, there will be major changes
in political institutions and in the connections between business and government.
I am proud to say that Thailand has been a leader in beginning such change, but
perhaps that is because we were the leaders in suffering the penalties of having
outdated and inadequate institutions. We
have experienced the costs of corruption, inadequate government regulation and
poor corporate governance. Our new constitution is an important starting point,
but just a starting point, and a strong signal of the desire for change. The constitution,
which came out of a broadly consultative process, includes strong provisions for
honesty in government and elections. I am pleased to see that some initial steps
have been taken to enforce those provisions. A lot more work still needs to be
done because the constitution is but words on paper. To work, it requires institutions
with the ability to enforce its counter-corruption provisions and people willing
to act, both inside and outside government, to make sure that those institutions
perform. Unfortunately, passive obedience
to the new rules is not enough. We need people willing to work together to ensure
that the rules are followed and that those breaking the rules are exposed. There
have to be some whistle-blowers and some troublemakers for the benefit of society.
Recently, we had the example of one Thai mother, concerned about unfair school
entrance examinations, start a process that has led to major improvements in access
and fairness all over the country. The
defence of human rights requires the same willingness to speak up. Some people
fear that globalisation will result in impersonal multi-national corporations,
above government control, abuse human rights for their corporate gains. That is
a possible danger, but I envisage a different outcome in the new millennium: new
technologies, global markets, international standards, and faster flows of information,
that give concerned people the weapons to ensure that corporations and governments
protect the rights of their workers and their local communities. Much more needs
to be done, but we see a clear direction: global markets and global brands are
leading to global standards of conduct. That
means change, not only for the big brand names, but also for their thousands of
suppliers all over the world. The new logistics technologies and “Just-in-Time”
management techniques mean that buyer and supplier must be tied closely together
by constant information flows. This extends from inventory, designs and shipments
to health and environmental standards. It forces knowledge down through the organisation
and out to the suppliers. This will mean that employees at all levels in the supply
chain must handle sensitive information. That, in turn, will mean that corporations
and their suppliers must develop co-operative, rather than confrontational relationships
with their workers. It is already clear that JIT does not work in a confrontational
system and this trend will only continue to expand in the future. I
believe the same is true of the hot new e-commerce technologies. In some ways
these technologies do the same thing as a client and a customer sitting down together
to talk. There is an exchange about needs, products, costs, capabilities, and
delivery information. Then there is an agreement on a sale and a payment. E-commerce
does the same things, but on such a scale and with such ease, speed and geographical
reach that it is rapidly changing important aspects of business. This technology
has provided such exciting new opportunities that there has been talk, particularly
with respect to stock markets, of a distinction between an “old economy” of physical
goods that grows slowly and a “new economy” of digital services that grows so
quickly that price/earnings ratios are irrelevant. I do not believe that this
distinction will last very long. Within a few years, the new technologies will
be incorporated in some way into almost every business, so the real distinction
will be between those companies that use electronic capabilities well and those
that don’t. What we need to do in Asia
is to ensure we climb the e-commerce learning curve quickly enough, so that our
businesses are not left behind and destroyed by global competitors who learn how
to use e-commerce ahead of us. Fears that
globalisation will destroy not only local companies, but also local communities,
environments and customs, have recently been the cause of much protest and controversy.
It has been argued that globalised; multi-national corporations are out of control
because they are too powerful and too geographically spread for individual governments
to handle. It is said that unelected corporate managers who affect what happens
to people around the world are accountable to no one. I
believe that is not actually the case now, and it will be even less so in the
years ahead. Managers are increasingly accountable to shareholders, employees
and customers. Information flows and human concerns are at the heart of this accountability.
New mechanisms are coming to ensure that all shareholders get the information
and analysis that is available to corporate-insiders and institutional shareholders.
Networks of NGOs and the power of the Internet ensure that corporate misconduct
in even remote parts of the world is soon known to the corporation’s customers
around the globe. Enforceable standards will make it much more difficult to lock
the fire doors of a toy factory, as was the case in Bangkok several years ago,
to improperly store hazardous waste or to use child labour. It
has been said that business managers are like sub-atomic particles. Observation
changes their behaviour. In the new millennium, I see increased observation of
management, whether in government or the private sector, leading to improved standards,
greater acceptance of standards and more effectively enforced standards. This
will lead to better lives for workers, better returns for shareholders and better
protection of local communities. Your students will be managing in a fish bowl
much of the time and you have to teach them how to do it. Observation
will not only come from outside the company. The new millennium will not work
in a top-down fashion. Business will have to involve employees and, indeed, all
stakeholders through much freer and fuller flows of information in good governance
processes. Recent research has shown that greater worker participation and better
information flows within a company, lead to higher motivation of employees, better
management decision-making and increased productivity These
flows of information in the new millennium will not be limited to workers’ issues.
As population growth and industrialisation increase, the pressure on the natural
environment, corporate treatment of the environment will become an ever more important
issue for management. Research at the Kenan-Flagler Business School has shown
that the companies that take the best care of the environment are also the most
profitable. Why should this be so? First
of all, pollution consists of materials that the corporation paid for that it
is now dumped into the environment without anyone to pay for it. Better design,
better production processes and better accounting for costs can reduce wastage
and make the company more profitable. Second,
production of waste entails disposal-costs or penalties. Avoidance of these costs
not only reduces expenses and legal fees but also reduces a serious demand on
management time and attention. Third, environmental
management systems cannot work effectively top down. They must involve workers
at every level. Workers tend to value working for a company that places a high
value on the environment. Involvement in environmental management motivates employees. Fourth,
the damage to corporate reputation among customers, may be greater than any penalties
paid to regulators, because it is damage that can persist for a long time. Even
decades after the Exxon Valdez, the corporate name is damaged by the memories
of the Alaskan oil spill. In the new millennium,
corporations will be known to workers, regulators, and communities by their actions
to protect the environment. Business schools need to give managers the skills
and attitudes to manage more open systems, that protect both the environment and
their workers. Open-ness to stakeholders
- workers, shareholders and communities - will also provide corporations with
mechanisms to avoid undue risk, cut costs and attract financing. Much
has been said about corporate governance and some progress has been made, at least
in the rules, with requirements for greater disclosure, audit committees, and
better accounting practices. It is still up to people to take actions. Workers
can passively follow management orders or they can speak up. Had workers understood
how the risks being piled up in Asian banks and corporations would lead to their
own loss of jobs, they would have spoken out, and those risks might have been
better managed? In the new millennium, I believe there will be systems that provide
timely risk information to employees. Company
executives, must learn ethical behaviour and new ways of management. Particularly
here in Asia, there needs to be a change in the old pattern of patriarchal, top-down
management. I am afraid this will be difficult for many of the dinosaurs of Asian
business to accept, but there will be little choice. To satisfy international
markets, international suppliers of capital, local communities and local government,
the managers of the new millennium will have to be more professional, more democratic
and less secretive. This is not just a nice thing to do; it is essential for survival
in the global economy of the new millennium. Ethical behaviour will be a source
of competitive advantage for nations as well as corporations. The
Thai government learned to its dismay that simply keeping its own state debt under
control is not enough, if the private sector undertakes high debt and high risk.
The suffering that accompanied the economic crisis, spread well beyond the managers,
regulators and entrepreneurs who made the mistakes. Employees were laid off; salaries
were cut and benefits reduced. We learned that we had few safety nets for the
victims of the downturn. We also learned that no safety net can replace a strong
economy. Unfortunately, market signals
are not perfect, and attention to markets alone will not achieve the kind of transparency,
good governance and ethical conduct that I envision for the new millennium. We
have learned to our cost in Asia that markets require strong and effective regulation.
Who is to regulate the new global economy? Some have suggested that this need
require a super world government that will be more powerful than the corporations,
and able to deal with rogue governments. I do not see this happening. We are still
hoping that the United States will pay its financial obligations to the United
Nations. We are still trying to get a long list of countries to respond to the
UN’s human rights committee. We are still trying to free the World Bank, the IMF
and the WTO from undue political interference by national governments. So a world
government is unlikely and, I think, unneeded. What
I see developing is not global government, but global governance. Not a super
bureaucracy, but a set of internationally accepted rules of conduct that protect
global interests. This global governance will be provided, not only through governments
and multi-lateral organisations, but also through activist NGOs, educated consumers,
civil society organisations, labour unions and corporations working together for
mutual self-interest. It will require the willingness on the part of some, to
give up special privileges, to protect the interests of future generations, and
to fore-go immediate advantages for long term, sustainable growth. In short, it
will require ethics and a sense of justice. This
sense of ethical behaviour needs to be instilled as early as possible - through
the family and through the education system. Since you are educators, let me expand
on the role of academia and education in the new millennium. First of all, we
need to teach our young people to understand how their actions can affect people
all over the world, whether it is making a decision that pollutes the atmosphere,
or taking on a risky loan. There has to be an emphasis on the social, ethical
and environmental bonds that connect us all. New communications technology will
help communities form around mutual interests rather than geography. Translation-software
will reduce language barriers. Second,
it is more important than ever before to teach our students how to think and how
to learn. Knowledge is changing so quickly, that in many disciplines about half
of the knowledge base for an advanced degree becomes obsolete every five years.
So we need to teach our students how to learn, because they will not conclude
their learning with the acquisition of a graduate degree, they just begin another
phase of it -continuous, self-directed, life-long learning. Learning
how to learn is not simple. It requires the tools of research, including the new
Internet tools, but more importantly, it requires the ability to think logically
and independently. Asia has immense talent,
but we must nurture it with quality education that is not directed only at a test
or a degree, but at real learning and ethical action. If we can do that, this
region will have an immense comparative advantage for the future. It is sometimes
noted that 60% of the world’s population is Asian and the percentage is growing,
therefore Asia will dominate the world economy of the 2lst century. While the
power of demographics is considerable, it is not numbers alone that will provide
leadership. It is the education of those people to think creatively and act responsibly
that will make the numbers important. We certainly have the bright young minds
to be successful; it is up to us, the not yet senior citizens, to make sure the
education we give them is good enough. Fortunately,
Internet technologies provide not only the challenge of improving learning, but
also give us new ways of doing it. We will not be far into the new millennium
when a large portion of education will be computer-aided and internet-based. Learning
will be less confined to the traditional years and more spread throughout a lifetime.
Education, like information and entertainment, will be digitised and delivered
electronically almost anywhere the consumer wants it. This is not to say that
all education will be electronic; we still have live theatre and concerts despite
television and hi-fl equipment. We will, and must continue to have, live inter-action
between student and teacher. Undoubtedly, however, education will be increasingly
electronic, inter-active and customised. The greatest change is likely to come
in those parts of universities that offer advanced professional education. Universities
will cease to be places of learning and increasingly become the guarantors
of the quality of education, that can be delivered anywhere and any time. The
past few years have been full of change. The pace has been dizzying. Sometimes
we just wish that things would slow down long enough for us to catch our breath.
That will not happen. More than 2,500 years ago, the Lord Buddha taught that the
only thing that does not change is the existence of change it. So I feel safe
in predicting that Asia will see even faster and more incredible changes in the
years ahead. It is your responsibility as scholars and educators, to ensure that
our students are equipped with the intellectual skills and moral strength, to
ensure that this inexorable change is for the betterment of all. |
| Asian
Business Leadership: Planning for the Future Dusit
Thani Hotel March 3, 1996 I am honoured to be
here tonight to address some of the top CEOs and presidents from around the region.
This is the first forum that I can think of that has drawn senior Asian company
executives together to share views and insights. I believe that Asians have a
great deal to learn from one another and I welcome other Dialogue programmes that
focus on the dynamic companies and leaders of Asia. The importance of this event
is underlined by the re-scheduling of a previous engagement to attend ABL. Tonight
I would like to speak on the roadmap for Asian business leadership and planning
for its future. Asia is a complex environment
in which to do business. Each country has its own unique history and culture.
In addition to these characteristics, the politics and economic development in
each country has greatly influenced the business structures, which have developed.
Successful companies such as the Birla Group, Sime Darby and SGV, however,
were early pioneers that focused on the similarities in this diverse region to
develop their regional businesses. Managing and operating as a regional business
rather than a national company is an important factor in their success. I believe
Asian companies will increasingly look to similar Asian companies as a model to
develop or enhance their regional businesses. These successful Asian companies
will also change how Asian companies are organised, managed and will plan for
the future. As international trade barriers
are eliminated, Multi-National Corporations (MNC) and regional players will increasingly
try to identify markets where they have a competitive advantage. Asian companies
have the ability to develop as competitive businesses as any MNC. The key to success
is to ensure the management and organisational structures are developed to respond
to the unique opportunities and challenges in Asia. San Miguel is an excellent
example of a company rising to this challenge. As San Miguel has discovered, an
Asian company can become a major player in the global beer market. A large regional
consumer market has made it possible for Asian companies to develop comparable
market volumes to truly global companies, by staying focused solely on Asia. Imagine
what could happen when that focus shifts to global arena. Asia
is often viewed as a region where companies need to court political favours to
be successful, but multi-lateral trade organisations are changing how business
is conducted in Asia as well as other parts of the World. Asian companies must
begin to explore key management issues as the means to get ahead. Companies must
rely more on their ability to manage resources and people rather than count on
political favour for their competitive advantage today. Our goal should be to
develop world class market leaders that are as common in Asia as they are in the
US or Europe. The forum over the next few days offers an excellent opportunity
to learn from some of the best strategists and management-thinkers in the world
and bring this vision to reality. Asian
companies have three distinct competitive advantages. One of the greatest advantages
Asian companies have over other large companies such us MNCs are flexibility.
This trait has allowed many companies to grow and flourish, and has even enabled
many smaller players to compete successfully with larger MNCs. Many companies
that develop into large market-leading companies become too complacent and even
risk-adverse, focusing on asset maintenance rather than growth. Asian companies
should learn from this and strive to maintain flexibility as they prosper. Another
advantage of many Asian companies is the family-owned business structure. The
ability of these companies to focus on the long term without outside investor
pressure is a key competitive advantage. As family-owned businesses grow and expand
regionally, a transition from family-owned and family-managed to family-owned
but professionally managed is occurring. The challenge to family-owned and managed
businesses is the retention of qualified management; professional managers will
not stay long in family companies where decision- making is based on family status.
The balance between family-owned but professionally managed companies exists to
a high degree in Korea. This can be used as a model on which to propel family-owned
businesses into the global arena. Asian
companies are less likely to be weighted with outdated technology. The ability
to leapfrog generations of older technology without the burden of replacing older
units, is also a competitive advantage. In addition, as technology becomes less
of a factor in companies maintaining market leadership and as the lead times to
develop new products is reduced, the availability of technology becomes more like
a commodity. These three competitive advantages
are just a few of the factors transforming business organisations in Asia. So
where does this leave us in terms of looking at some of the challenges ahead for
the leading companies in Asia? There are
some key challenges facing Asia’s business leaders, which require us to continue
to change and adapt our organisations and practices in order to respond effectively
or face being left behind. In making these changes in our organisations, in order
to compete in the future, it is my hope that we do not discard some practices,
which have served us well and are common across the region. In
Asia, the biggest challenge facing business today is that of human resources.
The lack of qualified and well-trained executives has the potential to de-rail
our progress, more than any other single factor. While infrastructure projects
are basically a one-time expenditure, education requires a continual investment.
It is clearly an issue that needs attention. A shortage of skilled middle and
upper management already exists. To develop a long-term solution, we must turn
our attention to academic institutions. The
Malaysian Minister of Education expressed it best when he said, “We have been
recipients of knowledge from the West. The time is ripe for us to be originators
of it.” The global thought leaders who have one to Bangkok to share some of their
insights, come mostly from business schools in the West. They have useful insights,
and through extensive study and research have contributed to the field of management.
How many executives could name the Minister of Education for any country including
their own? Business leaders must take leadership to improve education and to develop
regional talent. The business leaders need to be part of a solution. Companies
profiting in Asia should give back to society in the region. There
is a need, for leadership within the business community for work across the region.
The scope of business research conducted is focused on local issues, however,
not at cross-border issues, which Asian companies face. Business leaders should
unite and promote the development of funds to develop projects that focus on relevant
cross-border issues. If our business schools
are unable to adequately undertake such research, the fund could be used to undertake
joint co-operative research with researchers from Western institutions, thus helping
to upgrade university students' research skills. A commitment of US$25,000 from
one hundred companies will go a long way to attract talented academics back to
Asia and also help us to understand what business practices work best in Asia
for the long term. As business leaders, you not only help yourself but also take
one small step towards addressing this major problem faced throughout Asia. The
challenge of business leaders is to show vision and commitment to develop our
own role models and management gurus. While
there are other challenges faced by companies in Asia, I think one of the most
formidable is the shortage of middle management and human resources in the region.
While we have our national business leaders, we also need regional business leaders
to step forward. I hope this has perhaps made a few people think about one small
thing they can easily do. If it has made one person begin to think about their
role and responsibility to the region in addition to their country or company,
I think this will be a healthy development in our corporate development. Avoiding
the natural nationalistic tendencies for companies that dominate one market is
important. The only other challenge I would
like to discuss is the building of lasting organisations. This requires developing
and instilling core values within every member of the organisation. This value
system will help organisations get beyond owner-dependent personalities. It should
be our goal to fill Asian companies’ corporate annual reports with quotes from
Asian leaders and legends, rather than the quotes by Western figures as currently
seen in so many corporate annual reports. Thank
you for your attention. I hope I have left you with enthusiasm and the knowledge
that you have the opportunity to influence and lead the direction of your organisation
and contribute to the future of the region. It is easier to shape the future
than to react to it! |
| Quest
for Investment Liberalization Luncheon Address by
Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman, Saha Union Public Co., Ltd. Former
Prime Minister of Thailand at APEC Investment Symposium Shangri-la
Hotel, Bangkok October 2, 1995 Distinguished
Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great
pleasure for me to be here today at this event and to address such a distinguished
gathering. This is a unique occasion where we have government officials, business
representatives, and academia from APEC member economies as well as representatives
from international organizations, all gathered here in Bangkok to discuss how
APEC should move forward to achieve freer investment flows. I
believe there is no need to stress the importance of the topic that you, distinguished
guests, are focusing on at this symposium. We are all aware that investment is
an area without concrete frontiers. A broad spectrum of issues is related to investments.
It is undeniably a complex, difficult issue with far-reaching implications for
every economy. Nevertheless, this challenge is worth exploring, particularly for
APEC, which has a goal to achieve free and open trade and investment by
the year 2010 for developed members and 2020 for developing members. Investment
liberalization is a prevalent policy theme around the globe in recent years. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) has been created under
the Uruguay Round trade talks to discipline the use of performance requirements
imposed on investors, and stresses non-discriminatory practices. APEC has produced
its own set of non-binding investment principles. Thailand supports the notion
of the WTO as the best forum for negotiating actual regulations because of its
inclusive, multi-lateral nature. OECD is currently in the process of negotiating
its Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment. Bi-lateral negotiations on investment
issues are conducted on a continual basis. These are just a few examples that
indicate how active development of international investment is right now. The
question is not so much on whether or not governments should liberalize their
investment regimes. Long-term benefits arising from liberal investment environments
are well recognized. In an area with strong intra-regional investment like APEC,
increasing investment flow is certainly desirable as long as it does not isolate
the region or polarize global markets. I
believe that questions of investment liberalization concern “how” and “when” rather
than “whether or not”. The Bogor Declaration has set a general goal for APEC to
achieve free and open trade and investment by the target dates. The details of
“how” and “when” are left to most of you here to figure out. This is not an easy
task, and should be thought about in the larger context of the WTO as well as
APEC. As a former diplomat and presently
a businessman, I would like to take this opportunity to share my views with you.
When I assumed the responsibilities of Prime Minister of Thailand, I had a chance
to be involved in various investment facilitation and liberalization schemes.
As Prime Minister, I also chaired the Board of Investment. My experience tells
me that the agenda in front of you is extremely complicated. A broad range of
factors has to be taken into consideration, and theoretical expectations may diverge
widely from realities. We often hear of
two motives underlying investment liberalization. One is to enhance an economy’s
attractiveness as a foreign investment location. Creation of a level playing field
is often cited as one of the most effective means to attract foreign investment.
The other motive is to benefit consumers. Perfect competition, as the basic economic
theory goes, creates a win-win situation: The industries of an open market and
the global market as a whole are stimulated to work more cost-effectively and
efficiently as a result. Consumers then enjoy the largest range of products at
the best prices. In effect, I believe that
most policy makers have no quarrel with the benign objectives of investment liberalization.
Most governments recognize that competitiveness is a key to thriving in today’s
global economy where distinct borderlines between international economic transactions
do not exist. However, whether these desired objectives can truly and effectively
be materialized remains a moot point. As
one of the creators of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, I certainly have all the reasons
to believe in removal of major barriers to investment. One crucial motive behind
the establishment of AFTA is to induce more foreign investment into this region.
It was not to form a trade bloc. Our idea is that it is easier to begin removing
barriers in a smaller region - and then to keep expanding the barrier-free environment
with the long-term goal of creating a truly free global market. Common
international rules governing the treatment of foreign investment by host governments
are believed to be a means to promote its flow. More freedom and less unpredictability
will occur in an environment where everyone observes the same rules and practices.
You will probably hear about the development of the creation of the Multi-lateral
Agreement on Investment Agreement being pursued by OECD at this symposium. This
so-called “MAI” is expected to provide foreign investors from every part of the
world with the same rules of the game. So, ostensibly, the level playing field
can become a reality. Many policy makers
may argue against the necessity of international rules, claiming investment policies
lie within the sovereign rights of host governments. Moreover, the exact same
set of rules cannot be equally appropriate for both developing and post-industrial
economies. This principle is recognized by GATT, which allows countries trying
to attract investment to poor rural areas to use incentives to lure industries. It
should be noted that barriers to investment do not come from public policies alone;
natural resources, history, geography and other factors all come into play. However,
one school of thought holds that by creating a set of common rules, economies
will ensure the requisite environment for foreign investment. However,
it is not my intention today to debate for or against the formation of the MAl
but to use this as one example of the numerous on-going attempts to establish
universal rules for investment which are believed to promote greater flows. In
the long run, the larger the arena of players, the more efficiently the market
should function. In the shorter term, though, we need to look carefully at the
motives of those pushing regulations on smaller economies. Sometimes, those demanding
common standards are really seeking advantage for themselves, not a cleaner planet
or better treatment of workers. It is notable
that even without a set of common universal rules, liberalization is the current
theme for policy makers in most economies. If we look around the globe, we witness
actions taken by many governments attempting to deregulate and liberalize their
investment regimes with an intention to improve their competitiveness. Rivalry
for foreign investment is growing increasingly severe. This situation naturally
prompts contemplation of positive changes. These actions may have nothing to do
with obligations of governments under international agreements or legal obligations.
Some economies experience success whereas others are still struggling with adjustment. Thailand
is also one of the countries that has chosen a pro-active, yet gradual approach
towards liberalization. We realize that benefits cannot be possible without appropriate
adjustments to cope with the new environment. Gradual steps have been taken to
minimize negative effects. This leads to the whole question of approaches. When
facing external pressure to open up investment regimes, many policy-makers, like
some of you here, may query whether governments should design their own liberalization
regimes rather than having legal “boiler-plate” forced upon them. To create change
is a challenge, because you face resistance arising from inertia and other reasons.
Many people argue that if there is no channel to force things to happen, change
will never take place. It is often said that governments will only take liberalization
steps when they have no alternatives, because they cannot take the short-term
political “heat.” This may hold true in many circumstances, but we have seen a
great number of governments taking bold steps in liberalizing their investment
regimes for economic reasons. The key point
here is the readiness of economies to embark on a liberalization journey. Benefits
such as “increased competitiveness” or “greater efficiency” remains theoretical
and abstract until a country has advanced to a certain level of industrial development.
Until that point, when its economy can begin to cope with a globally oriented
environment, such terms lack the meaning and substance attached to them in developed
countries. Given the great diversity in
socio-economic development among APEC economies, there is not one ready-made formula
for successful liberalization. The needs and priorities of one economy greatly
differ from those of others. Ways and means to open up an economy have to be designed
specifically to accommodate relevant settings. With
the same goal and objective, we may take varying routes leading to a common target.
Some governments may prefer gradualism, while others choose to take more radical
steps. Thailand is among the economies that opt for a gradual route. Sustainability
of economic development is probably the single most important factor that determines
ultimate success. Liberalization that leaves an economy in a poorer and more vulnerable
situation than it was should not be APEC‘s goal, or WTO’s. Economic sustainability
is particularly crucial in developing countries, when designing liberalization
packages. I know that many of you here are facing this challenge at this very
moment, and feeling some pressure from countries with larger, stronger economies. Investment
liberalization creates positive effects to economic systems in the long run, but
tends to lead to negative impacts in the shorter run. Can short-term problems
be avoided? Not completely. However, disturbance can be minimized when the right
mechanisms are in place. Gradualism is one way to avoid sudden shocks to domestic
entrepreneurs. Steady, measured change that gradually reaches the goal, is often
the best path for developing economies. Short-term
agitation has to be carefully dealt with; otherwise, backlash can occur and the
expected long-term benefits of liberalization will never be realized. “Equal footing”
competition is often quoted as an objective for which we should strive Today’s
world does not consist of economies or companies with the same features, operating
in similar competitive environments. In
concluding, no one doubt the merits of investment liberalization, but how to go
about it still pose several questions. No success formula that applies equally
to every economy exists. We have to create our own individual concoctions that
address particular features of our economy. I truly believe that we do have many
options to choose from, in achieving the goal of free and open investment. |
| AIDS
and Social and Economic Progress in the Asian and
Pacific Countries by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Third International
Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific Fifth National AIDS Seminar
in Thailand Chiang Mai September 21, 1995 Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests and Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Over the past few days of deliberations on the myriad issues
and topics relating to AIDS in the region, it seems that there is a wealth of
knowledge and experience on addressing the issue of AIDS. It seems that we have
a good idea of what we must do. Then, why must we continually call for action
to prevent the further spread of AIDS? As
I reflected on the topic for discussion today, I felt the most useful contribution
I could make to this forum was to share the perspective of a group that seems
to have been otherwise excluded from the deliberations here - the heads of government
and national leaders. My humble opinion is that without the commitment of leadership
at the highest level to preventing further spread of AIDS; we will never see the
scale of action necessary to address this issue and its social and economic consequences. AIDS
must be viewed as a national development issue. If we present AIDS as a health
problem, it will be treated as such. AIDS is not a health problem, it is a behavioral
and a societal problem - and an urgent national development priority. Today, AIDS
remains the most critical threat to the social and economic progress of the region
- along with environmental degradation. The
leaders of our countries are not taking AIDS seriously enough. I am here today
to tell you about my view as the former Prime Minister of a country facing one
of the fastest spreading AIDS epidemics on the planet, in the hope that we can
get more leaders to take AIDS more seriously. We need more action! II.
The Case of Thailand You and many others
around the world have heard much about AIDS in Thailand. You will continue to
hear about AIDS in Thailand because many people are infected and they are only
beginning to become sick. We are only beginning to feel the impact on our society.
It will become severe, as it has already in some communities, and it will become
more and more painful. Even with the hard-earned
successes to-date, Thailand must still learn to care for the 800,000 infected
people and their families - many of them live not too far from where we sit at
this moment. Many resources from the pockets of these families, from government
budgets, and from our society as a whole, will be consumed by these infections
and associated illnesses. Thanks to many
people here in this room, you have heard many reports on some of the successes
here in Thailand so far. There is much more to do, on many fronts. We must be
honest and accept that there is still too much discrimination against people with
AIDS in this country. Action must start at home, with our own attitudes. Many
companies in Thailand have adopted progressive AIDS education programmes in the
workplace, but still many companies - including some foreign firms - continue
to discriminate against people with AIDS. There
are some important lessons in Thailand’s experience. We must focus on action,
time is running out. We must enlist the commitment of the highest levels of authority
and begin implementing the necessary prevention programmes on a meaningful scale. In
early 1991, I assumed the Office of the Prime Minister, here in Thailand. This
was a time when Thailand was moving from several years of denial, to a gradual
acceptance that AIDS would pose a significant threat to social and economic progress.
Already in place was an immigration regulation, prohibiting HIV-positive people
from entering the country. Awaiting my
government’s consideration from the previous year, was proposed legislation, whereby,
HIV-positive people would be subject to close scrutiny by health officials and
could be detained if their behaviour was determined a threat to public safety.
This legislation would also require the head of every household to report to the
authorities any HIV-positive member of their household. In
addition to this legislation was a proposal to establish “therapeutic communities”
where HIV-positive people were to be sent, under quarantine. This gives you a
sense of the prevailing attitude at the time - those were dark days. So,
when I entered office these proposals awaited us. Had we not paid close attention
to these issues, we could have followed quite a different path. With close assistance
and cooperation from the NGO sector, we were able to prevent these proposed draconian
measures. Upon assuming office, we faced
a whole host of pressing issues regarding trade and investment, land reform, education,
and many more. The economy had been growing at over eight percent for ten years,
and some important actions were required to set the stage for another decade of
growth. As we looked at national development, we could not ignore the AIDS controversy. There
was no consensus on the extent of the problem, so the previous governments had
difficulty agreeing on a solution - let alone implementing it. We made a concerted
effort to analyze the actual situation. We were open and honest about the size
of the problem because this was the only way to mobilize the required response
of a corresponding magnitude. This is a
critical point. Without an open assessment of the current extent of the problem,
we are unable to plan the necessary response. Today, there is far too much deception
and denial about the extent of AIDS in the countries of this region. When we made
public our projections, we became highly unpopular among the tourism industry.
I am happy to say that because of our actions back in 1991, we still have a tourism
industry today. In fact, there are more tourists this year than in 1991, and you
can be sure there are more people with AIDS. If we do not address the problem
early, we are ensuring the early demise of tourism. So, effective action on AIDS
begins with a realistic assessment of the problem and a planned response of corresponding
magnitude. To achieve the goals of our
plan, we needed a comprehensive multi-sectoral effort. To mobilize these sectors
and maintain a focus on this urgent issue, I accepted the Chairmanship of the
National AIDS Committee. I am told that I was the only head of government at the
time to lead a national AIDS effort, but - for me - there was no other way. For
effective action against AIDS, you need both: the highest level of authority and
the broadest base of support. I put the
National Economic and Social Development Planning Board, our national planning
authority, in charge of formulating our National AIDS Action Plan. They included
AIDS in the National Development Plan and ensured smooth cooperation between the
ministries and government agencies in formulating a comprehensive action plan
for the long-term. Our AIDS prevention
efforts included all sectors; it was the only way to mobilize a meaningful response.
We made a point to enlist companies, schools, all government ministries - including
the Army and Police, the NGOs, and the communities themselves. I invited all relevant
groups to join the National AIDS Committee - the Tourism Authority, the Hotel
Association, and the Federation of Thai Industries, the Chamber of Commerce, and
the Thai Bankers’ Association. They all had to play a part, so we gave them a
constructive role. By including them in the process, we could depend upon their
cooperation and assistance. As the Prime
Minister, I demanded that all government ministries play an active role in AIDS
prevention and we granted necessary budget allocations for these activities. AIDS
is much bigger than the Ministry of Health; it is much bigger than government
as a whole. In fact, many other ministries play the most important roles in communicating
to the public and educating people about AIDS. Government
budgets are critical. We could not expect all of the ministries and provinces
to play the active role we were demanding, without giving them the necessary resources.
So, we approved supplemental budgets for AIDS activities. We
mobilized foreign donor funding and maximized in-kind contributions, like radio
and television airtime from the stations and creative media talent from the advertising
companies. Companies even paid for the printing of most of our public information
materials at the time. We did not see HIV
as a health problem; we approached it as a national development issue. We were
facing a potential economic impact equivalent to 20% of our GDP by the year 2000,
not to mention the social devastation an epidemic of such a scale would cause.
Without such a comprehensive effort, our response would have amounted to “throwing
a bucket of water at our burning house”. ‘Without
our own financial commitment, others would not have taken us so seriously. AIDS
is our national development issue, and it requires our own investment. We must
demonstrate our political and financial commitment, before we can expect anyone
else to contribute. My government was not
popular for promoting AIDS prevention so openly at the time, but research now
shows that these efforts were effective in changing behaviour and reducing the
rate of increase in all sexually-transmitted disease infections, including HIV.
It was recently reported in the Lancet that during the years 1991
to 1993, the incidence of sexually-transmitted diseases decreased by 77 percent.
So, action works! In some ways, Thailand
is lucky. However, it is tragic that it took us over three years to mobilize enough
of an education and prevention effort to begin changing people’s behavior - and
many people were infected during this time of denial and cover-up. However, because
we did make a concerted effort to educate people and equip them to prevent becoming
infected, I would like to think we were able to avoid many more infections. Even
now, we must remain vigilant. AIDS has slipped from the consciences of our own
leaders of late. If left unchecked, AIDS could still proliferate and impede Thailand’s
social and economic progress far into the future. The US Bureau of the Census
has estimated that if Thailand is unable to slow the rate of AIDS infections:
the Average Life Expectancy at Birth in the year 2010 will be only 44 years -
a dramatic drop of 30 years from the 74 years we would achieve without AIDS. This
would return our life expectancy back to the same level as in the 1930s. The
same study shows that in that year Thailand will experience a negative annual
population growth rate of minus 0.8 percent, compared to a positive 0.9 percent
growth rate without AIDS. Ten years later, in the year 2020, our population would
be about 62 million rather than the projected 78 million without AIDS - a full
16 million people less, due to AIDS-related deaths and associated demographic
changes. This is the equivalent number of population growth for the next 20 years! Today
in Thailand, we need continued action to educate young people about sexuality
and its consequences. We must demonstrate compassion for those already infected,
and seek to provide them with as much decent care as we can afford. We must constantly
remind ourselves, that action can prevent further tragedy. Ill.
Implications for the Region As we consider
the implications for other countries in the region, I think we must accept several
hard truths. Despite some action and awareness,
the progress made to date is still small. AIDS is prevalent
throughout the region, now more than ever. AIDS will affect ALL
countries in the region - rich and poor. Countries
enjoying rapid economic growth could face serious obstacles to further economic
progress, if AIDS is not addressed as a national development issue now. For those
Asian countries experiencing high economic growth - like Thailand, AIDS will affect
some critical economic sectors such as tourism, labour exports, and foreign direct
investment. Tourists are reluctant to visit
countries where they know that AIDS is not under control. This will be exacerbated
when we consider that the more people there are with AIDS, the more hosts there
are for communicative tuberculosis. This will surely keep tourists away. Similarly,
there will be a greater reluctance from certain countries to accept guest workers
from places known to have a high prevalence of AIDS. After all, AIDS is most prevalent
among the most economically active segment of the population. As
more and more people become sick from the illnesses associated with AIDS, labour
costs will be forced to increase. More health costs will have to be covered and
more people will be removed from the labour supply. With higher labour costs,
foreign companies will be deterred from investing and will seek other places to
locate their business. This will affect us as a region because all Southeast Asian
countries will eventually face a similar fate. In
poorer countries, AIDS threatens to condemn the majority to another generation
of grinding poverty. Such countries will face significant difficulties in stimulating
economic growth if effective AIDS prevention is avoided or postponed until it
becomes too serious. National leadership must address AIDS as an urgent national
development priority and reflect this in government policies, plans and budgets
- not to make donor governments or international investors happy - but, for only
one purpose, to initiate effective action. AIDS
will have the most severe impact in countries where men frequent commercial sex
and where the government is most apathetic about effective prevention. Conversely,
those countries that take early and effective action, can minimize the scale of
the epidemic, and lessen its impact on social and economic progress far into the
future. I would hazard to guess that on
average no less than 20% of GDP is at stake for each and every country in the
region, if we do not achieve more results in the next twelve months. Of course,
we stand to lose much more, when we consider the pain and suffering, social tension,
and other unquantifiable implications. AIDS represents such a significant threat
to social and economic progress in the region, that the Asian Development Bank
should be offering substantial grants to countries that successfully initiate
effective AIDS action plans. I hope they are represented here today to hear this.
They should reward the countries that take AIDS seriously and achieve significant
reductions in the potential impact of the epidemic. This should serve as an incentive
to the governments in the region, and send a strong message to the heads of government,
finance ministers and business leaders. It could be the best investment the ADB
will ever make. Any other economic or trade
issue with the potential to affect 20% of GDP -such as AFTA or the rise of the
Yen - would have its own summit. Why should AIDS be different? Only because the
leaders do not understand that AIDS is an economic issue. IV.
Conclusion and Call to Action We have
learned many important lessons over the years. I do not think we need to spend
much more time searching for answers. I think we must focus on action - time is
running out for many in the region. Our opportunity for early action has passed
us by. We face a momentous and growing task. We must re-think our approach. AIDS
policy-making in the region is still medically oriented. Leaders still do not
realize how seriously their societies will be affected if AIDS is not addressed
properly. We must get the leaders more involved. Many
resources have been devoted to the preparation of this conference. It behooves
us to brief the leaders of this region about the important lessons that were discussed
in these halls over the past week. We need not do any further research for this
purpose; we should summarize our current findings and propose a prescription for
success. We must sell solutions. We should get the heads of government from around
the region into the same room to gain their unqualified commitment and endorsement
of national AIDS action plans by the middle of next year. We must focus on results. The
next AIDS conference should be for parliamentarians and business leaders. These
are the people that initiate and sustain action. Most of the answers to the problems
of AIDS are already known. We must communicate these to the people who control
the wheels of power and the purse. Time
has run out on millions in the region. We have the answers. We need solutions.
Let us focus on action. Let us return to our countries and enlist the meaningful
involvement of our leaders, it is the only way. |
| The
Future of Asia’s Past – Bringing Conservation
Philosophy into Practice by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman
of the Council of Trustees, Thailand Environment Institute Chairman,
Thailand Business Council for Sustainable Development Chiang Mai Orchid
Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand January 11, 1995 Mr.
Nicholas Platt, President of the Asia Society Dr. Vishakha
Desai, Vice President of the Asia Society Mr. Athueck Asvanund,
President of the Siam Society Distinguished guests Ladies
and Gentlemen It is a great pleasure for
me personally to be among so distinguished a gathering, at such an important conference.
My sincere thanks go to the Siam Society, the Asia Society and the Getty Conservation
Institute for organising this momentous gathering. The
theme of this conference evokes excitement and vision. Some of you here may recall
a piece of conversation in “Alice in Wonderland”, by Lewis Carroll.
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” asked
Alice. “That depends a good deal on where you want to go,” said the Cat. “I
don’t much care where,” said Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter which way you
go”, said the Cat. I have
the distinct impression that the organisers of the present conference not only
do know which way they want to go but also exactly where they want to lead us
to! The timing of this conference is indeed
opportune. Last month’s World Heritage Conference in Phuket has re-focussed attention
on Asia’s rich cultural heritage and natural splendour, and in doing so has highlighted
the very real threats; posed by environmental degradation, uncontrolled development
and, in particular, tourism. The preservation
of Asia’s heritage, as called for by the international community, can no longer
be neglected and must be given due priority commensurate with it’s significance. At
the same time, Asia has reached the point where responsibility for the conservation
of cultural heritage now lies squarely with national governments. In most countries
of Asia, the science of conservation has now advanced to the stage where national
institutions and experts can increasingly take on the task of architectural conservation
themselves. Heritage conservation is therefore,
moving out of what may be termed the “colonial phase” – where academics and concerned
institutions, mostly in developed countries, took the lead in preserving historic
monuments and artifacts in developing countries – and into a new “nationalist
phase” – where national experts are now in the vanguard of protecting their own
cultural heritage. It is thus significant
that we are meeting in Chiang Mai, the seat of Lanna culture, for here the challenges
and pitfalls facing heritage conservation in Asia are only too apparent. Chiang
Mai is the most important city in Northern Thailand. It was founded almost seven
hundred years ago, during the reign of King Mengrai, the ruler of the Lanna Kingdom.
According to old Northern scripts, King Mengrai chose the location and designed
the square-shaped walled city himself. From
its inception until the Burmese conquest in the sixteenth century, Chiang Mai
flourished as the capital of the Lanna Kingdom and the political, commercial and
cultural centre of the North. Following
liberation and revival in the eighteenth century, the city resumed its role as
the principal city of the North and continues to prosper today. Chiang
Mai will celebrate it’s seventh centennial next year. More than any other town
in Thailand, the city has been fighting to preserve the past and it’s architectural
heritage. And nowhere is this glorious past more evident than in the city’s many
temples; built-in the typical Lanna style with multiple-tiered roofs, gracefully-curved
eaves and a portico. But Chiang Mai has
also lost much of its appeal in recent years. The present-day city thrives on
the site of its origin. Thus giving rise to the universal problem of conservation
versus development. The pace of commercialisation
in Chiang Mai has outstripped the best efforts of town planners, resulting in
unsightly high-rise condominiums and office buildings. The traffic situation is
following the same vicious path as that of Bangkok, with consequent noise, air
and visual pollution; and in addition, rubbish disposal remains a perennial problem
for City Hall. It is obvious too that Chiang
Mai’s precious cultural heritage is suffering under the strain of modern progress. Hundreds
of historic sites still languish in neglect, encroached upon by squatters or hemmed
in and hidden by new buildings. Of those sites which are registered with the Fine
Arts Department, many receive only marginal maintenance, there being too few personnel
and funds allocated to undertake necessary repairs and restorations. The
remains of the ancient city walls, once a proud symbol of Chiang Mai’s strength
and purpose, have suffered long periods of neglect alternating with periods of
hasty reinforcement. And yet Chiang Mai
is dependent upon the very development that is threatening it’s heritage, if it
is to develop as a modern regional centre – part of the “economic quadrangle”
being enthusiastically promoted by Thailand, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Southern China. What
then can be done to preserve the city’s cultural legacy, while at the same time
allowing the benefits of development to flow freely? Simply
put, the aim should be to integrate development with preservation. The term sustainable
development, which has come to define modern environmental thought, can be used
in this context to describe the integration of cultural with commercial demands. Such
development is already appearing; all construction within the city walls is now
required to uphold the local architectural identity, and the building of condominiums
within the old city, or construction of tall buildings in the vicinity of temples,
is strictly under control. Furthermore,
the people of Chiang Mai have added their voice to the conservation crusade. Public
campaigns have been instrumental in preserving the rich cultural heritage of Northern
Thailand. Strong opposition to the construction of a cable car up Doi Suthep resulted
in the project being dropped, and public support for the control of high-rise
buildings within the old city led to the drafting of the regulations I have already
mentioned. These campaigns demonstrate the depth of community feeling which exists
here, and the importance of public participation in the development process. Chiang
Mai is, in effect, a living ancient city, and has to live with all the problems
associated with balancing the past and future. However, the solutions to the city’s
dilemmas demonstrate that conservation must be recognised as an essential part
of development. It is important that the elements of cultural heritage, such as
historic buildings and sites, should be counted as assets, not as burdens or obstacles
to development. Historical and cultural
traditions are an important, enriching dimension of community identity. Active
community participation is therefore essential to the process of sustainable development. It
is important, however, that the community contributes fully to the process of
conservation, by which I mean there must be free access to any relevant conservation
and development plans, Dissemination of this information at all public levels
is essential to success. Furthermore, education,
both inside and outside the classroom, must play a strong role in creating understanding
and pride in our cultural heritage. It is time that conservation, for both natural
and cultural environments, was taught on equal terms with other professional skills. It
is undeniable, however, that the preservation of our cultural heritage is expensive,
and will become more so in the future as the pressures of development and tourism
mount on historic sites. Yet despite the
costs of cultural conservation, it is no longer realistic to expect international
agencies or foreign bilateral donors to continue to pay for this effort in the
booming economies of Asia. Now is the time for the governments of Asia to take
this responsibility upon their own shoulders. Ways
and means of providing for the expense of conservation in the national budgets
must be identified. There is a need to rectify the current imbalance which exists
between the promotion of tourism and the conservation of historic sites, for example.
Too often, a tourism-orientated policy prevails, and sites are preserved only
as tourist attractions. Ideally, such a
situation should be reversed so that historic monuments are preserved first and
foremost for their cultural values, and not merely as showpieces to attract more
tourists. It would be dangerous to establish too close a link between tourist
revenues and conservation, which might lead to a risk of losing cultural and artistic
independence. Perhaps we should look to
our common heritage to provide us with the answers we are seeking. Asia is a region
of immense antiquity, with a correspondingly rich and turbulent history. Many
countries in the region have inter-acted in the past, and benefited from cross-fertilisation
in arts, religion and commerce. Today,
however, we are unable to appreciate the collective effort needed to preserve
what is left of our past. This is due in part to the concern of each country with
its internal affairs – economic growth and development particularly. It is also
due to the current emphasis placed on the natural environment, rather than the
cultural environment. As an issue, conservation
of the natural environment has taken centre stage in the last decade, culminating
in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Global attention is now being given
to issues such as biological diversity, climate change and protection of the Earth’s
ozone layer. The level of funding, the number of qualified professionals and the
degree of public awareness are higher for the protection of tropical forests,
or endangered species, than they are for restoring temples and ancient cities. This
imbalance stems in part from an imperfect understanding of our environment, and
what it encompasses. Humans are intimately associated with not only their natural
environment, but also their cultural environment. Together these two elements
form the millieu within which our societies evolved and exist today. Because
of this disunion between culture and nature, development and conservation plans
for our natural and cultural environments have progressed in different directions;
they are no longer mutually sustaining or even inter-related. But
in fact they should be. To protect the environment, man must be able to live in
harmony with nature – which means being able to cultivate its bounty without destroying
its sources. Yet, aside from physical well being, man also yearns for spiritual
enrichment, which is where culture plays such an important role. Our cultural
heritage provides us with spiritual fulfilment, which alone distinguishes man
from other species on Earth. The time has
come for us to recognise the relationship between man, nature and culture, and
to formulate appropriate strategies to conserve our environmental legacy. We must
be serious about protecting our heritage at all costs. I
would like to call for concerted action on three main fronts; Firstly,
the governments of Asia should start working together to restore cultural heritage
with both national and regional significance. The
restoration of ancient cities such as Luang Prabang and Ayutthaya will have a
significance far beyond national boundaries. Similarly, the preservation of Angkor
Wat will ensure that the Khmer heritage is saved not only for the people of Southeast
Asia but also for the rest of the world. Surely there is now enough wealth and
expertise in the region for us to take a leading role in preserving our regional
heritage. Governments also have an important
role to play as guardians of our cultural heritage. Throughout history, one of
the most insidious threats faced by sites and monuments has been looting, dismantling
and illegal destruction. National governments should now ensure that regulations
prohibiting the encroachment on, or destruction and looting of, cultural property
are in place and properly enforced. It
is now incumbent upon governments to take strong action in protecting the national
heritage. However, protection must go hand-in-hand with development programs designed
to benefit those communities living on or near historic sites. Local populations
will have to play their part in safeguarding our national heritage, but they will
only be able to do this if they have a fair share of the national resources. Secondly,
regional collaboration should not only be limited to government to government
efforts. Aside from such initiatives, I would like to call for business to contribute
to the preservation of our cultural heritage. The
private sector in Asia has been the prime mover in the economic development of
the region, and now is the time for business to put its considerable experience
and financial resources behind efforts to save our cultural legacy. Here in Thailand
for example, the Thailand Business Council for Sustainable Development and the
Thailand Environment institute are currently discussing ways of supporting efforts
to restore our ancient capital city of Ayutthaya. I believe the time is now opportune
for more of such private-public partnerships in Asian heritage protection, and
would urge businesses to explore options for taking action on heritage conservation. Finally,
the time has come for non-governmental organisations to take up a more prominent
and effective role in the preservation of our cultural heritage. As
an example of an NGO playing a constructive and commendable role in protecting
the nation’s cultural legacy, I would like to cite the Siam Society, co-organiser
of this conference. The Siam Society has an almost century-long tradition of fostering
scholars and scholarship, both Thai and foreign. The Society has played an important
role in not only the study and conservation of our region’s cultural heritage,
but also in the promotion of this heritage to the wider public. Indeed,
next month the Society will initiate it’s Historic House series, at the Bangkhunphrom
Palace Seventh-Cycle Celebration. This series hopes to channel corporate sponsorship
into the restoration of historic buildings in the Kingdom. It
is obvious however, that worthy organisations such as the Siam Society can only
do so much with the limited funds and personnel they have at their disposal. It
is for this reason that countries may wish to explore the establishment of an
independent national “heritage trust”, along the lines of the British National
Trust. This Trust manages public properties all over Britain, with over two million
members supporting its work. The establishment of such an organisation would give
both financial and political independence to the conservation effort, as well
as raise the profile of heritage conservation amongst the wider public. Asia
has now emerged as an International economic centre. As Asians, we are known for
our hard-working ethic, and our striving to improve the standard of living for
the billions of people living within our boundaries. Let
us therefore be unsparing in our efforts to ensure that our cultural legacy remains
secure and undiminished, both for this and future generations. For if we can accomplish
the union of conservation with development, and truly attain sustainable development,
then we may look forward to the glories of our future, whilst benefiting from
the richness of our past. Let me end my
address by quoting from Mr. Abba Eban, former Foreign Minister of Israel. He said,
“history teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted
all other alternatives.” Perhaps now is the time to behave wisely together.
|
| Asian Prospects toward
the 21st Century By Anand Panyarachun Former
Prime Minister of Thailand Chairman of Saha-Union Public Co. Ltd. at
the International Conference sponsored by the Association for Promotion
of International Cooperation and the Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo November
8, 1994 Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, Introduction
The year 2000 will mark a rare historical occasion. It will
usher in not only a new century but also a new millennium. Some, who take ancient
prophecies, literally predict that this period will be accompanied by cataclysmic
upheavals. I can see some empirical basis
for the millenarians’ fear. While the Cold War may be over, a wide variety of
international challenges still loom large before us: nuclear proliferation; ethnic
cleanings; competing claims of territorial sovereignty; East-West differences
over democracy and human rights, trade, environment and population. The world
is not in danger of going up with a bang, but we must ensure that neither will
it end with a whimper. Meanwhile, the drama
on the world stage is changing. If the end of the Cold War taught us anything,
it was that fundamental change could be swift and unexpected. While the United
States has emerged as the world’s sole super-power and Japan continues to play
an influential role, attention is increasingly focused on China as a new pole
of power and engine for growth in the world’s most economically dynamic region.
Further afield is a host of other medium-range regional countries in Southeast
and South Asia--particularly India - which are assuming an increasingly significant
role in regional and global affairs. These emergent players are actively forging
cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels with the various regional
players. The Asia Pacific region’s booming
economy has prompted widespread optimism about its future. Everywhere, the East
Asian “model” of development is being studied and admired. Intra-regional trade
has far outstripped that of other regions. Economic inter-dependence and cooperation
are at unprecedented levels. So, what does
the future hold for the Asia Pacific region? Regional
Economic Institution-Building The
key trend is a renewed interest in regional cooperation through institution building.
This is an apt response to the Cold War’s end, particularly for a region that
has for too long lacked a sense of common identity. Throughout most of its history,
the Asia Pacific has been an odd cluster of different economic and political systems.
For many countries in the region, colonialism has contributed to the various malefactors,
which have fed on historical distrust between regional players. The fact that
regional countries now show willingness to work together in forging new modes
of cooperation is by far the most promising development for continued peace and
prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. The
areas for such cooperation are many. So far, the spotlight has been on economic
cooperation. ASEAN is finally making good on its economic promise. This dynamic
market, with 340 million people and a combined GNP of 430 billion US dollars,
is taking steps that will ensure its vibrancy well into the next century. The
members have recently agreed to move forward the timetable for trade liberalization
under the ASEAN Free Trade Area by five years, to the year 2003. Furthermore,
the members of ASEAN have agreed to eventually include agricultural products,
which have initially been excluded from the tariff reduction scheme. These advantages
of these major steps are two-fold: it will boost intra-ASEAN trade and also make
investment in the region even more attractive. With the passage of the Uruguay
Round, this move should help ASEAN to maintain its competitive edge and stay ahead
of the game. This trend is likely, to find
echoes throughout the greater Asia Pacific area. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) is quickly gathering momentum, shedding its modest origins to become a
potent force for free trade and open regionalism. Next week, the eighteen member
countries of APEC will assemble in Indonesia to define the goals of more liberalized
trade and investments with proposed timeframes ranging from 2010 to 2020. This
will be a further complementary step in the direction towards freer and fairer
trade in the wake of the conclusion of Uruguay Round of GATT and the pending establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The APEC leaders will also have occasion
to discuss other areas of strengthening the APEC cooperation process including
education, human resources development, technology transfer and private enterprises
participation in regional cooperation. Nevertheless,
some countries are concerned about being rushed into trade liberalization. These
concerns are not entirely unjustified. The reallocation of labour into more economically
productive areas, the urbanization that accompanies industrialization - these
pose socio-cultural challenges that certainly need to be taken into account by
each country. But they should not overlook the powerful argument for economic
liberalization. As the risk of being left behind become apparent, governments
will have little choice but to open up their economies. Therefore, the sooner
each APEC member shifts away from protecting inefficient sectors and concentrates
on developing its areas of comparative advantage, the better. This
is, of course, more easily said than done. Inefficient producers often wield considerable
political clout. Governments are concerned about social dislocations and environmental
deterioration resulting from rapid shifts in economic activity. Since conditions
in each country differ, each sub-region in the expansive Asia Pacific area should
be encouraged to work out for itself the most appropriate pace and timeframe to
adjust for, the side-effects of economic liberalization by taking into account
their varying stages of preparedness and development. Regional
Security Cooperation Sustained
economic development requires a stable security climate, and this is another area
that will benefit from regional institution building. During the Cold War, the
United States security umbrella allowed the East Asian NIEs to prosper. At present,
however, Washington’s foreign policy priorities, including its security role in
the region, are in flux. Domestic pre-occupations and unresolved debates over
America’s vital interests will tend to constrain U.S. involvement abroad. While
Washington is likely to “remain engaged” in Asia, the relative scope and nature
of that engagement will probably be more limited than before out of their own
agenda. It, thus, falls to the Asia Pacific countries to assume greater responsibility
for regional security. In response to this
trend, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was inaugurated earlier this year in Bangkok.
For the first time, all ten countries of Southeast Asia were gathered under one
roof. For the first time, ASEAN and its dialogue partners from the West and in
the region resolved to engage in regular dialogue as part of a process called
preventive diplomacy. To build trust and confidence over the longer term, such
ideas as the establishment of a regional peacekeeping centre and the exchange
of military information may be tabled in the future. The
“proof of the pudding”, of course, will be whether the ARF can contribute directly
to reducing regional tensions. The three biggest potential threats to regional
security today are North Korea, Cambodia and the South China Sea. Some may wish
to portray them, as bilateral or domestic disputes, but their impact on the region,
should conflict break out, will not be confined to the disputing parties. Should
the Korean peninsula be de-stabilized, Japan and China will be the first to be
affected. Should the terrorist and brutal tactics of the Khmer Rouge escalate
into large-scale violence, neighbouring. Thailand will once again bear the brunt,
a massive influx of refugees. Should force be used over the Spratlys, vital sea-lanes
will be disrupted, and regional economies will suffer. At this early stage of
its existence, it is understandable if the ARF seeks to avoid controversy. If
it can play a constructive role in these disputes, the initiation by fire will
quickly establish its credibility. Other
Opportunities for Cooperation Other
areas can also benefit from similar cooperative efforts in the region. As I suggested
earlier, rapid economic growth can produce adverse social and environmental side
effects, and these often transcend national borders. In the early enthusiasm for
free-wheeling capitalism, these side effects tend to be ignored or overlooked.
But growth cannot be sustained over the long term if they are left un-addressed.
The fact that the side effects have trans-national consequences, make them an
appropriate subject for regional cooperation. Another
reason for taking a regional approach to these developmental side effects is their
multidimensionality. For one, as industrialization in the region quickens, environmental
problems are likely to exacerbate. Inadequate infrastructure and rampant pollution
are already lowering the quality of life in many major Asian cities. Rural areas
are no less prone to environmental damage. The conversion of farmland to industrial
use, overfishing, soil erosion, flooding and erratic rainfall patterns caused
by de-forestation may turn some previously self-sufficient countries into net
food importers. Indeed, unbridled population growth would further compound the
problem of the already under-nourished populace. Add to this global warming, which
will raise sea levels and flood rich delta areas, and the environment becomes
an issue we can no longer afford to keep on the back-burner. The Climate Institute,
in a report commissioned by the Asian Development Bank, estimates conservatively
that climatic changes in the next 80 years may create over 20 million “environmental
refugees” in South and Southeast Asia, as well as social and economic disruptions
on an unparalleled scale. Taking steps to protect the environment now is more
sensible and feasible, than attempting to undo the damage later. Still,
it is not immediately clear how best to balance the region’s developmental and
environmental needs. Since global warming affects everyone, East and West alike
have an interest in preserving the last remaining strands of tropical rainforest
in the world. But the argument that developing countries should show their development
in order to preserve the environment is not convincing. The comparative advantage
of many Asian countries lies in non or semi-renewable natural resources such as
timber, and to restrain them from exploiting these resources would be patently
unfair. Any attempt to link trade, and environmental protection, particularly
if it is seen as an attempt to set up non-tariff barrier, is likely to be staunchly
resisted by the developing countries. The
growth-versus-environment dilemma might be usefully taken up within an institutional
setting such as APEC, for here is an issue directly related to economic development.
Furthermore, it involves allocative choices between more and less developed countries
in the region. The answer may lie in some form of compensation of “debt-for-nature
swap” in which a developing country’s debt is effectively reduced in exchange
for its commitment to protect its rainforests. Such swaps have already been negotiated
in several countries, including Costa Rica, Ecuador and the Philippines. While
this sort of arrangement may provide only a partial solution, its main advantage
is that it creates no losers, only winners. A region-wide dialogue would help
identify the key issues and suggest solutions satisfactory to all. Culture:
Clash or Convergence? A challenge
that lends itself less easily to institutional solutions is the simmering debate
over Western versus Eastern values. I am pleased that the organizers of this event
have included, besides the usual politics and economics, the issue of culture.
Already, disagreements between East and West over democracy, human rights, labour
rights, reproductive rights and -- dare I say it? -- even caning rights, appear
to validate Professor Huntington’s prediction of an impending “clash of civilizations.” I
believe the clash will eventually be avoided. The reason that its possibility
looms so large now, is a function of our continuing search for a post-Cold War
order. With communism all but dead, the United States, the only super-power left,
is returning to “core American values” to guide its foreign policy. This may be
no more than an effort to establish some measure of predictability in an increasingly
chaotic world. Despite its good intentions, however, Washington is still groping
for ways to win friends and influence governments, without alienating them. I
believe the learning curve will be overcome before too long. Washington may appear
aggressive and abrasive in promoting its democracy and human rights agenda, but
the limits of a heavy-handed approach are already becoming apparent. Even
as the United States begins to appreciate the advantages of friendly persuasion,
Asia will come around on its own. As we have seen in South Korea, Taiwan, and
Thailand, prosperity creates a demand for democracy, and at a certain juncture
in the national development process, citizens will long for greater political
freedom and civil liberties. Moreover, the free flow of information, so necessary
to a vibrant economy, is also the harbinger of new ideas. Satellite dishes and
other technologies are already helping spread the gospel of Western-style consumerism.
There is no reason to suppose that the idea of free choice in politics will not
make similar in-roads in Asian societies, the efforts of governments notwithstanding. The
final point that I wish to add regarding the so-called “clash of civilization”
or the clash between Western and Eastern values is that, in fact, throughout history
we have witnessed the conflicts of ideas and values arising out of conflicts between
forces of extremism on both ends. Coming from a country like Thailand, that adheres
to the precepts of Buddhism, which espouses moderation and the middle way, I earnestly
hope that the forces of moderation will succeed in overcoming those who profess
extremism of all kinds. It may be that both Western and Eastern civilizations
are flexible enough to accommodate one another. I like to think that, rather than
a clash of civilizations, what will eventually come about is a convergence of
cultures instead. Role of the Regional
Powers For all these region-wide
trends, the future of the Asia Pacific will still be tied to the fortunes of key
regional powers. The greatest uncertainty surrounds the future of China. Even
a change in the Chinese leadership is unlikely to affect the direction of economic
policy. However, China’s double-digit growth has been accompanied by corruption,
inflation, loss of job security and a widening income gap between urban and rural
areas. A large “floating population” of unemployed peasants, drugs, prostitution
and crime are also some of the social side effects of rapid economic reform. As
in any other country, how the leadership deals with these issues, will determine
the extent to which growth translates into development. The
problem that is particular to China, meanwhile, will be the eventual passing of
the torch to a new generation of leaders. When the last of the so-called “immortals”
- such as the octogenarian Deng Xiaoping - are gone, the new Communist Party leadership
will find it difficult to command the same deference as the Long March veterans.
The Party’s tight political control will be increasingly challenged by the children
of Tiananmen and a rising middle class. Dissent will become increasingly hard
to suppress. China is not the closed society it was during the Cultural Revolution
or the Great Leap Forward. Its economy is intimately linked to the outside world,
and any significant political or social unrest will damage that link. Maintaining
social order, instituting market reforms while making an orderly political transition
will, therefore, pose a tremendous challenge to the country’s leadership. Japan,
meanwhile, is free from the prospect of any such major upheaval. Continuing present
trends, it should become an increasingly important player in world politics. A
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council is within sight. Its repeated
expressions of remorse for its World War II role, as well as its categorical rejection
of deploying combat forces, provide assurances that Japan poses a threat neither
to Asia nor the world. These are all passive actions. Japan needs to demonstrate
its readiness to engage itself more actively and objectively in the deliberations
and decision-making process of the world organization. The
only question will be how Japan can best fulfill its new responsibilities - for
this will be a Japan, no longer dependent on the United States, but a regional
and world power in its own right. As such, it will be expected to play a leading
role in ensuring that the region’s economic development stays on the right track.
Japan has to come to a hard political decision, and by opening up its market,
it will have a vital role in the promotion of free trade and economic development
in the region. The yen is likely to continue rising and motivate Japanese industries
to relocate to Southeast Asia - and elsewhere - in ever greater numbers, facilitating
transfers of technology and managerial skills. In terms of government policy,
while official development assistance will continue to play a major role in the
region’s development, liberalization of trade and investment rules are no less
important and should be given greater emphasis. Apart
from the United States and Japan, the traditional Asia Pacific key players, as
well as emergent China, the second-tier NIEs in ASEAN will join the first-tier,
and a new second-tier will follow in turn. Among them will probably be Vietnam,
which will face a dilemma similar to China’s. Despite trying to balance political
control and economic freedom, it should still manage to grow rapidly, thanks to
its bountiful natural resources and industrious workforce. In addition, Australia
and New Zealand will inevitably identify themselves more closely with the East
Asian scene. Some countries from outside
the region are also likely to play a bigger role. India, for example, has of late
demonstrated interest in forging closer ties with the Asia Pacific. Given its
sheer size and the success of its ongoing economic reforms, India may well become
a formidable economic power in the first decade of the 21st century. Conclusion I
have tried to outline the major trends that I think will affect the future of
our region: economic and political institution-building, environmental changes,
cultural convergence, and developments in key regional countries. Assuming that
all things go well, and there are no major interruptions in the economic and political
developments in East Asia, what scenario can we then anticipate in the first decades
of the 21st century? East Asia,
including Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the ASEAN countries, will
have together an economy larger than that of either NAFTA or the European Union. East
Asia is set to occupy the central role in the world economy. According to the
survey of the global economy in the recent issue of the Economist, by the year
2020, there will be seven Asian, namely, China, Japan, India, Indonesia, South
Korea, Thailand and Taiwan in the ten largest economies. By
2030, China will account for half of East Asia’s GDP or roughly equal to the GDP
of North America. The centre of gravity
of the world economy will then have shifted to East Asia, but America will continue
to retain its lead in basic scientific research, advanced technologies, software
and sophisticated financial services. East
Asian countries will be more inter-dependent as their economies forge stronger
linkages in trade and investments among themselves and become closely integrated
with global economy, thus providing incentives for the maintenance of peace and
prosperity. China, the United States of
America and Japan will continue to have dominant roles in the organization of
peace and stability in East Asia, including the North Korean issue. Pragmatic
diplomacy must replace self-righteousness; dialogue and negotiation must prevail
over confrontation. A strategic partnership of these three powers working in tandem
with the rest of East Asia would bode well for the long-term future. Given
the pace of change in today’s world, I would not vouch for the accuracy of my
assessment with the confidence of a Nostradamus devotee. As we slip into an uncertain
future, though, we carry with us a faith no less strongly held than that of the
millenarians. It is a different kind of faith. This faith, which allows us hope
rather than despair, is faith in humanity. While other parts of the world are
torn by strife, we in the Asia Pacific region have begun to build faith in one
another. With a little luck, the coming millennium may yet prove to be everything
we hope and strive for. Thank you. |
| Liberalisation
of the Thai Economy by Mr. Anand Panyarachun for
the 4th Asian Management Awards Bangkok, September 22, 1994 Good
evening. Your Excellencies of the diplomatic corps, distinguished members the
Thai government, business leaders and industrialists, observers and friends from
the media, faculty and students, ladies and gentlemen: On
behalf of our gracious host, Viroj Phutrakul, and the Asian Institute of
Management, thank you for joining us this evening as we honor the recipients
of the 4th Annual Asian Management Awards in Thailand. As
I watched the presentation this evening, I must say that I was just as moved as
some of the recipients - and I felt as proud. In fact I think that all of us can
be proud of what Thailand and its private sector-government partnership has achieved. You,
tonight’s recipients, are outstanding symbols of what has happened in Thailand
of how significant economic growth can be achieved in an environment where democratic
institutions and practices prevail. Our
double-digit GDP growth in the late 80’s and our projected 8% - plus growth
this year and next is enviable. Inflation in controlled at well under 5% (I hope),
we have attracted over ten billion dollars of foreign investment over the last
few years, our foreign exchange reserves at $25 billion have never been higher,
our per capital income of $2300 is very respectable and is rising and unemployment
is at a low 3.3%. Today, however, we face
a very different challenge. (The prevailing political and socio-economic
forces of the 1980’s have all changed. The disintegration of
the former-Soviet block has opened up previously controlled-economies.
New countries and republics are being formed and admitted
to the United Nations at an ever-increasing rate. It is in this light of
change, that we must forge our new vision and policies to lead us
into the 1990’s and beyond. I know
that many experts will speak of how we need to prepare for changes in
technology that will affect the way we live and the way we compete. Others
say we must be ready for how the newly-emerging economies - China, India,
and Indochina - will at the same time be our competitors
for foreign investment and markets for our products. Within
this regional context, other pundits are convinced that Thailand’s real
priorities should be to resolve infrastructure bottlenecks, alleviate rural poverty
and create a more equitable distribution of wealth. All
of these pressing concerns are important, but today we address an issue of equal
importance, one if not handled appropriately may relinquish Thailand’s competitive
edge in the newly-forming global economy. From
being a lackluster resource-based under-developed economy in the 1970’s,
we became one of Asia’s emerging dragons in the last 10 years or so. How?
Economists, businessmen and politicians-the pundits, I spoke of
- are generally agreed that our growth and success were due to both sound
macro-economic policies coupled with prudent economic liberisation. In
the 1980’s, we started to liberalise our economy with the
enactment of an export-promotion policy. At the same time, the Board
of Investment, aggressively encouraged and fostered increased foreign direct
investment, triggering a boom in foreign investment in manufactured
products. As a result, exports surged in the late 80’s. Since
the late 1980’s, more liberal policies on capital flows, privatisation
and rules on foreign investment have led to an additional influx in
direct foreign investment. This has led to further industrialisation,
growth and technology transfer for Thailand.
To drive growth into the 90’s however, Thailand must not only continue
our current efforts at liberalisation but also move swiftly
to become one of the most open trading nations in Asia. Even as we continue
to reduce tariffs, gradually liberalise our financial services sector
via BIBF, and relax rules on foreign ownership, we must do more. Competition
amongst companies and multi-national corporations is fierce. A recent
issue of the Harvard Business Review says, I quote: “Competition
is now a ‘war of movement’ in which success depends on anticipation
of market trends and quick response to changing customer needs.
Successful competitors move quickly in and out of products, markets,
and sometimes even entire businesses - a process more akin to
an interactive video game than to chess. In such an environment, the essence
of strategy is not the structure of a company’s products and markets,
but the dynamics of its behavior.” Likewise,
competition amongst nations will be equally fierce. Nobel Laureate
Milton Freedman, recently stated that: “It is today possible,
to an extent greater than any time in the world’s history, for a
company to locate anywhere, to use resources from anywhere and to
produce a product that can be sold anywhere.” What
does all of this mean for Thailand? We can only compete effectively in the
global economy if our private sector is linked to the international
community. Our success came at a time when
we were a relatively liberal economy compared to those around us:
China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Soviet Union
were more protected than we were. The success stones are clear:
the open ports of Singapore and Hong Kong thrived while the
controlled-economies of Burma and Vietnam stalled. But
today we are in danger of becoming more protected than our neighbours.
If this happens the situation will be reversed: we will be hurt by our
protectionism, and they will benefit from their liberalism. And
Thailand cannot afford to let this happen. The
AFTA Monitor has made a very succinct case for free trade. It says,
and again I quote: “History
has shown that protectionism hurts economic growth and condemns
consumers to higher prices and lower quality. It also created unemployment,
lower wages and lower productivity. Protectionism leads to economic stagnation
- so much so that the world economy all but collapsed during the
depression of the 1930’s, a markedly protectionist period. It was thought
that world leaders had learned their lessons from that experience,
lessons like: Cutting or eliminating tariffs
exposes domestic industries to foreign competition. This competition
forces both domestic and foreign industries to become more
efficient, either by themselves, or by forming alliances. The result: consumers,
have a wider range of goods and services to choose from and
better-quality goods at low prices. Those industries no longer able to
compete invariably shift their resources to areas in which they
can compete, i.e., where the resources are used more efficiently. This
leads to higher productivity of a country’s factors of production
and therefore to better living standards. As
an added benefit, more jobs and higher incomes result from the entry
of foreign competition and technology. Workers are trained quickly
and become more productive. Domestic industry also flourishes
as new technology is acquired and new markets are opened. Every economy
that has tried freer trade has obtained these results”. End of quote. The
ones who will be hurt the most by protectionist policies will be the protected
industries themselves. Granting indefinite protection assures that our
local business or industry will become uncompetitive in the long-run in the
quickly converging world economy. We must instead insure that as we liberalise
and move to a true “free trade” area, that our local industries
be equipped to complete globally. Consider
what protectionism alone will do to Thailand and its workers. First,
we penalise our country because being protected, we are making inefficient use
of our resources, and Thailand must strive to use its resources wisely. Second,
we must realise that for every industry that is protected, another industry is
penalised. If cement is protected, that construction industry will suffer from
high prices and lower quality. If we protect textiles or leather, then we penalise
clothes and leather goods manufacturers. Third,
we penalise consumers - our fellow Thai’s - who have to pay higher prices for
lower-quality goods. Because if goods were priced lower and were of better quality,
the industry would not need protection from foreign competition. Just
as there are well-dressed fools, there are well-dressed foolish ideas, and protectionism
is one of them. Protectionism only benefits a very small group - and only for
a short period. Meanwhile millions suffer. Government
alone cannot move to liberalise the economy. Businessmen who propose protectionist
measures must recognise the implications of indefinite protection. In the long-term,
they will be uncompetitive. They must now take the first step to prepare for a
more open economy. As the government moves to liberalise our economy and welcome
not only foreign direct investment geared towards export but foreign competition
in the local markets as well, our local industries must be ready to compete with
tough foreign challenges. This is the first and most crucial thing for us to do
as we drop our protectionist shell. I wish
to call on the rest of us in the private sector and government to be on the lookout
for and expose those who would propose and those who would implement protectionist
measures. They say that a person who sees
the advantage but not the disadvantage is like a fish who sees the bait but not
the hook. I hasten to assure you that I am no such fish. Instead of looking only
at trade-offs and sacrifices, we must seek out mutually beneficial endeavors,
those in which both parties can share in a “win-win” scenario. Let me give you
a few examples. Those in manufacturing have discovered with economics of scale
we can achieve higher quality at lower prices. So also we now know that the ideals
of democracy can be well served even with a strong central government. Well, it’s
time we believed that economic liberalisation can help us achieve a much better
standard of living for our people without sacrificing nation interest or national
pride. Just like the trophies you have
received today with their Pillars of Hercules and the saying ‘Plus Ultra’, or
‘everything lies beyond’, Thailand must go forth into the next century standing
on the twin pillars of sound macro-economic management and economic liberalisation.
The time for discussion is past. It is now time to act. And if we do, everything
lies beyond for Thailand and we can move forward with confidence. I
congratulate all of the recipients of tonight’s Management Awards. You are amongst
not only Thailand’s best, but Asia’s best. I ask that all of us here this evening,
help our nation to remain one of Asia’s best as we move to liberalise our economy. Thank
you. (CJ note: Quotes from current sources
e.g. AFTA Monitor may not be appropriate given Khun Anand’s standing.) |
| ASIA:
Back to Basics? Remarks by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman
of Conference Shangri-La Hotel, Bangkok July 29-30, 1999
Prime Minister Chuan, Ladies and Gentlemen, Over
the next two days, the conference will provide us with an important opportunity
to look at the economic crisis affecting Asia. It will give us the chance to think
through some of the difficult issues facing us as a consequence of the crisis,
and, just as important, how we can avoid a recurrence of such a crisis. The
premise of the conference is that we need to look for answers by reconsidering
the basics of economic development: the effective use of land, human resources
and capital. With challenging speakers and discussants from government, academia
and the private sector, this conference gives us an opportunity to reason together
without defensiveness about the past. In
a crisis of this magnitude, everyone has made his share of mistakes: governments,
banks, companies, and multi-lateral institutions. The challenge is to draw the
right lessons from those mistakes, so the terrible pain of this crisis can be
the starting point for needed change. Although
this crisis has given us an opportunity for change, it is not a simple matter
to determine exactly what change is needed and how it is to be accomplished. Defensiveness,
self-interest, pet theories, disputed or incomplete data and maneuvering for future
economic advantage, all add to the smoke of intellectual battle that can obscure
the best way forward. What we need to do over the next two days is to listen carefully
to all views and focus on the essentials of what needs to be done to put our economies
in this region back on the road to sustainable development. In
the past decade of rapid development, these basics have sometimes been overlooked
and occasionally ignored. The productive use of land through agriculture was our
first and perhaps most fundamentals source of wealth, but in the past two decades
of rapid growth, agriculture trailed far behind the growth of industry and services.
Since the majority of the people of Asia still make their living from agriculture,
it meant that the majority was left behind in the boom. This sharpened income
disparities and accelerated urbanization. Over-emphasis
on industrial, rather than agricultural development contributed to social and
environmental problems. Asians became more dependent on imported fuel and food,
and therefore more dependent on the international trading system including international
exchange rates. Clearly, changes in the way that land is allocated and used are
needed to lead to more sustainable, more balanced and more evenly distributed
development. Similarly, the economic boom
generally outpaced the development of human resources. Perhaps exceptions are
Japan, Singapore, and Taiwan. It is, of course, a cliche to say that economic
development depends on an well-educated population. During our boom years, not
enough was done to build the systems needed to provide young people with the kind
of education that would allow them to reach their full potential. There was not
enough investment, despite the availability of funds. There was too little connection
between the manpower needs of the private sector and the education provided by
largely state-run educational systems. There was not enough pressure for changes
in the way that our people are educated. The
problem is widely recognized, but the solutions are much less clear. Should governments
be investing more in education? Should there be more reliance on private sector
education? Can useful links be created between government and industry in joint
efforts to teach immediately useful skills? How do we stop the brain-drain out
of education? Should technical education be the main priority? Some
would argue that as great as the shortage in technical training has been, there
has also been an important shortage in ethical training that is just as damaging
to progress as the lack of scientific and managerial expertise. In
contrast to these first two basic factors, the use of capital has received great
attention. Even before the crisis, there was rapid change in the financial systems
of all our countries. We opened our economies up to world capital markets, liberalized
banking, welcomed foreign investment and initially benefited from the rapid inflows
of external resources. New economic empires were created around the ability to
mobilize capital. Scarce managerial expertise was pulled into finance with high
salaries and rapid promotions. This focus
on capital was incomplete. Too much attention was paid to the attraction of capital
and too little to its effective and productive employment. Instead of spending
the time and money to build systems that support the allocation of capital towards
its most effective use, we simply assumed that reliance on market forces was sufficient.
Our banks became pawnshops; our stock markets became casinos. Insider trading,
conflicts of interest and simple criminal misuse of funds undermined our financial
systems and many of them go unpunished. Neither
foreign investors nor multi-lateral lending institutions insisted on reform. On
the contrary, foreign financiers were at our doors every day, insisting on lending
cheap money. While some noted the shortages of the ethical training, supervision,
regulation and enforcement needed to make those systems effective, the problems
were not taken seriously enough to slow investment. The high growth rates and
the profits available overwhelmed such objections. So,
while there are important changes needed in the various national financial systems,
there are also important issues for the international community to address. The
ignorance, irresponsibility, and heard mentality of those charged with moving
huge amounts of international capital around the world contributed to the crisis.
Advances in computers and telecommunications have dramatically increased the speed
at which capital can be moved. This has reduced the time allowed to investors
and fund managers to give careful consideration to their capital investment decisions.
It has led to irrational decisions to invest and to dis-invest in Asia. Has
our ability to move capital quickly now outstripped our ability to move capital
intelligently? Is there anything that can be done to protect economies from the
effects of these rapid movements? Finally,
as we look at changes in these three basics - land, labour and capital - we must
also look at the balance among them and the way we go about making changes which
would lessen the conflict between economic growth and social justice. Balance
is needed to avoid the capital intensive bubble growth of the recent past, but
how do we achieve it? The problems in our finance and business sectors that now
appear obvious, were not simply an accumulation of individual mistakes. Some mis-allocation
of capital cannot be avoided in a free enterprise system, but the extent of misallocation
we have seen in the recent past indicates a systemic problem of governance that
needs to be addressed. We need to think
about the processes through which our key economic decisions are made. Those processes,
whether in government or in private business, must be reviewed to ensure that
they are not distorted by special interests. The best way to do this may not be
to simply toughen laws and strengthen enforcement because it is so difficult,
well-nigh impossible, to invent regulations that address all possible situations. Greater
transparency, so that accurate, timely information is available to all of those
concerned - whether citizens or shareholders - is probably the greatest single
mechanism that can lead to improved governance and better performance. Even transparency
must have some limits. Where do we draw the lines? How do we build a new culture
of transparency and public responsibility that will be the real guarantee of good
governance? How do we incorporate the best of Asian traditions and practices into
this new culture of transparency? These
are difficult challenges. We cannot expect to meet all these challenges in a two-day
conference, but we can at least contribute to the process that will involve us
over the next several years. We can contribute with appropriate data, with new
ideas, and with careful analysis. Perhaps most importantly, I would like to see
a contribution in terms of the public spirit of the discussion that is aimed at
practical action and achievable goals. You have my best wishes for success in
this endeavor. |
| The
Leadership Forum Speech by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman
of Saha-Union Public Company Limited Former Prime Minister of Thailand Bangkok February
25, 1999 Khun
Arsa Sarasin, Chairman of the Foundation for International Human Resources
Development, Excellencies, Distinguished
Participants of the Leadership Forum, Ladies and Gentlemen, I
would, first of all, like to thank Khun Arsa for that warm and generous introduction.
I would also like to take this opportunity to congratulate him on being appointed
Chairman of the Foundation, which is just one of the many important positions
that he has been asked to assume. I am sure this latest assignment will involve
many challenging tasks ahead and will require the kind of determination, commitment
and experience that Khun Arsa has always brought to bear in every endeavour he
has undertaken. When I was asked to give
this talk, I was not sure what would be the appropriate subject for me to address
in my remarks this evening. But I was informed that the aim of this forum was
to discuss and search for possible solutions to issues of economic development
in the light of the current economic crisis, and particularly the implications
for human resource development. I think
that with the brainpower in this room, you may have already made much progress
towards finding such solutions. So let me offer by way of a disclaimer that I
may have little of substance to add to the discussion. Indeed, my remarks should
be taken as the musings of one man, and if what I say here makes us think - and
care - more deeply about human resource development, I shall consider that to
be ample reward. It seems that since the
Asian crisis broke out, with Thailand as the epicentre, we have all gone through
considerable soul-searching, particularly with regard to our development strategy.
What went wrong? What are the lessons to be learned? What do we need to change
to be able to thrive in the globalised economy? These are hard questions that
we have to keep asking ourselves if we are not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Certainly,
there is no shortage of theories on the origin of the crisis. Some blame it on
rampant capitalism, while others see a conspiracy led by “rogue” financial speculators.
Some point to the fallacies of so-called Asian values and the Asian model of development,
while others see globalisation as the main source of all our problems. There
may be elements of truth in all these analyses. But I believe that at the heart
of it all is the plain and simple fact that we became victims of our own success,
success which we defined much too narrowly and which lulled us into complacency. What
happened was that we came to see economic development purely in terms of material
wealth and astronomical GDP growth? We
equated economic success with the outward trappings of modernity such as high-rises
and luxurious lifestyles, whether or not they were cost-effective and appropriate.
Even as we enriched our pockets, we failed to enrich our minds and spirits. Success
bred excess. Traditional Thai values of thrift and spirituality gave way to consumerism
and materialism. The Asian values we trumpeted only served to justify a system
of patronage and favouritism that led to the misallocation and mismanagement of
our resources. We touted the abundance
of our natural and human resources but it turned out to be an open invitation
for the exploitation of cheap labour and the destruction of our environment. Certainly,
we can blame outside forces for the devastation wrought upon us, but complaining
would not get us very far. It would be a much better use of time and energy if
we were to realistically assess our strengths and weaknesses, determine what needs
to be done, and do it. When we talk about
the causes that contributed to the crisis, one weakness we tend to overlook is
in the area of human resource development. We have to admit that Thai society
has not traditionally devoted as much attention to developing its human potential,
as it should have. The paternalistic nature of our society has meant that ideas
and change mainly came from the top down. Authority
spoke, and the people listened and complied. While this social structure made
for great political stability, it meant that society was ill equipped to deal
with change, particularly rapid, sweeping change. And
change is what Thailand’s integration into the international system brought. Father-knows-best
leadership works well enough in closed systems, but when father himself is overwhelmed
by outside forces, the children have to fend for themselves. To do so successfully,
they have to be empowered to think for themselves. But
human resource development is a long-term proposition. For many years, the crucible
of the Cold War made the idea of people empowerment and independent thinking politically
unpalatable. Grassroots movements that aimed to build on society’s traditional
strengths, such as by fostering rural self-reliance, were regarded by the authorities
as controversial. Thus even with the advent of national development planning,
the workforce was generally taken to mean the labour force, with labour another
ingredient in the industrial development recipe - a raw ingredient, rather than
one that needed to be refined and developed. Without
the economic crisis, we would have probably continued on that unsustainable path,
and a bigger crisis would have been waiting for us further down the line. But
now we have had our wake-up call. The Cold War is no longer, and rapid change
is buffeting us from all sides. The trend towards democracy and good governance
is irreversible. If ever there was a time to reconsider our approach towards human
resource development, it is now. What is
most important is that we must return the process of economic development to where
it belongs, to the people. We have seen that a top-down or trickle-down approach
does not work. The State has shown that, for all the resources at its disposal,
it does not know enough to outguess the market, much less to achieve any degree
of efficiency in managing economic development. The business elite has also demonstrated
that it is not above making costly mistakes that can run the economy into the
ground. To be sure, there is a place for
the State and a place for the private business sector, but it is high time we
brought out the latent energies of our greatest asset, our people. After all,
you can invest as much as you like in all the skyscrapers, expressways and other
physical infrastructure, but it is the human infrastructure that matters the most
and potentially offers the highest return on your investment. A nation can pour
as much money as it likes in acquiring military might but no nation can feel truly
secure if its people languish in deprivation and social injustice. If
we are to become competitive as a nation, if we are to have social equity, if
we are to foster sustainable development, we have to put the people at centre
stage. The development of the human potential
must be the most important investment that any nation could make for the long
term. And it can only be achieved when people are free to learn, to think, to
express their views and to decide on their own choice of government and to engage
in the economic enterprise of their choosing. There
are some encouraging signs. An education reform bill has been passed. Human resource
development has become something of a mantra in policy circles. And in the midst
of this crisis, the word “human” has been given the kind of prominence
that it never received just a few years ago. In the press and in seminars, we
read and hear about the human impact of the economic turmoil, the imperatives
of promoting human security and human development. If there is a silver lining
in the dark cloud of the crisis, it is that it has put the human agenda at the
top of our development priorities where it rightly belongs. Perhaps,
despite all our efforts, we will never be able to rid our societies of inequality
and injustice. But at the very least we can offer our peoples more equal opportunities
for bettering their lives and livelihood. And there can be no better means of
providing such equal opportunities than education and human resources development. When
we speak of education, it should not be confined to the formal schooling every
child receives. Our attitude towards education and its role in economic development
must reflect the changes in today’s world. Education should not be seen as a process
that is completed upon receipt of a diploma or degree. Education must be a life-long
process both in and out of school. Our higher education has to be geared towards
producing independent, critical thinkers, not just workers and bureaucrats as
required by national development objectives as determined by the State. Students
have to be encouraged to question authority and not to settle for rote-learning
and accepting the wisdom of their teachers. Education needs to become more than
a ritual, a license to a good job and a good life. Learning must become second
nature, a habit that we instill in all our people from childhood onwards. I
regret to say that here in Thailand, in spite of all that has been said about
its importance, education has been given short shrift. It is a well-known fact
that the rate of functional literacy in Thailand is lower than in some of our
less-developed neighbours. Unfortunately, education has now become too much commercialised
and politicised. Teachers and lecturers nowadays care more about making money
than passing on knowledge and thinking skills. Universities and colleges now care
more about increasing enrolment than about producing quality graduates. Despite
claims about the decentralisation of education, the setting of school curricula
is still very much in the hands of the central government, making them rigid,
often times outdated, and unresponsive to real-world needs. I do not mean to be
harshly critical but I am simply stating some of my concerns about the present
state of education in Thailand. But the
main point that I should like to emphasise with regard to education as it relates
to the current economic crisis is the question of ethics and values. Human resources
development is not simply about instilling marketable skills and knowledge. We
need not remind ourselves that the problems besetting our economy were not due
just to the failure of our financial institutions. At the heart of it was the
erosion of moral standards, the excessive value placed on a culture of profligacy
and consumerism, the cosy relationship between businessmen and politicians, the
abuses of public trust and the lack of transparency and accountability in both
the corporate sector and government. Human resource development means that we
must restore personal responsibility and moral integrity to the economic development
equation. This is, of course, more easily
said than done. But the crisis has shown us that not doing it carries an extremely
high price. The renewed interest in Buddhist social values as a result of the
crisis appears to be a step in the right direction. By drawing upon the traditional
strengths inherent in our culture, we can restore our moral compass and use it
as a guide in managing change, rather than let change overwhelm us and cast us
morally adrift. Perhaps more important
than the various economic reform measures being undertaken is the need to build
into our political, economic and social systems a standard of ethics based on
the concept of good governance. Good governance, as far as the public sector is
concerned, means a government that is transparent, responsive and accountable
to the people. It must put the public interest before the interest of certain
individuals or of certain specialised groups within society. Good
governance does not stop at governments. Accountability and transparency must
also be demanded of companies and all others that exert a disproportionate influence
in public affairs. I have no doubt that
if good governance is going to become a permanent fixture in our society, it must
come through effective leadership. Those in positions of leadership must set an
example and show responsibility, vision and vigour - qualities which I believe
are the very essence of good governance. It is also necessary to bear in mind
that leadership means more than convincing and inspiring others to follow you.
Leadership is also about inspiring others to be the best that they can be, so
that if you inadvertently lead them down a blind alley, they can find their own
way back and set out in the right direction. And that is what human resource development
is really about. The way forward from the
current crisis is to critically rethink our policies and priorities. We need to
strike a balance between competing priorities. We need to focus on the fundamentals
of economic development. We need to reconcile our traditional strengths with the
power of the global economy. The way forward requires our nations, individually
and in partnership, to work towards the promotion of sustainable development -
through good governance in both the government and corporate sectors, through
effective leadership and through protecting the diversity and abundance of nature. Most
of all, we need to remind ourselves that modernization is not development. The
objective of development is not to have bigger buildings and more expensive cars.
Development is about uplifting the material and spiritual well being of each individual
in society. And that is best accomplished not by a top-down approach, but by empowering
each person to make the best of his circumstances and determine his own destiny.
Only then can we truly realise our potential as individual human beings and fulfil
our common aspirations as members of the human race. |
| Keynote
Address Integrity in Governance in Asia by
Mr. Anand Panyarachun Delivered at Workshop on integrity in Government
in Asia United Nations Development Programme Transparency
International - Thailand June 29, 1998 Ladies
and Gentlemen, First of all, allow me to
congratulate the organizers for gathering such a distinguished group of people
from the Asian region to deliberate on an important topic. To counter corruption
is not only critical to good governance but it is also central to an equitable,
balanced and sustainable development. Simply stated, corruption needs to be challenged,
curtailed and in the long run, hopefully eradicated. For corruption not only depletes
our already limited budget and resources, but it also demoralizes the spirit of
a nation and its people. Corruption, if allowed to persist unchecked, would inhibit
and dwarf the moral integrity of a society. The
current economic crisis in Asia has inadvertently brought much attention to economic
problems and their solutions. This rather single-minded focus on the economy may
have overshadowed other urgent issues that need to be addressed in the region.
Typical of conventional approach and thinking, the trend to divide problems and
issue into segmented categories would propel us to deal with them in a disjointed
manner, as if realities can be neatly divided into compartments where one could
systematically prioritize them and deal with them one at a time. At
least in the Thai situation, our economic woes are closely intertwined with failures
in our political and social-cultural institutions. Many Thais have wondered aloud
that if the first signs of financial mismanagement were taken seriously and immediately
and properly dealt with, perhaps our economic woes might have been lessened. Other
might hasten to add that the fact that the economic ills were allowed to escalate
and worsen indicated suspected acts of “cover-up” and “favoritism” in return for
special “favor” by powers that be. I would add that at the core of our “dark experience”
lies the ugly truth that there was an absence of transparency, accountability,
public interest and public responsibility. Socio-cultural
values, which propagated consumerism, conspicuous consumption fortified by the
practices of cronyism and patronage in politics and administration has invariable
combined to doom the Thai economy. Because socio-economic and political factors
are so inextricably intertwined, a holistic approach, which focuses on their inter-relationship,
will serve us well. The combat against
corruption is not an individual quest nor even solely a government’s duty. In
fact, it should be a joint effort of different players. Government should be an
active partner in this effort. But a strong civil society where average citizens
cohere to volunteer their time, energy and effort to monitor situations and persons,
which engender corrupt activities and behaviors will prove to be the most enduring
deterrence against corruption. Likewise, civil society organizations such as NGOs,
people’s group and informal associations of like-minded people will undoubtedly
and unmistakably be good partners for individual volunteers and government. In
reality, we will need to create an environment where cooperation and participation
from the public to tackle with corruption goes beyond verbal endorsement and commitment. Such
an “enabling” environment where integrity in governance is high would need to
meet certain requirements such as:
- Leadership with good moral characters and high integrity. Role models aside,
leadership with true commitment to foster transparency and accountability in governance
and a willingness to welcome public engagement and involvement in solving social
issues.
- Constitution or basic
law that provide the legal framework and assurances that people’s voices, needs,
participation and involvement in exercising their civil rights are not only guaranteed
but nurtured.
- A set of values
that are congruent with activism, engagement and participation in public life
by private individuals. Too often, in the context of many Asian countries, historical
conditions were such that an average citizen is made to feel not only his/her
insignificance and vulnerability vis-a-vis government and other powerful forces
in society, but he/she is also conditioned to submit to authorities with silence
and to endure all conditions, however onerous, with patience and tolerance.
I
would like to draw you attention especially to the last point - value system and
value change for social activism. Traditional Asian values speak of loyalty to
family and kins, commitment to honor and obligations, adherence to a system of
integrity, and a code of business ethics built on personal trust and relationship.
These values may be construed as antithetical to the values of modern society
where disengagement from familiar and kinship ties and reliance on legal contracts
are stressed. However, I contend that traditional
Asian values could be extrapolated to strengthen our present call for value change,
for integrity in good governance. Allow me to elaborate. Imbued
in some of the traditional Asian values already stated are the virtues of a moral
and integrity system which bind an individual to his social relations. Loyalty
to family and kinfolks submits an individual to an immediate social group for
the good of the group instead of for one’s own personal ends. The requirement
to honor and repay obligations serves to strengthen an individual’s commitment
and responsibility to social acts. It also serves to remind one that the social
world is a web of interrelated exchanges and reciprocities where one could not
act independently, disregarding social consequences and implications. As for the
code of honor and integrity in business, the virtue of honesty and basic trust
in the goodness and integrity of other human beings are hereby extolled. These
virtues could be and should be captured for our task at hand to interpret and
incorporate them into a set of values system that will counter the forces of corruption. We
could translate commitment to family and kins into commitment for an even larger
social group, which is society. That an individual’s obligation to society requires
participation and involvement and even vigilance to fend off the corrosive effects
on society which corruption inevitably incurs. The moral and integrity code of
business practice easily translates into an integrity system where corruption
could have no place and would not be tolerated. In
essence, through the cooperation of the media as a partner in the effort to stamp
out corruption and install transparency and accountability in all spheres, the
public will not be motivated to actively participate as alert monitors of wrong
doings only, but they will cultivate a strong distaste and contempt for both wrong
doings and wrong doers. They will also be concerned enough to act and not just
to sit back and complain. What should ordinary
citizens do and how could they be effective in battling corruption? I do not presume
to know all the answers, especially in the face of divergent socio-cultural economic-political
contexts. I trust that you will be addressing these questions among others in
the next few days. I wish you my best in your deliberations. |
| Facing
the Future Keynote Address by Mr. Anand
Panyarachun Chairman of Saha-Union Public Company Limited Former
Prime Minister of Thailand at Chulalongkorn University Bangkok,
Thailand March 23, 1998
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It
is a great honour to be invited to deliver this Keynote Address to all of you
attending this Conference on the “Social and Political Dimensions of The Asian
Economic Crisis” organised by Chulalongkorn University Social Research Institute,
the Asian forum for Human Rights and Development and Focus on the Global South
on March 23 and 24,1998 in Bangkok. Whither
the “Economic Miracle”? In a short
period of a few months only the “economic miracle” of Southeast Asian countries,
built over decades, has shuddered to a halt. Since July last year this country
and many others in this region have been several affected by an unprecedented
economic and financial crisis. In a short period of a few months, thousands have
been left jobless, drastic budget cuts have been made in government’s public spending
and prices for essential consumer goods have skyrocketed in some areas. On the
other hand, the financial system has been subjected to a thorough overhaul under
the direction of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Many of our countries
in this region had to be “bailed out” from this crisis through a comprehensive
but stringent “rescue package” put together by the IMF. The suffering for the
people that began with this crisis last year continues today, and is showing signs
of becoming more serious in the coming period. I
believe that the “economic fundamentals” of the countries in this region remain
sound. The crisis was an indication of the vulnerability of our countries to the
fluctuations of the international capital markets and unguided “open economic”
policies that had little roots in one’s own country, but were totally dependent
on foreign investment. Our “miracle economic
model” of development has been challenged to its fundamentals by the current
economic crisis in Asia. This was a model that was based on rapid growth and liberalisation
which catered more to the interests of foreigners (“external”) than to local people
(“internal”). This was a model that was biased towards the “rich”, and largely
neglected the poor and the vulnerable sections of our society. Under the influence
of this model, we all became its agents and preferred “extravagance” to “efficiency”,
“high growth” to “equitable income distribution” and “quick profits” over “sustainability”
I believe that the main cause of the economic
crisis was our “social deficiency”. Let me explain this concept:
- We did not have an effective monitoring system
to oversee the financial and commercial sector, as well as overall direction of
our economic paradigm,
- Our government seemed to
be less transparent and accountable and more “rapid growth” driven,
- Our civil society, while reaping some benefits of the economic miracle, generally
remained aloof to the economic direction of our country,
- Finally, there was little to no participation of the ordinary people in decision-making
on important economic and commercial policy making that affected the country as
a whole.
Development
Is More than Just Growth We know that development is not
just growth. The experience of our countries shows that rapid and high growth
can indeed take place, but many other crucial aspects of development remain stagnant
or neglected - viz., social justice and human rights, sustainable environmental
management, equitable sharing of the country’s resources and promotion of self-reliance
and local enterprises. The general discourse
on development revolves around two polarised positions, both of which I believe
are seriously questionable:
- Those that believe that mainstream development based on rapid
modernization (“globalization”) is the only way forward for development of the
country, and hence reject traditional and “local wisdom,”
- Those who believe only in traditional and “local wisdom” and reject all forms
of modernization.
I believe
there is a mid-way between these two juxtapositions. I am a firm believer in the
“middle-road” that blends and integrates the best elements in both positions -
the traditional and the modern; the local and the mainstream; the local economy
and the global village. It is only with this merging of historical paradigms of
development that we can achieve genuine self-help, self-reliance, sustainability
and overall human development for all. The
Way Forward The way forward from the current crisis is
to restore the value and spirit of the fundamental principles of human life and
good governance - viz. transparency, accountability and participation. Good governance
does not stop at governments. At the present time, we should be talking more about
“corporate governance” and “financial governance” we need to make companies and
corporations more transparent and sensitive to our people. We need to make them
more accountable to the environmental and social costs of their policies and actions. The
way forward from the crisis is to critically re-think our policies and priorities.
It was not our integration with the global economy that is to blame for the crisis
- it is our inability to balance various development priorities and build a foundation
of self-reliance based on our sound indigenous “economic” and “human” fundamentals.
We now need to go back to these fundamentals
- both the economic and the human - to restore confidence in our people, to rebuild
our country from the bottom-up, to draw inspiration from our local wisdom and
our local practices that emphasis sufficiency, mutual respect, equality, justice
and fair sharing of resources. In short, we need to reconcile our traditional
strengths and the power of the global economy. This is the task of “bridging”
that we are all called upon to play at this juncture in our history. The
Significance of This Conference This Asia-Europe People’s
Forum with its main aim of facilitating the involvement of civil society groups
in the ASEM process in order to ensure that the interests and needs of different
groups, especially children, women, the poor and the marginalised in society,
can be articulated; is an important step in the right direction. We need to build
dialogue and understanding between the government, business and private
sector, civil society groups and donors in our common endeavour to respond to
the plight of the poor and the vulnerable sections in our societies. We
need to recognise that people have struggled hard to build local level alternatives
that safeguard self-reliance, social justice and equality. We need to facilitate
their voice to be heard in national and international fora in order to influence
policy makers and our political leaders. Democracy and Development begins at the
grassroots levels first - it is a challenge to all of us to ensure that this experience
transcends the frontiers of nation states and becomes a global reality. I
am pleased to be part of this important Conference and wish the organisers and
all the participants from so many Asian countries and abroad, the very best in
your deliberations in these two days. |
| Keynote Address by
H.E. Mr. Anand Panyarachun Former Prime Minister of Thailand Socio-Economic
Summit Nepal 1998 "Strategy for the New Millennium" Kathmandu,
Nepal, 20 February 1998 Excellencies Distinguished
Guests Ladies and Gentlemen It
is a great pleasure to be in Nepal, a kingdom that has so much in common with
my own. Not only do we share similarities in our cultural heritage; through the
centuries, both our countries have managed to remain free of foreign rule. But
in our own way and in our own time, Nepal and Thailand has each had to open up
and adapt to the currents of globalization. And judging from rush-hour traffic
in Bangkok and Kathmandu, it seems we also face many of the same challenges on
the road to development! Thailand, of course,
had something of a head start. And by most conventional measures, we succeeded
spectacularly. In some three decades, we had gone from practically nothing to
become a role model for the developing World. Between 1985 and 1995, we achieved
the fastest economic growth in the World, were hailed as the latest Asian economic
tiger, and made the World Bank's top-ten list of projected biggest economies in
the year 2020. Our crash, when it came
in 1997, was equally spectacular, sparking an Asian crisis that has since gone
on to engulf much of the developing World. It has also given rise to much soul-searching
over whether our development path was the correct one. The
question asked most frequently is: How can Thailand's development experience turn
so quickly from blueprint for success into cautionary tale? How can something
so right turn out so wrong? Or was it wrong to begin with, only we didn't know
it, like someone who only realizes there is a problem with his diet and lifestyle
when he gets a heart attack? There are
no simple answers. National development has never been a cut-and-dried proposition.
You base your actions on the available knowledge at the time and make corrections
as you go along. Certainly, the crisis has severely shaken our confidence. But
we must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water. Yes, we made
mistakes along the way, but there were also some things that we did right. Today,
with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, I hope to share with you some insights on
how to tell them apart. First, to give
you some idea how far Thailand has come, let me take you back some four decades,
before we began to even think of economic development. In 1956, Thailand was what
economists in those politically-incorrect days called a backward economy. The
country's population stood at a mere 23.4 million. Bangkok was a tranquil city
of placid canals and tree-lined roads, its skyline dominated by temple spires.
By far the most important sector of the economy was agriculture, which accounted
for 42 percent of the country's GDP, engaged 88 percent of the country's labor
force and made up 98 percent of total exports. Industry, which consisted of light
manufacturing aimed mainly at the domestic market, made up only 12 percent of
GDP and employed just 2 percent of the country's labor force. Fast
forward to 1995, just before the first signs of trouble appeared. Thailand's population
had more than doubled to almost 60 million. Most Bangkok canals had been paved
over, the trees cut down to make way for more cars, the temples long since eclipsed
by high-rises. Bangkok had come to dominate the economy as few cities in the World
do, accounting for over 42 percent of Thailand's GDP and almost 15 percent of
its population. In the country as a whole, the contribution of agriculture to
GDP had fallen to just over 10.4 percent, while that of industry had risen to
almost 40 percent. What had happened in
those forty years to bring about his transformation? The
short answer is a combination of laissez-faire capitalism and fortuitous timing.
Over the years, a series of shifts in economic policy integrated Thailand ever
more closely into the World economy. Beginning
in the late 1950s, upon the advice of the World Bank, Thailand's leadership decided
to pursue economic development through private-sector-led, import-substituting
industrialization, while reducing the role of State enterprise in the economy. Another
significant shift in policy was the change from industrialization based on labor-intensive,
import-substitution to capital-intensive, export-oriented production. Announced
in the early 1970s, this policy began in earnest in the early 1980s. Finally,
and most controversially in light of the financial crisis, a process of financial
liberalization took place between 1991 and 1994, resulting in huge inflows of
capital that, in hindsight, we were unprepared to deal with. The
pace of foreign investment inflows began to quicken at about the same time that
Thailand launched its export-oriented industrial promotion drive in the 1980s.
When the Plaza Accord of 1985 pressured Japanese companies to move their manufacturing
operations offshore, Thailand was a logical choice-thanks to its abundant natural
resources, cheap labor, investor-friendly policies and a strong Japanese market
presence. And when Western fund managers
began looking for alternatives to the unexciting rates of return offered in the
advanced industrial economies, open, dynamic Thailand emerged as a strong favorite.
Between 1985 and 1990, foreign direct investment flowing into Thailand shot up
from $178 million to $2.5 billion, with Japanese investment rising from $124 million
in 1986 to $1.2 billion in 1990. When that flow began to slow down in the early
1990s, foreign portfolio investment took up the slack. Net portfolio investment,
which averaged $646 million in 1985-89, rose to $927 million in 1992 and jumped
to $5.5 billion in 1993. Thailand was no
longer a backward economy, but an East Asian miracle, a Newly Industrialized Country.
Thailand did everything by the book, and had the numbers to show that neo-classical
economics worked. But there was a darker
side to the success story. Even as Thailand was logging record growth rates, the
country was showing signs of strain. Rapid industrialization was creating social
and environmental externalities that could not be addressed within the existing
growth-oriented paradigm. The private sector was extracting resources and polluting
the environment faster than they could be replenished or restored, creating ecological
devastation on a grand scale. The income gap was widening between rural and urban
areas, and between the rich and the poor, resulting in a flow of labor from rural
communities to the city. Bangkok became overcrowded and polluted, with the slums,
disease, drugs and prostitution that typify so many of today's mega-cities. Was
this a reasonable price to pay for a decade of double-digit growth? The answer
would depend on whom one asks. Those paying the price and those enjoying the fruits
of rapid growth were not necessarily the same groups of people. Our economic growth,
while high, was unbalanced, inequitable and unsustainable.
Does this represent then, as some have suggested, the failure
of capitalism? To be sure, if we had not
opened up to global capitalism, there would have been no crisis, or at least the
Asian crisis would not have started in Thailand. But that is like saying one would
never have fallen if one had not attempted to walk. Capitalism
is not inherently good or evil. As long as man continues to be driven by self-interest,
capitalism will remain the least "evil" way of allocating resources. Like it or
not, it is more useful for us to learn to manage capitalism, rather than repudiate
it. The financial crash may also be seen
as a harsh market correction, or in the words of Joseph Schumpeter, an act of
creative destruction, from which hopefully we will draw the right lessons. So
if anything, I would say that the crisis is a reaffirmation of the laws of the
market-place. I would further suggest that
Thailand's lopsided growth and financial crash occurred not because we were abiding
too faithfully by market principles, but because we did not take those principles
sufficiently to heart. This may be a somewhat
controversial Statement, so let me explain. Earlier
I stated that Thailand undertook policies to integrate itself with the World economy.
But if you look more closely, you will see that while we adopted the outward trappings
of capitalism, much of our economy continued to be dominated by practices that
were not market-friendly -- in particular traditional social relationship patterns
involving personal connections, patronage and paternalism. Thus
it was that instead of allowing the laws of demand and supply to determine prices
and the most efficient allocation of resources, the State directed the process.
Instead of developing our comparative advantage to the fullest, we inadvertently
weakened it. Instead of fostering a competitive domestic environment, we encouraged
monopolies and oligopolies as a means of capital accumulation. One
of the clearest examples of this unwitting distortion of the marketplace can be
seen in our agricultural policy. Thailand has long had a tremendous natural comparative
advantage in agriculture. Every Thai child knows by heart the ancient inscription
describing 13th century Siam: "in the water there is fish, in the fields
there is rice" - an apt description of Thailand even in the 20th century. It
is therefore rather ironic that farmers have always been the poorest members of
society. Ever since Thailand began exporting rice in the mid-19th century,
the rice surplus was taxed, enriching the land-owning upper classes while keeping
farmers mired in poverty. When we decided
to industrialize the economy, it was again achieved at the expense of agriculture.
Industrial enterprise was subsidized through tax breaks and other preferential
privileges. Rice exports, meanwhile, were
subject to a tax - the so-called rice premium-, which was, ended only in 1985,
in response to US subsidies of its rice exports. What the rice premium did was
raise revenue for the State and keep rice prices artificially low for the benefit
of urban consumers. Unfortunately, it also reinforced the chronic impoverishment
of rural farmers. Allowing the market to determine prices instead would have raised
the income of farmers and energized agriculture, but it was feared that the resulting
higher cost of living would spark urban unrest. Agricultural
small-holders therefore remained dependent, orphan-like, on the "patronage" of
the State. It was the State that farmers relied on to provide infrastructure,
to grant loans and subsidies, even to tell farmers what crops o grow, how to grow
them and what animals to raise (advice which often turned out to be misguided).
The effect of this culture of dependence and the anti-agriculture bias in government
policy was to weaken the agricultural sector by discouraging initiative, innovation
and improvements in efficiency on the part of farmers. I
raise the issue of agriculture not only because it illustrates how political considerations
have pervaded the process of resource allocation, but also because it is crucial
in understanding many other phenomena in Thailand. Many of our social problems
can be traced to rapid industrialization and the imbalances it creates or aggravates
between agriculture and urban interests. Chronic rural poverty and indebtedness
have transformed farmers- the "backbone of the Thai economy" - into unskilled
labor feeding the country's industrial expansion. Rural communities are sapped
of their vitality, as Bangkok becomes ever more crowded, its infrastructure and
services stretched to the limits. Another
reason farmers have been so exploited and dependent on the State is lack of education.
Thailand's development policy has always rested on the assumption that our biggest
strengths lay in natural resources and cheap labor. Successive governments have
therefore paid scant attention to upgrading the quality of the workforce, preferring
instead to promote our advantage in cheap unskilled labor. But
the entry of new players into the global market after the Cold War has shown that
cheap labor is an advantage all developing countries have. Thus it was only relatively
recently that human resource development became a new mantra in policy circles,
with an emphasis on the upgrading of technical and management skills. Here
I should also add that HRD should not be confined to only the industrial sector.
We must make sure that farmers are not excluded, but encouraged to learn how markets
work and to develop the skills that will allow them to make independent, informed
choices. Education is a public good, like roads and public utilities, without
which development is impossible. This may seem obvious, but the short shrift education
tends to receive in our development policy suggests that the link between education
and development may not be as widely appreciated as it should be. So
far I have argued that the State should let market forces do their work without
imposing distorting incentives favoring or punishing a particular sector. I have
also pointed out that it is the obligation of the State to provide public goods
such as education to allow the economy to achieve its full potential. That
said, I must also note that markets as a rule do not function perfectly. Left
to themselves, markets give rise to monopolies, speculative bubbles, insider trading
and other assorted distortions. Hence,
the State cannot totally disengage itself from the economy and rely on the invisible
hand alone to maintain proper functioning. The State has an obligation to foster
competition, prevent market failures, and ensure that private gains are not made
at public expense. A minimalist State, or a State that is co-opted by the private
sector, will have difficulty performing such duties. A
peculiarity of the Thai State is that it was too hands-on with regard to agriculture,
but too hands-off with regard to industry and finance. Even in 1991, a World Bank
report noted that Thailand was "a private enterprise system where few controls
are imposed, [and] increased material standards and private gains have been secured
at an observable communal expense." This
insight is helpful in explaining how unintended consequences came about. When
capital and currency controls were lifted in the early 1990s, it was with the
intention of taking Thai industry to a higher plane of development. The policy
of financial liberalization, combined with fixed exchange rates and high interest
rates, did indeed attract a torrent of foreign capital. The missing part of the
equation was the mechanisms and institutions to ensure that this glut of capital
was channeled into productive activities, such as agriculture or manufacturing.
The situation thus unleashed unprecedented opportunities for the nimble to make
quick profits- in stocks, real estate and other speculative areas. The
mood in those years became one that Alan Greenspan aptly describes as irrational
exuberance. Flush with cheap money in search of borrowers, banks and finance companies
became undisciplined, grossly inflating asset values and over-extending credit.
Short-term loans, unhedged thanks to the perceived safety of the baht's peg to
the US dollar, were taken to finance long-term activities such as construction
projects. Businesses began ploughing their earnings from manufacturing into property
speculation. Over-capacity began to build up in sectors such as housing, industrial
estates, petrochemicals and steel, many sectors of which had been promoted by
the State itself. By 1996, signs appeared
to suggest the party was over. As the US dollar strengthened, so did the pegged
baht. Export growth dropped from 24 percent the previous year to zero percent,
while the current account deficit stood at a worrying 8 percent. Foreign investment
began moving out. Despite reassurances by the government that all was well, it
was apparent that the baht was overvalued, a point not lost on speculators. After
a series of bruising currency attacks, the government was forced to float the
baht on July 2, 1997. This episode in our
economic history demonstrates that if we wish to prosper in the modern market,
we cannot afford not to play by its rules. Here
again we have a clash between the traditional and the new. A banking system based
on mutual trust and support between lender and borrower, such as that which exists
in many Asian countries, is fine for the domestic capital market, but hopelessly
out of step in a globalize capital market. Not
only financial institutions but the State as well have to adjust their way of
doing things. In an open capital market system, the State, because it usually
guarantees bank deposits (with taxpayers' money, no less), must supervise the
banks to ensure that the risks taken by the banks are based on project evaluations
and kept within certain bounds. This means that a clean, transparent and effective
corporate governance system must be in place. Shareholders in a company that misuses
other people's money must be punished and not bailed out by the taxpayers. To
enforce this, effective supervision by the central bank is required, which in
turn presumes that a clean, transparent and effective government is in place.
The problem for most developing countries is how to get such a government -- one
free of corruption. Another area where
the State has an important supervisory role to play is in promoting sustainable
development. Developing countries, Thailand included, tend to take their natural
bounty for granted. Forests are chopped down for timber or farmland, minerals
are extracted with little regard for environmental damage, pollution clogs rivers
and lungs, all in the name of progress. Thailand
is beginning to realize, hopefully not too late, the importance of sustainable
development, which the Brundtland Commission's 1987 report defined as development
which meets the needs of the present without sacrificing the ability of the future
to meet its needs. From the beginning,
the Thai development model has focused single-mindedly on rapid growth. In recent
year, as our economy grew while our environment deteriorated, more and more people
are wondering if growth is really the panacea it is often made out to be. Given
time, nature replenishes its resources, such as trees, and breaks down most waste
products. But rapid industrialization and rampant commercialism tends to create
social and environmental externalities that outstrip the carrying capacity of
nature: prawn farms that destroy mangrove forests, logging that destroys human
and wildlife habitats, vehicle engines that emit noxious exhaust fumes, factories
that release toxic substances into the underground water table and waterways.
It is by no means certain if our runaway growth has not already compromised future
generations' ability to enjoy a reasonably good quality of life. Here
then is clearly a case where unfettered market forces cannot be counted on to
work for the greater good, particularly in the context of a global economy, which
by its very nature encourages large-scale resource extraction. The pervasiveness
of patronage and graft in Thailand aggravates the situation even further. Export-oriented
exploitation of resources is therefore simply not sustainable without some degree
of government regulation. What the State
should do is to inject greater rationality into the balance between economic and
environmental priorities. It can pass and strictly enforce environmental legislation.
It can require that prices reflect the internalization of such externalities,
rather than allow the socialization of environmental costs. But too often, the
State's agents are beholden to well-connected private interests and not particularly
keen to protect public resources. So overall,
Thailand's growth has been a mixed blessing. We have tried to compress centuries
of industrialization into a few decades, and in the process have discovered how
detrimental some of our most entrenched traditions and social institutions are
to our country as it tries to fit into the global market. If
those old ways were to disappear, I for one would not be nostalgic. In many cases,
they hark back to an unjust social hierarchy that perpetuated poverty for the
masses and enriched a wealthy few. I am not saying that we should dispense with
our cultural identity and blindly embrace the monoculture of the global market.
What I am saying is that, as in any culture, there is much that should be retained
and much that needs to be changed. If we are wise enough, we will know the difference. Indeed,
some wisdom seems to be emerging from the ashes of the financial crisis. Thai
society has become more introspective, asking itself where its strengths and weaknesses
really lie, and what are the things that really matter in life. A
reform process has begun towards an open society and more effective rule of law.
In the aftermath of the crisis, this movement has gathered momentum and is enjoying
wide public support. The shortcomings of the State are being redressed through
political reform as well as good public and corporate governance. The State is
trying to reduce its role in directing the economy, while strengthening its supervisory
and regulatory capacities. Transparency, full and timely disclosure of information,
and accountability have become watchwords in both the corporate and government
sectors. At the same time, the State and
the market are also being monitored by a society that is more aware than ever
of the potential for excess and inefficiency. Civil society -- and NGOs in particular
-- is playing a more active role in strengthening communities and empowering ordinary
citizens. The media have also been a powerful force for change, especially by
exposing wrongdoing in high places. Citizens now have the right to access official
information, a right that is being vigorously exercised and receiving the backing
of our independent judiciary. The financial
collapse therefore marked the beginning of a new chapter in Thailand's development.
We are under no illusions as to when we can achieve our goal of development that
is just, equitable and sustainable. We recognize that our efforts towards an open
society must proceed in tandem, at roughly the same pace, in both political and
economic areas. What we have learned is
that when you take steps towards greater economic openness, and especially financial
openness, there are a few rules of thumb to bear in mind: Do let the market do
its work of determining prices; do provide public goods such as education and
infrastructure; do intervene to correct market failures; and do intervene to prevent
private self-interest from damaging the common interest. There are also a few
don't 's: Don't second-guess the market; don’t favor certain sectors or groups
over others; and don't use public funds to bail out private mistakes. Even
when we know the rules, it is not always easy to live by them. South East Asia
has the advantage of being able to learn from the successes and mistakes of others.
You also have much experience in the way of appropriate technology, which is usually
more environment-and community-friendly. We should use the various regional fora--
such as the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation forum,
or BIMSTEC--not only to promote trade and economic cooperation, but also to exchange
ideas on development strategies. Globalization,
like capitalism, is a powerful force that should be harnessed for the greater
good of mankind. We need to change and grow and become wiser if we are to survive
it with our identity intact, so that future generations may look back at us with
approval for bequeathing them a World that is not chaotic and bursting at the
seams, but a World that is just, equitable and sustainable. Thank
you. |
| Constitutionalism
and Democracy in Asia by Mr. Anand Panyarachun 1997
Ramon Magsaysay Awards Awardees’ Forum Series No. 1 Manila,
September 1, 1997 The link between constitutionalism and
democracy in Asia is, in certain interesting ways, reminiscent of the inter-action
between law and order. Law and order comprise a neatly matched term commonly associated
with authoritarianism, or autocracy. It is often said – through clenched teeth
– that law and order constitute the primary legacy of nineteenth-century colonialism
in Asia. However, the disdain with which the term is often used contains a kernel
of truth and even a faint wisp of humanity that we would do well to consider further.
Much of Asia today treads a thin line between authoritarianism
and populism. The former represents the subjugation of the people to political
masters who, only in the most fortunate and rare of circumstances, provide enlightened
leadership. The latter spells political chaos, and typically results in metamorphosis
into the most vicious sorts of authoritarianism. If
we are to avoid straying from the thin line between authoritarianism and populism
– that is, if we are to have law and order without its accompanying evil of a
new, home-grown, indigenous colonialism consisting of a master class ruling a
subject population – we must pursue constitutionalism. What
do I mean by “constitutionalism”? I am not too humble to admit that my views on
that subject derive from the political theories initially advanced by the ancient
Greeks. It was Aristotle who referred to constitutionalism as “the arrangement
of the offices of a State.” Based on that definition, every State, no matter how
badly governed, has a constitution, written or not. But
the mere existence of a constitution does not represent constitutionalism. That
is because a constitution, to be respected as viable and democratic, must fulfill
certain necessary conditions. - A
constitutional government must, first and foremost, be “representative”.
The people must decide who is to lead them, and those in office must conduct themselves
as representatives of the people.
- Second, enhancement of “individual rights or liberties” should
be a cornerstone,
- Third,
a system of “checks and balances” is required of any constitutional
government to deter against abuse of power. Constitutional governments, therefore,
typically divide power between the legislature, executive and judiciary, as well
as between the center and the State, provincial or local levels of authority.
- Fourth, “simplicity” of form and of modus
operandi is required so that the system can be understood by the people and
not only by the professional politicians, and in order that it avoids the pitfalls
and loopholes that are the bedfellows of verbosity.
- A fifth requirement is “procedural stability”,
meaning that certain fundamental procedures of government must not be subject
to frequent or arbitrary intervention. Citizens must know the basic rules according
to which politics are conducted. Stable procedures of government provide citizens
with adequate knowledge of the probable consequences of their actions.
- Sixth is “accountability”. Measures must be
in place to ensure that those who govern consistently account for, and can be
held accountable for, their actions on behalf of the governed.
- The final essential element of a constitutional government
is “transparency”, as only through full openness and disclosure
about the affairs of government will the people be able to make informed judgments
and decisions on the future course of governance.
Written
constitutions provide a firm standard by which the legitimacy of government action
may be judged. In constitutional democracies, accountability can be enforced through
a great variety of regular procedures, including elections, systems of promotion
and discipline, fiscal accounting, recall, and referendum. The
accountability of government officials to the citizenry makes possible the citizens’
responsibility for the acts of government. The most obvious example of this process
of responsibility and accountability is the electoral process. In
constitutional systems, as we have noted, powers of legislation and enforcement
are divided among executive, legislative and judicial components, and the ability
of any one person to continue to hold power is subject to periodic recourse through
the electorate. In contract, totalitarianism
amounts to the abdication of constitutionalism. Totalitarian regimes emerge when
an organized minority seizes power by force or fraud, or through the apathy of
the electorate. Opposition to the dictator is stifled by the imposition of State
control over all forms of expression; the institution of clandestine police and
intelligence networks; and the suppression or destruction of all opposing political
parties. Autocracy is sometimes difficult
to distinguish from democratic rule. As we have often seen, autocracies try to
borrow legitimacy by adopting the language of the constitutions of democratic
regimes or by camouflaging themselves as “shadow” institutions. It
is common practice in modern totalitarian States to establish such shadow institutions
as parliaments or national assemblies, elections and political parties, courts
of justice and legal codes, and similar so-called “constitutional” bodies that
differ little in appearance from the institutions of genuine constitutional democracies.
Similarly, the language of constitutions promulgated by totalitarian regimes is
often couched in terms of the doctrines of popular democracy. Despite
the facades, the underlying realities of totalitarian rule are invariably the
concentration of power in a single centre and the mobilization of force to prevent
the emergence of opposition, democratic or otherwise. Constitutional
democracy is, as its name indicates, based on (1) a constitution, or basic law,
and (2) the people’s active participation. The
essence of a constitution is that it formalizes a set of fundamental norms governing
the political community and determining the relations between the rulers and the
people and the inter-action among the centres of power. The
“political party” is the other chief instrument of constitutional
democracy. It is the agency through which the electorate is involved in both the
exercise and transfer of power. The party in a constitutional democracy is at
once a means of representing a mass electorate in the exercise of power and also
a device for the peaceful replacement of one set of power holders with another. In
short, a constitution provides the starting point for the pursuit of democracy
and the building of good governance. Those
of you who have been following developments in Thailand can see that our current
economic crisis is a result of the weakness in Thailand’s political structure.
We face an erosion of faith and confidence in our political institutions that
needs to be urgently addressed for the continued advancement of Thai society. The
political reform process that has been initiated, provides Thailand with an opportunity
to take the first step in laying the foundation for true democracy and good governance. For
the last eight months now, I have been intensively engaged in the process of drafting
a new constitution for Thailand, a process that – I am happy to report – has been
marked by its openness to public participation and debate. As
some of you may know, Thailand has the dubious distinction of having had 15 constitutions
since the inception of its constitutional monarchy 65 years ago. Some of these
constitutions have been discarded as a result of coups d’etat; some have been
distorted through ill-advised amendments. The common feature of all these 15 constitutions
is that they have all been drafted by those in power, and not through any process
of consultation with the people. As a result,
these constitutions have not been respected, nor have they ensured good governance.
We aim to change that. Taking into account the guiding principles that I have
referred to earlier, the Constitution Drafting Assembly of Thailand during the
course of the past eight months was engaged in an intensive process of dialogue
with the people in the preparation of the draft constitution, to ensure that it
addresses the concerns of our citizenry. People’s
participation in the process of decision-making has been an important concept
in the political reform process. We feel that it is necessary to instill a sense
of ownership among the people of this important social contract between the State
and the people. There is no political
system in the world that can claim legitimacy that was not in some sense based
on “the will of the people.” This is the first time in Thai history that the people
have the right to contribute to this important process. We hope to have a government
“of the people, by the people and for the people.” But
I must emphasize here that the adoption of an enlightened constitution represents
only an initial step to the goal of stabilizing democracy in Asia. For democracy
to function effectively in Asia, we must also address the fundamental socio-economic
problems prevalent in Asia. The first is
to eradicate absolute poverty. Every one of Thailand’s citizens deserves
the opportunity to achieve an acceptable standard of living. Any obstacle
in the way of such opportunities, whether constitutional or extra-constitutional,
must be removed. This is axiomatic in any political system that claims to call
itself a democracy. It is also a pre-condition for sustainable democracy. As has
been most evident in modern Thai history, poverty is an invitation to one of the
easiest steps to authoritarianism: vote-buying. We must reduce the demand
for vote-buying through reducing the level of poverty in our countries. Otherwise,
vote-buying will continue to compromise the integrity of our electoral process.
Asian governments thus need to pursue “growing with equity” and bridge
the gap between rich and poor. Secondly,
we must provide our people with the education, skills, and opportunities
to enable them to function effectively in society and secure a livelihood. Experience
has shown that as peoples’ income rise and their horizons broaden, they will more
likely demand the right to participate in government and to enjoy full protection
under the rule of law. An informed electorate that is politically aware, knowledgeable
and committed to democratic principles is the key to good governance. Thirdly,
we must develop civil society. The Philippines has led the region
in this respect and provides a valuable role model for the rest of Asia. The contribution
of non-governmental organizations to national development has been commendable.
The Philippines’ respect for freedom of speech and the press should be the norm
for the region. Donald Kagan, a distinguished
scholar of ancient Greek history, in his book Pericles of Athens and the Birth
of Democracy, writes that democratic governance relies on three conditions:
- The first is to have a base of well-established political
institutions;
- The second is to have a body of
citizens who possess a mature understanding of the principles of democracy;
- The third is to have capable and responsive leadership.
We
must recognize that all this takes time – not just years, but decades and the
passing of generations. The road to democracy
is long and arduous, especially for countries which have long suffered economic
disadvantage. It is claimed by some in Asia that democracy is economically inefficient,
and that, “enlightened authoritarianism” is a more effective means
of generating economic growth. Some go so far as to say that this is a basic Asian
value, to be cherished and nurtured. This to some degree may be true. I would,
however, like to express a word of caution here. While a strong hand may guide
a nation out of hardship, even the most compassionate authoritarian leader is
likely to be vulnerable to the corrupting influence of power. Asia
today faces a moral dilemma. Constitutionalism is being questioned by powerful
voices, often acting in what they believe are the best collective interests of
the people. It has been implied that constitutionalism is anti-ethical to Asian
values, that it is an alien intrusion carrying the seeds of chaos. Yet,
it is my contention that constitutionalism is the key to law and order in the
best sense of that term. Strong and effective leadership in this region must be
based on the will of the people and must respect individual freedom. Only through
constitutionalism can this region hope to sustain its moral integrity, and thus
its vigorous progress, into the coming millennium. I
should like to conclude this address with a modest proposal. I propose that each
Asian State establish an independent body, representative of the people, to review
its national constitution. That review would assess the extent to which the constitution
fulfills the seven requirements of constitutionalism that I have outlined here.
It would propose means whereby constitutional reforms might be pursed to ensure
the full and free participation of all the people in the life of the nation. By
that means Asia would come to lead the world in our continuing struggle for law,
and for order. |
| Forging
A Partnership with the New Asia Address by H.E. Mr.
Anand Panyarachun Former Prime Minister of Thailand The Trilateral
Commission Tokyo, March 22, 1997 Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased
indeed to have the honour of addressing this distinguished gathering. The
world today is almost unrecognizable from that which existed when the Trilateral
Commission was formed in 1973. There is
no longer a single defining factor of international politics. In place of the
Cold War is a “hodge-podge” of economic and political issues, over-lapping one
another, blurring the traditional boundaries between the sub-national, the national,
the regional and the global. The pace of technological advancement has so compressed
space and time that ever more issues and players compete for our immediate attention.
Global-free market forces have pervaded every aspect of economic life, bringing
prosperity and growth even as they constrain the ability of governments to manage
national economic policies. Obviously,
the complexity we now face is different from that which had shaped our way of
thinking for over four decades. With the growing number of issues and actors,
traditional notions of economics, security and national sovereignty are increasingly
called into question or even flouted outright. One would think that after Francis
Fukuyama announced the end of history, the important questions would have been
handily resolved. Instead, vigorous debates are going on about the place of cultural
values, growth-oriented policies, the role of the State, and the role of the market
in promoting human welfare. In the arena of politics, speculation is rife as to
whence the next major conflict is likely to come. Amid
all these changes, a major testing ground will be Asia. Asia
has now joined the ranks of North America, Western Europe and Japan as an engine
of world economic growth. Asia, of course,
is not so uniformly industrialized or democratic that it would constitute a true
and comprehensive third side of the Trilateral Commission. In fact, its success
poses something of a conundrum. Can the Asian miracle be replicated elsewhere?
Is there an Asian model of development? Is there a set of Asian values that underlie
the region’s stunning performance? Or is it simply a matter of mobilizing capital
and labour inputs in sufficient quantities? The
diversity of Asia allows no easy answers. Every explanation begets a counter-argument.
All that can be agreed on is that the rise of Asia is the biggest event of the
late 20th century. Even if we allow for the recent drop-off in Asian growth rates,
or a downward revision in the GDP based on purchasing power parity (as the World
Bank did for China last year), the economic weight of the region will still be
considerable, thanks to its enormous and ever-wealthier population. For the rest
of our lifetimes, at the very least, the impact of developments in Asia will be
felt far beyond its shores. Asia’s economic
resurgence has led to a new-found confidence. Pundits such as John Naisbitt foresee
an increasing assertiveness of Asian identity, and prominent Asian leaders are
making a case for the importance of Asian cultural values for economic growth
and development. A growing number of influential thinkers, led by Samuel Huntington,
ascribe to culture a significance that surpasses even traditional economic and
political factors. This is actually a replay
of a debate in political science circles that took place a few decades ago, when
American academics were assessing the development chances of Third World countries.
The difference is that this time the cultural explanation is receiving a wider
audience in policy circles. The trouble
with culture and values, as the debate on political culture the first time around
showed, is that they are so hard to pin down. In
this world of inter-dependence and globalization, I suppose the assertion of values
as an explanatory variable can be re-assuring to some. It is difficult to tell
how much of, say, Asia’s economic success can be attributed to values or to the
right policies and institutions. What’s more, nations do not always fall neatly
into the civilizational slots assigned them. When
the concept at hand is so vague and impractical, yet is presented as the major
force that will lead to future conflict, it can hinder us from taking a constructive
approach towards one another. Rather than a clash of civilizations, the true clash
may be a clash of dogmas. I think we should
recognize the values debate for the distraction it is and focus on ways to build
bridges among us. The world has a vital stake in the future of Asia. Our common
interests will be better served by concentrating on that which binds us together,
by identifying areas where we can co-operate for mutual benefit. It is our duty
to prove that the champions of cultural and civilizational rifts are wrong. More
substantive challenges face the international community as it attempts to come
to terms with Asia’s growing economic - and inevitably political - clout. There
seems to be an odd mixture of optimism and apprehension in the West over the prospects
of an Asia ascendant. I tend to see the challenges as opportunities in disguise.
The trick is to approach them in the right frame of mind, to keep things in perspective. Keeping
things in perspective can be hard, but it is necessary if we are to continue on
the right path. Seeing skyscrapers spring up from rice paddies and fields of roof-top
satellite dishes can easily lead one to take for granted the glowing projections
about Asia in the 21st century. There is
no greater hype about Asia than the label “economic miracle.” To paraphrase an
old show biz saying, it took the East Asian countries decades to become “overnight
successes”, and plenty of toil and tears to pull off the miracle. A
miracle is by definition an un-natural phenomenon. As such, it should not be expected
to last indefinitely. Admittedly, it is
heart-warming to see institutions such as the World Bank use boom-year figures
to extrapolate Asia’s growth up to the year 2020, because that would make Thailand
the 8th largest economy in the world by that time. When
we consider how hard it is to forecast accurately even the next five years in
this fast-changing world, such academic exercises can lull us into complacency. In
between World Bank projections of Asian economic dominance, we should also take
into account the predictions of the doom-sayers. Andy Grove of Intel Corporation
says only the paranoid survive, and I think that’s an appropriate sentiment to
bear in mind as we sail into the uncharted waters of the new millennium. Whether
and how quickly Asia fulfills the prophecies made for it will depend on how it
strikes a balance between sometimes conflicting priorities. One
example is the balance between the State and the market. Many governments are
paranoid, but not quite in the way Andy Grove meant. They want both the benefits
of opening up their economies, yet balk at the prospect of surrendering control
to the vagaries of the market. As globalization intensifies, as market forces
and technology strip away the ability of central authorities to control flows
of capital and information, governments still attempt to cling to the old certainties. In
Southeast Asia, we see evidence of this ambivalence. At one level, the region
is heading towards greater economic openness and integration. The ASEAN Free Trade
Area, which is on track to be completed by the year 2003, will make ASEAN a market
comprising some 470 million people. The ASEAN members are firmly committed to
AFTA, because they recognize that delay or backtracking means AFTA will be made
redundant by APEC and the WTO. ASEAN’s competitive edge and credibility depends
on AFTA staying one step ahead of the game. At
another level, there is evidence that not all countries in the region are quite
ready to let the market decide. While Thailand has become a regional hub for the
automotive industry without State direction, countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia
have invested heavily in national car projects, and Malaysia is promoting a huge
Multi-media Super Corridor designed to attract hi-tech companies, in an Asian
version of Silicon Valley. Such efforts may well turn out to be successful in
the long run, but more importantly, they show that despite what proponents of
the border-less world say, governments are not about to go quietly into the night. This
ambivalence about giving market forces free rein is part of a larger trend. Mainstream
liberal thinkers, including Robert Kuttner and even George Soros, are increasingly
questioning the gospel of free-market capitalism. In
economies newly emerging from the constraints of central planning, laissez-faire
is the order of the day. In Asia, unfettered market forces are creating new wealth
and prosperity. At the same time they are also creating new problems, of widening
income gaps, of environmental degradation, of unsustainable resource use. This
presents another dilemma for Asia. The very factors that will make East Asia an
economic colossus, pose challenges for long-term growth. This is the world’s most
populous continent, with almost 1.3 billion in China alone. The latent energies
of this mass of humanity are only beginning to be tapped, as governments open
up their economies and compete for foreign direct investment. As the developing
countries’ manpower enters the world labour market, it forces earlier industrializers
to upgrade their production structure to stay one step ahead, in a kind of economic
domino effect. The upside to all this is
that incomes will rise, as will demand for goods and services. This will in turn
spur trade and investment, within Asia and with the world. Barring catastrophic
upheavals, Asia will become the pre-eminent economic centre of the world, even
if actual growth rates fall short of those in the late 20th century. The
downside to Asia’s growth is the strain it will exert on the environment and the
earth’s resources. This can in turn lead to international frictions. Neo-Malthusian
predictions, of course, are nothing new. The population bomb scare of the 1970s
was eventually proven wrong (or premature, depending on how one looks at it),
thanks to scientific advances and the “green” revolution. Current thinking, though,
has it that the limits of sustainability are quickly being reached. Not only is
the population growing, industrialization and its side effects are on the verge
of outstripping the earth’s ability to repair itself. This sort of argument comes
not only from dyed-in-the wool tree-huggers, but increasingly from mainstream
research. Among the most pressing issues
for Asia is water. A recent UN report noted that only 0.007 per cent of the earth’s
water is readily accessible for human uses, and that water use has been growing
at more than twice the rate of the population increase during this century. With
the world population expected to increase from 5.7 billion now to 8.3 billion
by 2025, with more water needed for agriculture, irrigation and industry, and
with a growing proportion of consumers, the strain on water resources can lead
to more frequent international disputes over water rights. The Asia Development
Bank estimates $80 billion to $100 billion will be needed over the next five years
to lay an acceptable foundation for a water infrastructure in Asia. Moreover,
as arable land is increasingly converted to industrial use, grain production in
rapidly industrializing economies may not be able to keep pace with demand. Likewise,
the demand for energy will surge as Asia’s newly affluent adopt Western life-styles,
with TVs, refrigerators, computers and cars. Already,
trade in non- or semi-renewable resources has burgeoned, as wealth spurs demand
for such commodities as timber, oil and gas, and even endangered animal species
believed to have medicinal properties. These
developments will play a key part in determining foreign policy, as nations seek
to secure supplies and supply lines. Poorer countries, which tend to also be the
most abundant in natural resources, will have little choice but to comply with
the demands of the market. This is one
key area where the West and Japan can make a useful contribution. Asia’s industrialization
has come at a high environmental cost, and this is one of the most serious obstacles
to sustainable development. As early industrializers, Western governments are
familiar with the growing pains of rapid development, and have worked out ways
to manage resources and even undo decades of damage. A growing environmental movement
is gathering strength in Asia, and companies from America, Europe and Japan are
well placed to address their concerns. As Asia seeks to clean-up, so can environmental
management companies. There are other areas,
such as information technology, where our interests coincide - where the strengths
of the trilateral countries can help Asia’s development, while themselves benefiting
in the process. Let us not be side-tracked into giving tangential issues more
importance than they deserve. It is not in anybody’s interest to attempt to remake
others in their image, as the only response will be resistance. As inter-action
and inter-dependence increase, a certain degree of convergence will occur naturally.
Let us remember that diversity is healthy for the survival of the species. Let
us find mutual benefit in our diversity, and learn from one another, for only
by doing so can we grow together into a community that transcends all boundaries.
|
| Keynote
Address
by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Former Prime Minister Chairman,
Saha-Union Public Co. Ltd. in the Fourth AFCRA Conference on “Competitiveness
of Asian Emerging Economies” November 29, 1996 Mr.
Chairman, Distinguished Guests and Colleagues, Ladies
and Gentlemen, It gives me great
pleasure to be here in another activity representing the development of
cooperation among ASEAN member countries, namely the Fourth AFCRA Conference. For
many years I have witnessed the increasing sense of ASEAN spirit and partnership
which translates cooperation of organizations and professionals across the region
into important and visible institutions in their own right. Such a leading institution
has been the ASEAN Forum of Credit Rating Agencies or AFCRA. AFCRA
has been a successful model of ASEAN values of consensus and cooperation
in action. As you know, rating agencies provide a crucial role in today’s global
financial markets. They inform investors of the risk of their investment and this
creates a better climate for future investment. They
also send signals to governments, such as Thailand, to improve their financial
and economic directions as well as to companies to maintain prudent debt management. AFCRA
should be congratulated on its past development and is to be encouraged to continue
its successful collaboration. Let me begin
my discussion of competitiveness with a personal observation. I
have often found discussions of competitiveness very much like the proverbial
ten blind men describing an elephant from one of its parts. No one has a full
picture of it. Therefore, I am very pleased that AFCRA has taken the challenge
of trying to understand competitiveness in all its facets. When
we look at the top 25 companies in ASEAN, three observations come to mind.
First you will see international companies: SONY (3), CALTEX (4), SEAGATE (5),
MATSUSHITA (9) and HEWLETT PACKARD (11). These
companies represent consumer electronics, computer-related and energy. They are
all based in Singapore. Secondly, you will
see a variety of public enterprises: Pertamina (1), Petroleum
National (2), Petroleum Authority (7), Singapore Airlines (8) and Electric Generating
Authority of Thailand (12) These are all
State-owned companies in the energy sector, with the exception of Singapore Airlines,
which has been privatized. A final group
of companies representing major local businesses are Astra International of Indonesia
(6), Sime Darby of Malaysia (10), Siam Cement of Thailand (15), San - Migual
of the Philippines (18) and Hong Leong Investment of Singapore (21). These
are businesses, which have achieved a strong level of performance and a
recognized level of business leadership in ASEAN. Two
key questions are reached: First, does
it appear that countries are not competitive while companies are? Second,
why are international companies so often based in Singapore - is it because Singapore
is the number one in competitiveness or is Singapore number one because so many
leading companies, because of their own competitiveness, choose Singapore for
strategic reasons? My own
assessment is that it is the competitiveness of companies that is the key factor.
Countries that provide excellent supporting conditions attract the companies and
this in turn stimulates the economy. Let
me support this assertion by looking at the factors or criteria used to indicate
competitiveness: 1. Economic strength 2.
Internationalization 3. Government regulations and policies 4. Financial
market 5. Science and technology 6. Management 7. Infrastructure 8.
Human resources It is interesting
that with the exception of management, the remaining factors are all public policies
related. The key point is that a climate
supportive of competitiveness requires effective public policy to guide the economy
and international trade, science and technology, infrastructure development arid
human resource development. Thus, what is perceived, as “a country’s competitiveness”
is more likely a measure of how good its public policy is? Let
me consider the definitions the World Economic Forum used of management: “Management
measures the effort of business leaders and business organizations to respond
to market opportunities. The countries with a well managed capacity will display
a higher rate of economic growth.” To simplify
this: Management capacity and business
capability - sustained economic growth. It
is the role of business to develop the economy, and the role of government
to provide the supporting environment for this development. It is not the other
way round. Let us consider the ASEAN rankings
for competitiveness: Singapore (1), Malaysia (10), Thailand
(14), Indonesia (30) and the Philippines (31). What
this indicates to me is an assessment of how good public policy is in the various
member countries. Please allow me to draw
your attention on the role of human resources and competitiveness. One
major failure in supporting competitiveness in the ASEAN region has been the insufficient
attention to human resource development. For
example, in basic skills the rankings are not very promising: Singapore (29),
Malaysia (31), the Philippines (33), Thailand (39) and Indonesia (45) On
the contrary, in this same ranking the U.S. is #1 and Japan is #10. This strongly
indicates to me the lack of attention ASEAN members have for human resource development. It
seems to be that it is not the cost of labour, which relates to competitiveness
but the skill and quality that labour can provide. This
conclusion can also be illustrated by another factor, i.e. the comparison between
productivity and wage increases over time, between 1983 and 1993.
| | Productivity | Wage
Increases | | Singapore | $4.8 | $11.3 |
| Malaysia | $4.8 | $5.3 |
| Thailand | $5.7 | $8.8 |
For these three examples, wages have
grown faster than productivity. This means that labour is becoming more expensive.
It also means that management has been slow to develop ways to enhance the performance
of business. There is a business failure of competitiveness to improve the productivity
of employees and the profitability of companies. The
last issue that I would like to share my opinion with you is the new direction
of human resources development for competitiveness. It
is always true that companies will strive for competitiveness despite what government
does or does not do. This often leads to companies re-locating where public policy
is more supportive. At this point I would
like to make a modest proposal - that governments in ASEAN, but particularly in
Thailand, can demonstrate a public policy supportive of competitiveness by giving
a strong priority to quality human resource development. Policy
initiatives to do this could include: 1.
Raise attendance at primary and secondary schools. 2. Improve the quality
of educational programmes and institutions at all levels 3. Establish more
comprehensive vocational training programmes. 4. Emphasize more science
techno1ogy and engineering programmes. 5. Enhance education and development
programmes for managers to become more globally aware and professionally capable. Skilled
people are the key resource for competitiveness and education creates the foundation
for this advantage. Well-planned educational
policy accelerates human capital development, which is essential to factors supporting
competitiveness that I had mentioned earlier, namely, science and technology,
internationalization, financial development and economic strength. Developed
and capable human resources provide better quality, greater innovation and higher
productivity. They save more, invest more and pay taxes In
other words, human resources development brings the highest return on investment. On
this note, you have my best wishes for the success of this conference! |
Asian
Business Leadership: Planning for the Future Dusit
Thani Hotel March 3, 1996 I am honoured to be
here tonight to address some of the top CEOs and presidents from around the region.
This is the first forum that I can think of that has drawn senior Asian company
executives together to share views and insights. I believe that Asians have a
great deal to learn from one another and I welcome other Dialogue programmes that
focus on the dynamic companies and leaders of Asia. The importance of this event
is underlined by the re-scheduling of a previous engagement to attend ABL. Tonight
I would like to speak on the roadmap for Asian business leadership and planning
for its future. Asia is a complex environment
in which to do business. Each country has its own unique history and culture.
In addition to these characteristics, the politics and economic development in
each country has greatly influenced the business structures, which have developed.
Successful companies such as the Birla Group, Sime Darby and SGV, however,
were early pioneers that focused on the similarities in this diverse region to
develop their regional businesses. Managing and operating as a regional business
rather than a national company is an important factor in their success. I believe
Asian companies will increasingly look to similar Asian companies as a model to
develop or enhance their regional businesses. These successful Asian companies
will also change how Asian companies are organised, managed and will plan for
the future. As international trade barriers
are eliminated, Multi-National Corporations (MNC) and regional players will increasingly
try to identify markets where they have a competitive advantage. Asian companies
have the ability to develop as competitive businesses as any MNC. The key to success
is to ensure the management and organisational structures are developed to respond
to the unique opportunities and challenges in Asia. San Miguel is an excellent
example of a company rising to this challenge. As San Miguel has discovered, an
Asian company can become a major player in the global beer market. A large regional
consumer market has made it possible for Asian companies to develop comparable
market volumes to truly global companies, by staying focused solely on Asia. Imagine
what could happen when that focus shifts to global arena. Asia
is often viewed as a region where companies need to court political favours to
be successful, but multi-lateral trade organisations are changing how business
is conducted in Asia as well as other parts of the World. Asian companies must
begin to explore key management issues as the means to get ahead. Companies must
rely more on their ability to manage resources and people rather than count on
political favour for their competitive advantage today. Our goal should be to
develop world class market leaders that are as common in Asia as they are in the
US or Europe. The forum over the next few days offers an excellent opportunity
to learn from some of the best strategists and management-thinkers in the world
and bring this vision to reality. Asian
companies have three distinct competitive advantages. One of the greatest advantages
Asian companies have over other large companies such us MNCs are flexibility.
This trait has allowed many companies to grow and flourish, and has even enabled
many smaller players to compete successfully with larger MNCs. Many companies
that develop into large market-leading companies become too complacent and even
risk-adverse, focusing on asset maintenance rather than growth. Asian companies
should learn from this and strive to maintain flexibility as they prosper. Another
advantage of many Asian companies is the family-owned business structure. The
ability of these companies to focus on the long term without outside investor
pressure is a key competitive advantage. As family-owned businesses grow and expand
regionally, a transition from family-owned and family-managed to family-owned
but professionally managed is occurring. The challenge to family-owned and managed
businesses is the retention of qualified management; professional managers will
not stay long in family companies where decision- making is based on family status.
The balance between family-owned but professionally managed companies exists to
a high degree in Korea. This can be used as a model on which to propel family-owned
businesses into the global arena. Asian
companies are less likely to be weighted with outdated technology. The ability
to leapfrog generations of older technology without the burden of replacing older
units, is also a competitive advantage. In addition, as technology becomes less
of a factor in companies maintaining market leadership and as the lead times to
develop new products is reduced, the availability of technology becomes more like
a commodity. These three competitive advantages
are just a few of the factors transforming business organisations in Asia. So
where does this leave us in terms of looking at some of the challenges ahead for
the leading companies in Asia? There are
some key challenges facing Asia’s business leaders, which require us to continue
to change and adapt our organisations and practices in order to respond effectively
or face being left behind. In making these changes in our organisations, in order
to compete in the future, it is my hope that we do not discard some practices,
which have served us well and are common across the region. In
Asia, the biggest challenge facing business today is that of human resources.
The lack of qualified and well-trained executives has the potential to de-rail
our progress, more than any other single factor. While infrastructure projects
are basically a one-time expenditure, education requires a continual investment.
It is clearly an issue that needs attention. A shortage of skilled middle and
upper management already exists. To develop a long-term solution, we must turn
our attention to academic institutions. The
Malaysian Minister of Education expressed it best when he said, “We have been
recipients of knowledge from the West. The time is ripe for us to be originators
of it.” The global thought leaders who have one to Bangkok to share some of their
insights, come mostly from business schools in the West. They have useful insights,
and through extensive study and research have contributed to the field of management.
How many executives could name the Minister of Education for any country including
their own? Business leaders must take leadership to improve education and to develop
regional talent. The business leaders need to be part of a solution. Companies
profiting in Asia should give back to society in the region. There
is a need, for leadership within the business community for work across the region.
The scope of business research conducted is focused on local issues, however,
not at cross-border issues, which Asian companies face. Business leaders should
unite and promote the development of funds to develop projects that focus on relevant
cross-border issues. If our business schools
are unable to adequately undertake such research, the fund could be used to undertake
joint co-operative research with researchers from Western institutions, thus helping
to upgrade university students' research skills. A commitment of US$25,000 from
one hundred companies will go a long way to attract talented academics back to
Asia and also help us to understand what business practices work best in Asia
for the long term. As business leaders, you not only help yourself but also take
one small step towards addressing this major problem faced throughout Asia. The
challenge of business leaders is to show vision and commitment to develop our
own role models and management gurus. While
there are other challenges faced by companies in Asia, I think one of the most
formidable is the shortage of middle management and human resources in the region.
While we have our national business leaders, we also need regional business leaders
to step forward. I hope this has perhaps made a few people think about one small
thing they can easily do. If it has made one person begin to think about their
role and responsibility to the region in addition to their country or company,
I think this will be a healthy development in our corporate development. Avoiding
the natural nationalistic tendencies for companies that dominate one market is
important. The only other challenge I would
like to discuss is the building of lasting organisations. This requires developing
and instilling core values within every member of the organisation. This value
system will help organisations get beyond owner-dependent personalities. It should
be our goal to fill Asian companies’ corporate annual reports with quotes from
Asian leaders and legends, rather than the quotes by Western figures as currently
seen in so many corporate annual reports. Thank
you for your attention. I hope I have left you with enthusiasm and the knowledge
that you have the opportunity to influence and lead the direction of your organisation
and contribute to the future of the region. It is easier to shape the future
than to react to it! |
Quest
for Investment Liberalization Luncheon Address by
Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman, Saha Union Public Co., Ltd. Former
Prime Minister of Thailand at APEC Investment Symposium Shangri-la
Hotel, Bangkok October 2, 1995 Distinguished
Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great
pleasure for me to be here today at this event and to address such a distinguished
gathering. This is a unique occasion where we have government officials, business
representatives, and academia from APEC member economies as well as representatives
from international organizations, all gathered here in Bangkok to discuss how
APEC should move forward to achieve freer investment flows. I
believe there is no need to stress the importance of the topic that you, distinguished
guests, are focusing on at this symposium. We are all aware that investment is
an area without concrete frontiers. A broad spectrum of issues is related to investments.
It is undeniably a complex, difficult issue with far-reaching implications for
every economy. Nevertheless, this challenge is worth exploring, particularly for
APEC, which has a goal to achieve free and open trade and investment by
the year 2010 for developed members and 2020 for developing members. Investment
liberalization is a prevalent policy theme around the globe in recent years. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) has been created under
the Uruguay Round trade talks to discipline the use of performance requirements
imposed on investors, and stresses non-discriminatory practices. APEC has produced
its own set of non-binding investment principles. Thailand supports the notion
of the WTO as the best forum for negotiating actual regulations because of its
inclusive, multi-lateral nature. OECD is currently in the process of negotiating
its Multi-lateral Agreement on Investment. Bi-lateral negotiations on investment
issues are conducted on a continual basis. These are just a few examples that
indicate how active development of international investment is right now. The
question is not so much on whether or not governments should liberalize their
investment regimes. Long-term benefits arising from liberal investment environments
are well recognized. In an area with strong intra-regional investment like APEC,
increasing investment flow is certainly desirable as long as it does not isolate
the region or polarize global markets. I
believe that questions of investment liberalization concern “how” and “when” rather
than “whether or not”. The Bogor Declaration has set a general goal for APEC to
achieve free and open trade and investment by the target dates. The details of
“how” and “when” are left to most of you here to figure out. This is not an easy
task, and should be thought about in the larger context of the WTO as well as
APEC. As a former diplomat and presently
a businessman, I would like to take this opportunity to share my views with you.
When I assumed the responsibilities of Prime Minister of Thailand, I had a chance
to be involved in various investment facilitation and liberalization schemes.
As Prime Minister, I also chaired the Board of Investment. My experience tells
me that the agenda in front of you is extremely complicated. A broad range of
factors has to be taken into consideration, and theoretical expectations may diverge
widely from realities. We often hear of
two motives underlying investment liberalization. One is to enhance an economy’s
attractiveness as a foreign investment location. Creation of a level playing field
is often cited as one of the most effective means to attract foreign investment.
The other motive is to benefit consumers. Perfect competition, as the basic economic
theory goes, creates a win-win situation: The industries of an open market and
the global market as a whole are stimulated to work more cost-effectively and
efficiently as a result. Consumers then enjoy the largest range of products at
the best prices. In effect, I believe that
most policy makers have no quarrel with the benign objectives of investment liberalization.
Most governments recognize that competitiveness is a key to thriving in today’s
global economy where distinct borderlines between international economic transactions
do not exist. However, whether these desired objectives can truly and effectively
be materialized remains a moot point. As
one of the creators of the ASEAN Free Trade Area, I certainly have all the reasons
to believe in removal of major barriers to investment. One crucial motive behind
the establishment of AFTA is to induce more foreign investment into this region.
It was not to form a trade bloc. Our idea is that it is easier to begin removing
barriers in a smaller region - and then to keep expanding the barrier-free environment
with the long-term goal of creating a truly free global market. Common
international rules governing the treatment of foreign investment by host governments
are believed to be a means to promote its flow. More freedom and less unpredictability
will occur in an environment where everyone observes the same rules and practices.
You will probably hear about the development of the creation of the Multi-lateral
Agreement on Investment Agreement being pursued by OECD at this symposium. This
so-called “MAI” is expected to provide foreign investors from every part of the
world with the same rules of the game. So, ostensibly, the level playing field
can become a reality. Many policy makers
may argue against the necessity of international rules, claiming investment policies
lie within the sovereign rights of host governments. Moreover, the exact same
set of rules cannot be equally appropriate for both developing and post-industrial
economies. This principle is recognized by GATT, which allows countries trying
to attract investment to poor rural areas to use incentives to lure industries. It
should be noted that barriers to investment do not come from public policies alone;
natural resources, history, geography and other factors all come into play. However,
one school of thought holds that by creating a set of common rules, economies
will ensure the requisite environment for foreign investment. However,
it is not my intention today to debate for or against the formation of the MAl
but to use this as one example of the numerous on-going attempts to establish
universal rules for investment which are believed to promote greater flows. In
the long run, the larger the arena of players, the more efficiently the market
should function. In the shorter term, though, we need to look carefully at the
motives of those pushing regulations on smaller economies. Sometimes, those demanding
common standards are really seeking advantage for themselves, not a cleaner planet
or better treatment of workers. It is notable
that even without a set of common universal rules, liberalization is the current
theme for policy makers in most economies. If we look around the globe, we witness
actions taken by many governments attempting to deregulate and liberalize their
investment regimes with an intention to improve their competitiveness. Rivalry
for foreign investment is growing increasingly severe. This situation naturally
prompts contemplation of positive changes. These actions may have nothing to do
with obligations of governments under international agreements or legal obligations.
Some economies experience success whereas others are still struggling with adjustment. Thailand
is also one of the countries that has chosen a pro-active, yet gradual approach
towards liberalization. We realize that benefits cannot be possible without appropriate
adjustments to cope with the new environment. Gradual steps have been taken to
minimize negative effects. This leads to the whole question of approaches. When
facing external pressure to open up investment regimes, many policy-makers, like
some of you here, may query whether governments should design their own liberalization
regimes rather than having legal “boiler-plate” forced upon them. To create change
is a challenge, because you face resistance arising from inertia and other reasons.
Many people argue that if there is no channel to force things to happen, change
will never take place. It is often said that governments will only take liberalization
steps when they have no alternatives, because they cannot take the short-term
political “heat.” This may hold true in many circumstances, but we have seen a
great number of governments taking bold steps in liberalizing their investment
regimes for economic reasons. The key point
here is the readiness of economies to embark on a liberalization journey. Benefits
such as “increased competitiveness” or “greater efficiency” remains theoretical
and abstract until a country has advanced to a certain level of industrial development.
Until that point, when its economy can begin to cope with a globally oriented
environment, such terms lack the meaning and substance attached to them in developed
countries. Given the great diversity in
socio-economic development among APEC economies, there is not one ready-made formula
for successful liberalization. The needs and priorities of one economy greatly
differ from those of others. Ways and means to open up an economy have to be designed
specifically to accommodate relevant settings. With
the same goal and objective, we may take varying routes leading to a common target.
Some governments may prefer gradualism, while others choose to take more radical
steps. Thailand is among the economies that opt for a gradual route. Sustainability
of economic development is probably the single most important factor that determines
ultimate success. Liberalization that leaves an economy in a poorer and more vulnerable
situation than it was should not be APEC‘s goal, or WTO’s. Economic sustainability
is particularly crucial in developing countries, when designing liberalization
packages. I know that many of you here are facing this challenge at this very
moment, and feeling some pressure from countries with larger, stronger economies. Investment
liberalization creates positive effects to economic systems in the long run, but
tends to lead to negative impacts in the shorter run. Can short-term problems
be avoided? Not completely. However, disturbance can be minimized when the right
mechanisms are in place. Gradualism is one way to avoid sudden shocks to domestic
entrepreneurs. Steady, measured change that gradually reaches the goal, is often
the best path for developing economies. Short-term
agitation has to be carefully dealt with; otherwise, backlash can occur and the
expected long-term benefits of liberalization will never be realized. “Equal footing”
competition is often quoted as an objective for which we should strive Today’s
world does not consist of economies or companies with the same features, operating
in similar competitive environments. In
concluding, no one doubt the merits of investment liberalization, but how to go
about it still pose several questions. No success formula that applies equally
to every economy exists. We have to create our own individual concoctions that
address particular features of our economy. I truly believe that we do have many
options to choose from, in achieving the goal of free and open investment. |
AIDS
and Social and Economic Progress in the Asian and
Pacific Countries by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Third International
Conference on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific Fifth National AIDS Seminar
in Thailand Chiang Mai September 21, 1995 Excellencies,
Distinguished Guests and Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Over the past few days of deliberations on the myriad issues
and topics relating to AIDS in the region, it seems that there is a wealth of
knowledge and experience on addressing the issue of AIDS. It seems that we have
a good idea of what we must do. Then, why must we continually call for action
to prevent the further spread of AIDS? As
I reflected on the topic for discussion today, I felt the most useful contribution
I could make to this forum was to share the perspective of a group that seems
to have been otherwise excluded from the deliberations here - the heads of government
and national leaders. My humble opinion is that without the commitment of leadership
at the highest level to preventing further spread of AIDS; we will never see the
scale of action necessary to address this issue and its social and economic consequences. AIDS
must be viewed as a national development issue. If we present AIDS as a health
problem, it will be treated as such. AIDS is not a health problem, it is a behavioral
and a societal problem - and an urgent national development priority. Today, AIDS
remains the most critical threat to the social and economic progress of the region
- along with environmental degradation. The
leaders of our countries are not taking AIDS seriously enough. I am here today
to tell you about my view as the former Prime Minister of a country facing one
of the fastest spreading AIDS epidemics on the planet, in the hope that we can
get more leaders to take AIDS more seriously. We need more action! II.
The Case of Thailand You and many others
around the world have heard much about AIDS in Thailand. You will continue to
hear about AIDS in Thailand because many people are infected and they are only
beginning to become sick. We are only beginning to feel the impact on our society.
It will become severe, as it has already in some communities, and it will become
more and more painful. Even with the hard-earned
successes to-date, Thailand must still learn to care for the 800,000 infected
people and their families - many of them live not too far from where we sit at
this moment. Many resources from the pockets of these families, from government
budgets, and from our society as a whole, will be consumed by these infections
and associated illnesses. Thanks to many
people here in this room, you have heard many reports on some of the successes
here in Thailand so far. There is much more to do, on many fronts. We must be
honest and accept that there is still too much discrimination against people with
AIDS in this country. Action must start at home, with our own attitudes. Many
companies in Thailand have adopted progressive AIDS education programmes in the
workplace, but still many companies - including some foreign firms - continue
to discriminate against people with AIDS. There
are some important lessons in Thailand’s experience. We must focus on action,
time is running out. We must enlist the commitment of the highest levels of authority
and begin implementing the necessary prevention programmes on a meaningful scale. In
early 1991, I assumed the Office of the Prime Minister, here in Thailand. This
was a time when Thailand was moving from several years of denial, to a gradual
acceptance that AIDS would pose a significant threat to social and economic progress.
Already in place was an immigration regulation, prohibiting HIV-positive people
from entering the country. Awaiting my
government’s consideration from the previous year, was proposed legislation, whereby,
HIV-positive people would be subject to close scrutiny by health officials and
could be detained if their behaviour was determined a threat to public safety.
This legislation would also require the head of every household to report to the
authorities any HIV-positive member of their household. In
addition to this legislation was a proposal to establish “therapeutic communities”
where HIV-positive people were to be sent, under quarantine. This gives you a
sense of the prevailing attitude at the time - those were dark days. So,
when I entered office these proposals awaited us. Had we not paid close attention
to these issues, we could have followed quite a different path. With close assistance
and cooperation from the NGO sector, we were able to prevent these proposed draconian
measures. Upon assuming office, we faced
a whole host of pressing issues regarding trade and investment, land reform, education,
and many more. The economy had been growing at over eight percent for ten years,
and some important actions were required to set the stage for another decade of
growth. As we looked at national development, we could not ignore the AIDS controversy. There
was no consensus on the extent of the problem, so the previous governments had
difficulty agreeing on a solution - let alone implementing it. We made a concerted
effort to analyze the actual situation. We were open and honest about the size
of the problem because this was the only way to mobilize the required response
of a corresponding magnitude. This is a
critical point. Without an open assessment of the current extent of the problem,
we are unable to plan the necessary response. Today, there is far too much deception
and denial about the extent of AIDS in the countries of this region. When we made
public our projections, we became highly unpopular among the tourism industry.
I am happy to say that because of our actions back in 1991, we still have a tourism
industry today. In fact, there are more tourists this year than in 1991, and you
can be sure there are more people with AIDS. If we do not address the problem
early, we are ensuring the early demise of tourism. So, effective action on AIDS
begins with a realistic assessment of the problem and a planned response of corresponding
magnitude. To achieve the goals of our
plan, we needed a comprehensive multi-sectoral effort. To mobilize these sectors
and maintain a focus on this urgent issue, I accepted the Chairmanship of the
National AIDS Committee. I am told that I was the only head of government at the
time to lead a national AIDS effort, but - for me - there was no other way. For
effective action against AIDS, you need both: the highest level of authority and
the broadest base of support. I put the
National Economic and Social Development Planning Board, our national planning
authority, in charge of formulating our National AIDS Action Plan. They included
AIDS in the National Development Plan and ensured smooth cooperation between the
ministries and government agencies in formulating a comprehensive action plan
for the long-term. Our AIDS prevention
efforts included all sectors; it was the only way to mobilize a meaningful response.
We made a point to enlist companies, schools, all government ministries - including
the Army and Police, the NGOs, and the communities themselves. I invited all relevant
groups to join the National AIDS Committee - the Tourism Authority, the Hotel
Association, and the Federation of Thai Industries, the Chamber of Commerce, and
the Thai Bankers’ Association. They all had to play a part, so we gave them a
constructive role. By including them in the process, we could depend upon their
cooperation and assistance. As the Prime
Minister, I demanded that all government ministries play an active role in AIDS
prevention and we granted necessary budget allocations for these activities. AIDS
is much bigger than the Ministry of Health; it is much bigger than government
as a whole. In fact, many other ministries play the most important roles in communicating
to the public and educating people about AIDS. Government
budgets are critical. We could not expect all of the ministries and provinces
to play the active role we were demanding, without giving them the necessary resources.
So, we approved supplemental budgets for AIDS activities. We
mobilized foreign donor funding and maximized in-kind contributions, like radio
and television airtime from the stations and creative media talent from the advertising
companies. Companies even paid for the printing of most of our public information
materials at the time. We did not see HIV
as a health problem; we approached it as a national development issue. We were
facing a potential economic impact equivalent to 20% of our GDP by the year 2000,
not to mention the social devastation an epidemic of such a scale would cause.
Without such a comprehensive effort, our response would have amounted to “throwing
a bucket of water at our burning house”. ‘Without
our own financial commitment, others would not have taken us so seriously. AIDS
is our national development issue, and it requires our own investment. We must
demonstrate our political and financial commitment, before we can expect anyone
else to contribute. My government was not
popular for promoting AIDS prevention so openly at the time, but research now
shows that these efforts were effective in changing behaviour and reducing the
rate of increase in all sexually-transmitted disease infections, including HIV.
It was recently reported in the Lancet that during the years 1991
to 1993, the incidence of sexually-transmitted diseases decreased by 77 percent.
So, action works! In some ways, Thailand
is lucky. However, it is tragic that it took us over three years to mobilize enough
of an education and prevention effort to begin changing people’s behavior - and
many people were infected during this time of denial and cover-up. However, because
we did make a concerted effort to educate people and equip them to prevent becoming
infected, I would like to think we were able to avoid many more infections. Even
now, we must remain vigilant. AIDS has slipped from the consciences of our own
leaders of late. If left unchecked, AIDS could still proliferate and impede Thailand’s
social and economic progress far into the future. The US Bureau of the Census
has estimated that if Thailand is unable to slow the rate of AIDS infections:
the Average Life Expectancy at Birth in the year 2010 will be only 44 years -
a dramatic drop of 30 years from the 74 years we would achieve without AIDS. This
would return our life expectancy back to the same level as in the 1930s. The
same study shows that in that year Thailand will experience a negative annual
population growth rate of minus 0.8 percent, compared to a positive 0.9 percent
growth rate without AIDS. Ten years later, in the year 2020, our population would
be about 62 million rather than the projected 78 million without AIDS - a full
16 million people less, due to AIDS-related deaths and associated demographic
changes. This is the equivalent number of population growth for the next 20 years! Today
in Thailand, we need continued action to educate young people about sexuality
and its consequences. We must demonstrate compassion for those already infected,
and seek to provide them with as much decent care as we can afford. We must constantly
remind ourselves, that action can prevent further tragedy. Ill.
Implications for the Region As we consider
the implications for other countries in the region, I think we must accept several
hard truths. Despite some action and awareness,
the progress made to date is still small. AIDS is prevalent
throughout the region, now more than ever. AIDS will affect ALL
countries in the region - rich and poor. Countries
enjoying rapid economic growth could face serious obstacles to further economic
progress, if AIDS is not addressed as a national development issue now. For those
Asian countries experiencing high economic growth - like Thailand, AIDS will affect
some critical economic sectors such as tourism, labour exports, and foreign direct
investment. Tourists are reluctant to visit
countries where they know that AIDS is not under control. This will be exacerbated
when we consider that the more people there are with AIDS, the more hosts there
are for communicative tuberculosis. This will surely keep tourists away. Similarly,
there will be a greater reluctance from certain countries to accept guest workers
from places known to have a high prevalence of AIDS. After all, AIDS is most prevalent
among the most economically active segment of the population. As
more and more people become sick from the illnesses associated with AIDS, labour
costs will be forced to increase. More health costs will have to be covered and
more people will be removed from the labour supply. With higher labour costs,
foreign companies will be deterred from investing and will seek other places to
locate their business. This will affect us as a region because all Southeast Asian
countries will eventually face a similar fate. In
poorer countries, AIDS threatens to condemn the majority to another generation
of grinding poverty. Such countries will face significant difficulties in stimulating
economic growth if effective AIDS prevention is avoided or postponed until it
becomes too serious. National leadership must address AIDS as an urgent national
development priority and reflect this in government policies, plans and budgets
- not to make donor governments or international investors happy - but, for only
one purpose, to initiate effective action. AIDS
will have the most severe impact in countries where men frequent commercial sex
and where the government is most apathetic about effective prevention. Conversely,
those countries that take early and effective action, can minimize the scale of
the epidemic, and lessen its impact on social and economic progress far into the
future. I would hazard to guess that on
average no less than 20% of GDP is at stake for each and every country in the
region, if we do not achieve more results in the next twelve months. Of course,
we stand to lose much more, when we consider the pain and suffering, social tension,
and other unquantifiable implications. AIDS represents such a significant threat
to social and economic progress in the region, that the Asian Development Bank
should be offering substantial grants to countries that successfully initiate
effective AIDS action plans. I hope they are represented here today to hear this.
They should reward the countries that take AIDS seriously and achieve significant
reductions in the potential impact of the epidemic. This should serve as an incentive
to the governments in the region, and send a strong message to the heads of government,
finance ministers and business leaders. It could be the best investment the ADB
will ever make. Any other economic or trade
issue with the potential to affect 20% of GDP -such as AFTA or the rise of the
Yen - would have its own summit. Why should AIDS be different? Only because the
leaders do not understand that AIDS is an economic issue. IV.
Conclusion and Call to Action We have
learned many important lessons over the years. I do not think we need to spend
much more time searching for answers. I think we must focus on action - time is
running out for many in the region. Our opportunity for early action has passed
us by. We face a momentous and growing task. We must re-think our approach. AIDS
policy-making in the region is still medically oriented. Leaders still do not
realize how seriously their societies will be affected if AIDS is not addressed
properly. We must get the leaders more involved. Many
resources have been devoted to the preparation of this conference. It behooves
us to brief the leaders of this region about the important lessons that were discussed
in these halls over the past week. We need not do any further research for this
purpose; we should summarize our current findings and propose a prescription for
success. We must sell solutions. We should get the heads of government from around
the region into the same room to gain their unqualified commitment and endorsement
of national AIDS action plans by the middle of next year. We must focus on results. The
next AIDS conference should be for parliamentarians and business leaders. These
are the people that initiate and sustain action. Most of the answers to the problems
of AIDS are already known. We must communicate these to the people who control
the wheels of power and the purse. Time
has run out on millions in the region. We have the answers. We need solutions.
Let us focus on action. Let us return to our countries and enlist the meaningful
involvement of our leaders, it is the only way. |
The
Future of Asia’s Past – Bringing Conservation
Philosophy into Practice
by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman
of the Council of Trustees, Thailand Environment Institute Chairman,
Thailand Business Council for Sustainable Development Chiang Mai Orchid
Hotel, Chiang Mai, Thailand January 11, 1995 Mr.
Nicholas Platt, President of the Asia Society Dr. Vishakha
Desai, Vice President of the Asia Society Mr. Athueck Asvanund,
President of the Siam Society Distinguished guests Ladies
and Gentlemen It is a great pleasure for
me personally to be among so distinguished a gathering, at such an important conference.
My sincere thanks go to the Siam Society, the Asia Society and the Getty Conservation
Institute for organising this momentous gathering. The
theme of this conference evokes excitement and vision. Some of you here may recall
a piece of conversation in “Alice in Wonderland”, by Lewis Carroll.
“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” asked
Alice. “That depends a good deal on where you want to go,” said the Cat. “I
don’t much care where,” said Alice. “Then it doesn’t matter which way you
go”, said the Cat. I have
the distinct impression that the organisers of the present conference not only
do know which way they want to go but also exactly where they want to lead us
to! The timing of this conference is indeed
opportune. Last month’s World Heritage Conference in Phuket has re-focussed attention
on Asia’s rich cultural heritage and natural splendour, and in doing so has highlighted
the very real threats; posed by environmental degradation, uncontrolled development
and, in particular, tourism. The preservation
of Asia’s heritage, as called for by the international community, can no longer
be neglected and must be given due priority commensurate with it’s significance. At
the same time, Asia has reached the point where responsibility for the conservation
of cultural heritage now lies squarely with national governments. In most countries
of Asia, the science of conservation has now advanced to the stage where national
institutions and experts can increasingly take on the task of architectural conservation
themselves. Heritage conservation is therefore,
moving out of what may be termed the “colonial phase” – where academics and concerned
institutions, mostly in developed countries, took the lead in preserving historic
monuments and artifacts in developing countries – and into a new “nationalist
phase” – where national experts are now in the vanguard of protecting their own
cultural heritage. It is thus significant
that we are meeting in Chiang Mai, the seat of Lanna culture, for here the challenges
and pitfalls facing heritage conservation in Asia are only too apparent. Chiang
Mai is the most important city in Northern Thailand. It was founded almost seven
hundred years ago, during the reign of King Mengrai, the ruler of the Lanna Kingdom.
According to old Northern scripts, King Mengrai chose the location and designed
the square-shaped walled city himself. From
its inception until the Burmese conquest in the sixteenth century, Chiang Mai
flourished as the capital of the Lanna Kingdom and the political, commercial and
cultural centre of the North. Following
liberation and revival in the eighteenth century, the city resumed its role as
the principal city of the North and continues to prosper today. Chiang
Mai will celebrate it’s seventh centennial next year. More than any other town
in Thailand, the city has been fighting to preserve the past and it’s architectural
heritage. And nowhere is this glorious past more evident than in the city’s many
temples; built-in the typical Lanna style with multiple-tiered roofs, gracefully-curved
eaves and a portico. But Chiang Mai has
also lost much of its appeal in recent years. The present-day city thrives on
the site of its origin. Thus giving rise to the universal problem of conservation
versus development. The pace of commercialisation
in Chiang Mai has outstripped the best efforts of town planners, resulting in
unsightly high-rise condominiums and office buildings. The traffic situation is
following the same vicious path as that of Bangkok, with consequent noise, air
and visual pollution; and in addition, rubbish disposal remains a perennial problem
for City Hall. It is obvious too that Chiang
Mai’s precious cultural heritage is suffering under the strain of modern progress. Hundreds
of historic sites still languish in neglect, encroached upon by squatters or hemmed
in and hidden by new buildings. Of those sites which are registered with the Fine
Arts Department, many receive only marginal maintenance, there being too few personnel
and funds allocated to undertake necessary repairs and restorations. The
remains of the ancient city walls, once a proud symbol of Chiang Mai’s strength
and purpose, have suffered long periods of neglect alternating with periods of
hasty reinforcement. And yet Chiang Mai
is dependent upon the very development that is threatening it’s heritage, if it
is to develop as a modern regional centre – part of the “economic quadrangle”
being enthusiastically promoted by Thailand, Myanmar, Lao PDR, and Southern China. What
then can be done to preserve the city’s cultural legacy, while at the same time
allowing the benefits of development to flow freely? Simply
put, the aim should be to integrate development with preservation. The term sustainable
development, which has come to define modern environmental thought, can be used
in this context to describe the integration of cultural with commercial demands. Such
development is already appearing; all construction within the city walls is now
required to uphold the local architectural identity, and the building of condominiums
within the old city, or construction of tall buildings in the vicinity of temples,
is strictly under control. Furthermore,
the people of Chiang Mai have added their voice to the conservation crusade. Public
campaigns have been instrumental in preserving the rich cultural heritage of Northern
Thailand. Strong opposition to the construction of a cable car up Doi Suthep resulted
in the project being dropped, and public support for the control of high-rise
buildings within the old city led to the drafting of the regulations I have already
mentioned. These campaigns demonstrate the depth of community feeling which exists
here, and the importance of public participation in the development process. Chiang
Mai is, in effect, a living ancient city, and has to live with all the problems
associated with balancing the past and future. However, the solutions to the city’s
dilemmas demonstrate that conservation must be recognised as an essential part
of development. It is important that the elements of cultural heritage, such as
historic buildings and sites, should be counted as assets, not as burdens or obstacles
to development. Historical and cultural
traditions are an important, enriching dimension of community identity. Active
community participation is therefore essential to the process of sustainable development. It
is important, however, that the community contributes fully to the process of
conservation, by which I mean there must be free access to any relevant conservation
and development plans, Dissemination of this information at all public levels
is essential to success. Furthermore, education,
both inside and outside the classroom, must play a strong role in creating understanding
and pride in our cultural heritage. It is time that conservation, for both natural
and cultural environments, was taught on equal terms with other professional skills. It
is undeniable, however, that the preservation of our cultural heritage is expensive,
and will become more so in the future as the pressures of development and tourism
mount on historic sites. Yet despite the
costs of cultural conservation, it is no longer realistic to expect international
agencies or foreign bilateral donors to continue to pay for this effort in the
booming economies of Asia. Now is the time for the governments of Asia to take
this responsibility upon their own shoulders. Ways
and means of providing for the expense of conservation in the national budgets
must be identified. There is a need to rectify the current imbalance which exists
between the promotion of tourism and the conservation of historic sites, for example.
Too often, a tourism-orientated policy prevails, and sites are preserved only
as tourist attractions. Ideally, such a
situation should be reversed so that historic monuments are preserved first and
foremost for their cultural values, and not merely as showpieces to attract more
tourists. It would be dangerous to establish too close a link between tourist
revenues and conservation, which might lead to a risk of losing cultural and artistic
independence. Perhaps we should look to
our common heritage to provide us with the answers we are seeking. Asia is a region
of immense antiquity, with a correspondingly rich and turbulent history. Many
countries in the region have inter-acted in the past, and benefited from cross-fertilisation
in arts, religion and commerce. Today,
however, we are unable to appreciate the collective effort needed to preserve
what is left of our past. This is due in part to the concern of each country with
its internal affairs – economic growth and development particularly. It is also
due to the current emphasis placed on the natural environment, rather than the
cultural environment. As an issue, conservation
of the natural environment has taken centre stage in the last decade, culminating
in the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Global attention is now being given
to issues such as biological diversity, climate change and protection of the Earth’s
ozone layer. The level of funding, the number of qualified professionals and the
degree of public awareness are higher for the protection of tropical forests,
or endangered species, than they are for restoring temples and ancient cities. This
imbalance stems in part from an imperfect understanding of our environment, and
what it encompasses. Humans are intimately associated with not only their natural
environment, but also their cultural environment. Together these two elements
form the millieu within which our societies evolved and exist today. Because
of this disunion between culture and nature, development and conservation plans
for our natural and cultural environments have progressed in different directions;
they are no longer mutually sustaining or even inter-related. But
in fact they should be. To protect the environment, man must be able to live in
harmony with nature – which means being able to cultivate its bounty without destroying
its sources. Yet, aside from physical well being, man also yearns for spiritual
enrichment, which is where culture plays such an important role. Our cultural
heritage provides us with spiritual fulfilment, which alone distinguishes man
from other species on Earth. The time has
come for us to recognise the relationship between man, nature and culture, and
to formulate appropriate strategies to conserve our environmental legacy. We must
be serious about protecting our heritage at all costs. I
would like to call for concerted action on three main fronts; Firstly,
the governments of Asia should start working together to restore cultural heritage
with both national and regional significance. The
restoration of ancient cities such as Luang Prabang and Ayutthaya will have a
significance far beyond national boundaries. Similarly, the preservation of Angkor
Wat will ensure that the Khmer heritage is saved not only for the people of Southeast
Asia but also for the rest of the world. Surely there is now enough wealth and
expertise in the region for us to take a leading role in preserving our regional
heritage. Governments also have an important
role to play as guardians of our cultural heritage. Throughout history, one of
the most insidious threats faced by sites and monuments has been looting, dismantling
and illegal destruction. National governments should now ensure that regulations
prohibiting the encroachment on, or destruction and looting of, cultural property
are in place and properly enforced. It
is now incumbent upon governments to take strong action in protecting the national
heritage. However, protection must go hand-in-hand with development programs designed
to benefit those communities living on or near historic sites. Local populations
will have to play their part in safeguarding our national heritage, but they will
only be able to do this if they have a fair share of the national resources. Secondly,
regional collaboration should not only be limited to government to government
efforts. Aside from such initiatives, I would like to call for business to contribute
to the preservation of our cultural heritage. The
private sector in Asia has been the prime mover in the economic development of
the region, and now is the time for business to put its considerable experience
and financial resources behind efforts to save our cultural legacy. Here in Thailand
for example, the Thailand Business Council for Sustainable Development and the
Thailand Environment institute are currently discussing ways of supporting efforts
to restore our ancient capital city of Ayutthaya. I believe the time is now opportune
for more of such private-public partnerships in Asian heritage protection, and
would urge businesses to explore options for taking action on heritage conservation. Finally,
the time has come for non-governmental organisations to take up a more prominent
and effective role in the preservation of our cultural heritage. As
an example of an NGO playing a constructive and commendable role in protecting
the nation’s cultural legacy, I would like to cite the Siam Society, co-organiser
of this conference. The Siam Society has an almost century-long tradition of fostering
scholars and scholarship, both Thai and foreign. The Society has played an important
role in not only the study and conservation of our region’s cultural heritage,
but also in the promotion of this heritage to the wider public. Indeed,
next month the Society will initiate it’s Historic House series, at the Bangkhunphrom
Palace Seventh-Cycle Celebration. This series hopes to channel corporate sponsorship
into the restoration of historic buildings in the Kingdom. It
is obvious however, that worthy organisations such as the Siam Society can only
do so much with the limited funds and personnel they have at their disposal. It
is for this reason that countries may wish to explore the establishment of an
independent national “heritage trust”, along the lines of the British National
Trust. This Trust manages public properties all over Britain, with over two million
members supporting its work. The establishment of such an organisation would give
both financial and political independence to the conservation effort, as well
as raise the profile of heritage conservation amongst the wider public. Asia
has now emerged as an International economic centre. As Asians, we are known for
our hard-working ethic, and our striving to improve the standard of living for
the billions of people living within our boundaries. Let
us therefore be unsparing in our efforts to ensure that our cultural legacy remains
secure and undiminished, both for this and future generations. For if we can accomplish
the union of conservation with development, and truly attain sustainable development,
then we may look forward to the glories of our future, whilst benefiting from
the richness of our past. Let me end my
address by quoting from Mr. Abba Eban, former Foreign Minister of Israel. He said,
“history teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they have exhausted
all other alternatives.” Perhaps now is the time to behave wisely together. |
Asian
Prospects toward the 21st Century By Anand Panyarachun Former
Prime Minister of Thailand Chairman of Saha-Union Public Co. Ltd. at
the International Conference sponsored by the Association for Promotion
of International Cooperation and the Yomiuri Shimbun, Tokyo November
8, 1994 Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen, Introduction
The year 2000 will mark a rare historical occasion. It will
usher in not only a new century but also a new millennium. Some, who take ancient
prophecies, literally predict that this period will be accompanied by cataclysmic
upheavals. I can see some empirical basis
for the millenarians’ fear. While the Cold War may be over, a wide variety of
international challenges still loom large before us: nuclear proliferation; ethnic
cleanings; competing claims of territorial sovereignty; East-West differences
over democracy and human rights, trade, environment and population. The world
is not in danger of going up with a bang, but we must ensure that neither will
it end with a whimper. Meanwhile, the drama
on the world stage is changing. If the end of the Cold War taught us anything,
it was that fundamental change could be swift and unexpected. While the United
States has emerged as the world’s sole super-power and Japan continues to play
an influential role, attention is increasingly focused on China as a new pole
of power and engine for growth in the world’s most economically dynamic region.
Further afield is a host of other medium-range regional countries in Southeast
and South Asia--particularly India - which are assuming an increasingly significant
role in regional and global affairs. These emergent players are actively forging
cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels with the various regional
players. The Asia Pacific region’s booming
economy has prompted widespread optimism about its future. Everywhere, the East
Asian “model” of development is being studied and admired. Intra-regional trade
has far outstripped that of other regions. Economic inter-dependence and cooperation
are at unprecedented levels. So, what does
the future hold for the Asia Pacific region? Regional
Economic Institution-Building The
key trend is a renewed interest in regional cooperation through institution building.
This is an apt response to the Cold War’s end, particularly for a region that
has for too long lacked a sense of common identity. Throughout most of its history,
the Asia Pacific has been an odd cluster of different economic and political systems.
For many countries in the region, colonialism has contributed to the various malefactors,
which have fed on historical distrust between regional players. The fact that
regional countries now show willingness to work together in forging new modes
of cooperation is by far the most promising development for continued peace and
prosperity in the Asia Pacific region. The
areas for such cooperation are many. So far, the spotlight has been on economic
cooperation. ASEAN is finally making good on its economic promise. This dynamic
market, with 340 million people and a combined GNP of 430 billion US dollars,
is taking steps that will ensure its vibrancy well into the next century. The
members have recently agreed to move forward the timetable for trade liberalization
under the ASEAN Free Trade Area by five years, to the year 2003. Furthermore,
the members of ASEAN have agreed to eventually include agricultural products,
which have initially been excluded from the tariff reduction scheme. These advantages
of these major steps are two-fold: it will boost intra-ASEAN trade and also make
investment in the region even more attractive. With the passage of the Uruguay
Round, this move should help ASEAN to maintain its competitive edge and stay ahead
of the game. This trend is likely, to find
echoes throughout the greater Asia Pacific area. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) is quickly gathering momentum, shedding its modest origins to become a
potent force for free trade and open regionalism. Next week, the eighteen member
countries of APEC will assemble in Indonesia to define the goals of more liberalized
trade and investments with proposed timeframes ranging from 2010 to 2020. This
will be a further complementary step in the direction towards freer and fairer
trade in the wake of the conclusion of Uruguay Round of GATT and the pending establishment
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The APEC leaders will also have occasion
to discuss other areas of strengthening the APEC cooperation process including
education, human resources development, technology transfer and private enterprises
participation in regional cooperation. Nevertheless,
some countries are concerned about being rushed into trade liberalization. These
concerns are not entirely unjustified. The reallocation of labour into more economically
productive areas, the urbanization that accompanies industrialization - these
pose socio-cultural challenges that certainly need to be taken into account by
each country. But they should not overlook the powerful argument for economic
liberalization. As the risk of being left behind become apparent, governments
will have little choice but to open up their economies. Therefore, the sooner
each APEC member shifts away from protecting inefficient sectors and concentrates
on developing its areas of comparative advantage, the better. This
is, of course, more easily said than done. Inefficient producers often wield considerable
political clout. Governments are concerned about social dislocations and environmental
deterioration resulting from rapid shifts in economic activity. Since conditions
in each country differ, each sub-region in the expansive Asia Pacific area should
be encouraged to work out for itself the most appropriate pace and timeframe to
adjust for, the side-effects of economic liberalization by taking into account
their varying stages of preparedness and development. Regional
Security Cooperation Sustained
economic development requires a stable security climate, and this is another area
that will benefit from regional institution building. During the Cold War, the
United States security umbrella allowed the East Asian NIEs to prosper. At present,
however, Washington’s foreign policy priorities, including its security role in
the region, are in flux. Domestic pre-occupations and unresolved debates over
America’s vital interests will tend to constrain U.S. involvement abroad. While
Washington is likely to “remain engaged” in Asia, the relative scope and nature
of that engagement will probably be more limited than before out of their own
agenda. It, thus, falls to the Asia Pacific countries to assume greater responsibility
for regional security. In response to this
trend, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was inaugurated earlier this year in Bangkok.
For the first time, all ten countries of Southeast Asia were gathered under one
roof. For the first time, ASEAN and its dialogue partners from the West and in
the region resolved to engage in regular dialogue as part of a process called
preventive diplomacy. To build trust and confidence over the longer term, such
ideas as the establishment of a regional peacekeeping centre and the exchange
of military information may be tabled in the future. The
“proof of the pudding”, of course, will be whether the ARF can contribute directly
to reducing regional tensions. The three biggest potential threats to regional
security today are North Korea, Cambodia and the South China Sea. Some may wish
to portray them, as bilateral or domestic disputes, but their impact on the region,
should conflict break out, will not be confined to the disputing parties. Should
the Korean peninsula be de-stabilized, Japan and China will be the first to be
affected. Should the terrorist and brutal tactics of the Khmer Rouge escalate
into large-scale violence, neighbouring. Thailand will once again bear the brunt,
a massive influx of refugees. Should force be used over the Spratlys, vital sea-lanes
will be disrupted, and regional economies will suffer. At this early stage of
its existence, it is understandable if the ARF seeks to avoid controversy. If
it can play a constructive role in these disputes, the initiation by fire will
quickly establish its credibility. Other
Opportunities for Cooperation Other
areas can also benefit from similar cooperative efforts in the region. As I suggested
earlier, rapid economic growth can produce adverse social and environmental side
effects, and these often transcend national borders. In the early enthusiasm for
free-wheeling capitalism, these side effects tend to be ignored or overlooked.
But growth cannot be sustained over the long term if they are left un-addressed.
The fact that the side effects have trans-national consequences, make them an
appropriate subject for regional cooperation. Another
reason for taking a regional approach to these developmental side effects is their
multidimensionality. For one, as industrialization in the region quickens, environmental
problems are likely to exacerbate. Inadequate infrastructure and rampant pollution
are already lowering the quality of life in many major Asian cities. Rural areas
are no less prone to environmental damage. The conversion of farmland to industrial
use, overfishing, soil erosion, flooding and erratic rainfall patterns caused
by de-forestation may turn some previously self-sufficient countries into net
food importers. Indeed, unbridled population growth would further compound the
problem of the already under-nourished populace. Add to this global warming, which
will raise sea levels and flood rich delta areas, and the environment becomes
an issue we can no longer afford to keep on the back-burner. The Climate Institute,
in a report commissioned by the Asian Development Bank, estimates conservatively
that climatic changes in the next 80 years may create over 20 million “environmental
refugees” in South and Southeast Asia, as well as social and economic disruptions
on an unparalleled scale. Taking steps to protect the environment now is more
sensible and feasible, than attempting to undo the damage later. Still,
it is not immediately clear how best to balance the region’s developmental and
environmental needs. Since global warming affects everyone, East and West alike
have an interest in preserving the last remaining strands of tropical rainforest
in the world. But the argument that developing countries should show their development
in order to preserve the environment is not convincing. The comparative advantage
of many Asian countries lies in non or semi-renewable natural resources such as
timber, and to restrain them from exploiting these resources would be patently
unfair. Any attempt to link trade, and environmental protection, particularly
if it is seen as an attempt to set up non-tariff barrier, is likely to be staunchly
resisted by the developing countries. The
growth-versus-environment dilemma might be usefully taken up within an institutional
setting such as APEC, for here is an issue directly related to economic development.
Furthermore, it involves allocative choices between more and less developed countries
in the region. The answer may lie in some form of compensation of “debt-for-nature
swap” in which a developing country’s debt is effectively reduced in exchange
for its commitment to protect its rainforests. Such swaps have already been negotiated
in several countries, including Costa Rica, Ecuador and the Philippines. While
this sort of arrangement may provide only a partial solution, its main advantage
is that it creates no losers, only winners. A region-wide dialogue would help
identify the key issues and suggest solutions satisfactory to all. Culture:
Clash or Convergence? A challenge
that lends itself less easily to institutional solutions is the simmering debate
over Western versus Eastern values. I am pleased that the organizers of this event
have included, besides the usual politics and economics, the issue of culture.
Already, disagreements between East and West over democracy, human rights, labour
rights, reproductive rights and -- dare I say it? -- even caning rights, appear
to validate Professor Huntington’s prediction of an impending “clash of civilizations.” I
believe the clash will eventually be avoided. The reason that its possibility
looms so large now, is a function of our continuing search for a post-Cold War
order. With communism all but dead, the United States, the only super-power left,
is returning to “core American values” to guide its foreign policy. This may be
no more than an effort to establish some measure of predictability in an increasingly
chaotic world. Despite its good intentions, however, Washington is still groping
for ways to win friends and influence governments, without alienating them. I
believe the learning curve will be overcome before too long. Washington may appear
aggressive and abrasive in promoting its democracy and human rights agenda, but
the limits of a heavy-handed approach are already becoming apparent. Even
as the United States begins to appreciate the advantages of friendly persuasion,
Asia will come around on its own. As we have seen in South Korea, Taiwan, and
Thailand, prosperity creates a demand for democracy, and at a certain juncture
in the national development process, citizens will long for greater political
freedom and civil liberties. Moreover, the free flow of information, so necessary
to a vibrant economy, is also the harbinger of new ideas. Satellite dishes and
other technologies are already helping spread the gospel of Western-style consumerism.
There is no reason to suppose that the idea of free choice in politics will not
make similar in-roads in Asian societies, the efforts of governments notwithstanding. The
final point that I wish to add regarding the so-called “clash of civilization”
or the clash between Western and Eastern values is that, in fact, throughout history
we have witnessed the conflicts of ideas and values arising out of conflicts between
forces of extremism on both ends. Coming from a country like Thailand, that adheres
to the precepts of Buddhism, which espouses moderation and the middle way, I earnestly
hope that the forces of moderation will succeed in overcoming those who profess
extremism of all kinds. It may be that both Western and Eastern civilizations
are flexible enough to accommodate one another. I like to think that, rather than
a clash of civilizations, what will eventually come about is a convergence of
cultures instead. Role of the Regional
Powers For all these region-wide
trends, the future of the Asia Pacific will still be tied to the fortunes of key
regional powers. The greatest uncertainty surrounds the future of China. Even
a change in the Chinese leadership is unlikely to affect the direction of economic
policy. However, China’s double-digit growth has been accompanied by corruption,
inflation, loss of job security and a widening income gap between urban and rural
areas. A large “floating population” of unemployed peasants, drugs, prostitution
and crime are also some of the social side effects of rapid economic reform. As
in any other country, how the leadership deals with these issues, will determine
the extent to which growth translates into development. The
problem that is particular to China, meanwhile, will be the eventual passing of
the torch to a new generation of leaders. When the last of the so-called “immortals”
- such as the octogenarian Deng Xiaoping - are gone, the new Communist Party leadership
will find it difficult to command the same deference as the Long March veterans.
The Party’s tight political control will be increasingly challenged by the children
of Tiananmen and a rising middle class. Dissent will become increasingly hard
to suppress. China is not the closed society it was during the Cultural Revolution
or the Great Leap Forward. Its economy is intimately linked to the outside world,
and any significant political or social unrest will damage that link. Maintaining
social order, instituting market reforms while making an orderly political transition
will, therefore, pose a tremendous challenge to the country’s leadership. Japan,
meanwhile, is free from the prospect of any such major upheaval. Continuing present
trends, it should become an increasingly important player in world politics. A
permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council is within sight. Its repeated
expressions of remorse for its World War II role, as well as its categorical rejection
of deploying combat forces, provide assurances that Japan poses a threat neither
to Asia nor the world. These are all passive actions. Japan needs to demonstrate
its readiness to engage itself more actively and objectively in the deliberations
and decision-making process of the world organization. The
only question will be how Japan can best fulfill its new responsibilities - for
this will be a Japan, no longer dependent on the United States, but a regional
and world power in its own right. As such, it will be expected to play a leading
role in ensuring that the region’s economic development stays on the right track.
Japan has to come to a hard political decision, and by opening up its market,
it will have a vital role in the promotion of free trade and economic development
in the region. The yen is likely to continue rising and motivate Japanese industries
to relocate to Southeast Asia - and elsewhere - in ever greater numbers, facilitating
transfers of technology and managerial skills. In terms of government policy,
while official development assistance will continue to play a major role in the
region’s development, liberalization of trade and investment rules are no less
important and should be given greater emphasis. Apart
from the United States and Japan, the traditional Asia Pacific key players, as
well as emergent China, the second-tier NIEs in ASEAN will join the first-tier,
and a new second-tier will follow in turn. Among them will probably be Vietnam,
which will face a dilemma similar to China’s. Despite trying to balance political
control and economic freedom, it should still manage to grow rapidly, thanks to
its bountiful natural resources and industrious workforce. In addition, Australia
and New Zealand will inevitably identify themselves more closely with the East
Asian scene. Some countries from outside
the region are also likely to play a bigger role. India, for example, has of late
demonstrated interest in forging closer ties with the Asia Pacific. Given its
sheer size and the success of its ongoing economic reforms, India may well become
a formidable economic power in the first decade of the 21st century. Conclusion I
have tried to outline the major trends that I think will affect the future of
our region: economic and political institution-building, environmental changes,
cultural convergence, and developments in key regional countries. Assuming that
all things go well, and there are no major interruptions in the economic and political
developments in East Asia, what scenario can we then anticipate in the first decades
of the 21st century? East Asia,
including Japan, China, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and the ASEAN countries, will
have together an economy larger than that of either NAFTA or the European Union. East
Asia is set to occupy the central role in the world economy. According to the
survey of the global economy in the recent issue of the Economist, by the year
2020, there will be seven Asian, namely, China, Japan, India, Indonesia, South
Korea, Thailand and Taiwan in the ten largest economies. By
2030, China will account for half of East Asia’s GDP or roughly equal to the GDP
of North America. The centre of gravity
of the world economy will then have shifted to East Asia, but America will continue
to retain its lead in basic scientific research, advanced technologies, software
and sophisticated financial services. East
Asian countries will be more inter-dependent as their economies forge stronger
linkages in trade and investments among themselves and become closely integrated
with global economy, thus providing incentives for the maintenance of peace and
prosperity. China, the United States of
America and Japan will continue to have dominant roles in the organization of
peace and stability in East Asia, including the North Korean issue. Pragmatic
diplomacy must replace self-righteousness; dialogue and negotiation must prevail
over confrontation. A strategic partnership of these three powers working in tandem
with the rest of East Asia would bode well for the long-term future. Given
the pace of change in today’s world, I would not vouch for the accuracy of my
assessment with the confidence of a Nostradamus devotee. As we slip into an uncertain
future, though, we carry with us a faith no less strongly held than that of the
millenarians. It is a different kind of faith. This faith, which allows us hope
rather than despair, is faith in humanity. While other parts of the world are
torn by strife, we in the Asia Pacific region have begun to build faith in one
another. With a little luck, the coming millennium may yet prove to be everything
we hope and strive for. Thank you. |
Liberalisation
of the Thai Economy by Mr. Anand Panyarachun for
the 4th Asian Management Awards Bangkok, September 22, 1994 Good
evening. Your Excellencies of the diplomatic corps, distinguished members the
Thai government, business leaders and industrialists, observers and friends from
the media, faculty and students, ladies and gentlemen: On
behalf of our gracious host, Viroj Phutrakul, and the Asian Institute of
Management, thank you for joining us this evening as we honor the recipients
of the 4th Annual Asian Management Awards in Thailand. As
I watched the presentation this evening, I must say that I was just as moved as
some of the recipients - and I felt as proud. In fact I think that all of us can
be proud of what Thailand and its private sector-government partnership has achieved. You,
tonight’s recipients, are outstanding symbols of what has happened in Thailand
of how significant economic growth can be achieved in an environment where democratic
institutions and practices prevail. Our
double-digit GDP growth in the late 80’s and our projected 8% - plus growth
this year and next is enviable. Inflation in controlled at well under 5% (I hope),
we have attracted over ten billion dollars of foreign investment over the last
few years, our foreign exchange reserves at $25 billion have never been higher,
our per capital income of $2300 is very respectable and is rising and unemployment
is at a low 3.3%. Today, however, we face
a very different challenge. (The prevailing political and socio-economic
forces of the 1980’s have all changed. The disintegration of
the former-Soviet block has opened up previously controlled-economies.
New countries and republics are being formed and admitted
to the United Nations at an ever-increasing rate. It is in this light of
change, that we must forge our new vision and policies to lead us
into the 1990’s and beyond. I know
that many experts will speak of how we need to prepare for changes in
technology that will affect the way we live and the way we compete. Others
say we must be ready for how the newly-emerging economies - China, India,
and Indochina - will at the same time be our competitors
for foreign investment and markets for our products. Within
this regional context, other pundits are convinced that Thailand’s real
priorities should be to resolve infrastructure bottlenecks, alleviate rural poverty
and create a more equitable distribution of wealth. All
of these pressing concerns are important, but today we address an issue of equal
importance, one if not handled appropriately may relinquish Thailand’s competitive
edge in the newly-forming global economy. From
being a lackluster resource-based under-developed economy in the 1970’s,
we became one of Asia’s emerging dragons in the last 10 years or so. How?
Economists, businessmen and politicians-the pundits, I spoke of
- are generally agreed that our growth and success were due to both sound
macro-economic policies coupled with prudent economic liberisation. In
the 1980’s, we started to liberalise our economy with the
enactment of an export-promotion policy. At the same time, the Board
of Investment, aggressively encouraged and fostered increased foreign direct
investment, triggering a boom in foreign investment in manufactured
products. As a result, exports surged in the late 80’s. Since
the late 1980’s, more liberal policies on capital flows, privatisation
and rules on foreign investment have led to an additional influx in
direct foreign investment. This has led to further industrialisation,
growth and technology transfer for Thailand.
To drive growth into the 90’s however, Thailand must not only continue
our current efforts at liberalisation but also move swiftly
to become one of the most open trading nations in Asia. Even as we continue
to reduce tariffs, gradually liberalise our financial services sector
via BIBF, and relax rules on foreign ownership, we must do more. Competition
amongst companies and multi-national corporations is fierce. A recent
issue of the Harvard Business Review says, I quote: “Competition
is now a ‘war of movement’ in which success depends on anticipation
of market trends and quick response to changing customer needs.
Successful competitors move quickly in and out of products, markets,
and sometimes even entire businesses - a process more akin to
an interactive video game than to chess. In such an environment, the essence
of strategy is not the structure of a company’s products and markets,
but the dynamics of its behavior.” Likewise,
competition amongst nations will be equally fierce. Nobel Laureate
Milton Freedman, recently stated that: “It is today possible,
to an extent greater than any time in the world’s history, for a
company to locate anywhere, to use resources from anywhere and to
produce a product that can be sold anywhere.” What
does all of this mean for Thailand? We can only compete effectively in the
global economy if our private sector is linked to the international
community. Our success came at a time when
we were a relatively liberal economy compared to those around us:
China, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Soviet Union
were more protected than we were. The success stones are clear:
the open ports of Singapore and Hong Kong thrived while the
controlled-economies of Burma and Vietnam stalled. But
today we are in danger of becoming more protected than our neighbours.
If this happens the situation will be reversed: we will be hurt by our
protectionism, and they will benefit from their liberalism. And
Thailand cannot afford to let this happen. The
AFTA Monitor has made a very succinct case for free trade. It says,
and again I quote: “History
has shown that protectionism hurts economic growth and condemns
consumers to higher prices and lower quality. It also created unemployment,
lower wages and lower productivity. Protectionism leads to economic stagnation
- so much so that the world economy all but collapsed during the
depression of the 1930’s, a markedly protectionist period. It was thought
that world leaders had learned their lessons from that experience,
lessons like: Cutting or eliminating tariffs
exposes domestic industries to foreign competition. This competition
forces both domestic and foreign industries to become more
efficient, either by themselves, or by forming alliances. The result: consumers,
have a wider range of goods and services to choose from and
better-quality goods at low prices. Those industries no longer able to
compete invariably shift their resources to areas in which they
can compete, i.e., where the resources are used more efficiently. This
leads to higher productivity of a country’s factors of production
and therefore to better living standards. As
an added benefit, more jobs and higher incomes result from the entry
of foreign competition and technology. Workers are trained quickly
and become more productive. Domestic industry also flourishes
as new technology is acquired and new markets are opened. Every economy
that has tried freer trade has obtained these results”. End of quote. The
ones who will be hurt the most by protectionist policies will be the protected
industries themselves. Granting indefinite protection assures that our
local business or industry will become uncompetitive in the long-run in the
quickly converging world economy. We must instead insure that as we liberalise
and move to a true “free trade” area, that our local industries
be equipped to complete globally. Consider
what protectionism alone will do to Thailand and its workers. First,
we penalise our country because being protected, we are making inefficient use
of our resources, and Thailand must strive to use its resources wisely. Second,
we must realise that for every industry that is protected, another industry is
penalised. If cement is protected, that construction industry will suffer from
high prices and lower quality. If we protect textiles or leather, then we penalise
clothes and leather goods manufacturers. Third,
we penalise consumers - our fellow Thai’s - who have to pay higher prices for
lower-quality goods. Because if goods were priced lower and were of better quality,
the industry would not need protection from foreign competition. Just
as there are well-dressed fools, there are well-dressed foolish ideas, and protectionism
is one of them. Protectionism only benefits a very small group - and only for
a short period. Meanwhile millions suffer. Government
alone cannot move to liberalise the economy. Businessmen who propose protectionist
measures must recognise the implications of indefinite protection. In the long-term,
they will be uncompetitive. They must now take the first step to prepare for a
more open economy. As the government moves to liberalise our economy and welcome
not only foreign direct investment geared towards export but foreign competition
in the local markets as well, our local industries must be ready to compete with
tough foreign challenges. This is the first and most crucial thing for us to do
as we drop our protectionist shell. I wish
to call on the rest of us in the private sector and government to be on the lookout
for and expose those who would propose and those who would implement protectionist
measures. They say that a person who sees
the advantage but not the disadvantage is like a fish who sees the bait but not
the hook. I hasten to assure you that I am no such fish. Instead of looking only
at trade-offs and sacrifices, we must seek out mutually beneficial endeavors,
those in which both parties can share in a “win-win” scenario. Let me give you
a few examples. Those in manufacturing have discovered with economics of scale
we can achieve higher quality at lower prices. So also we now know that the ideals
of democracy can be well served even with a strong central government. Well, it’s
time we believed that economic liberalisation can help us achieve a much better
standard of living for our people without sacrificing nation interest or national
pride. Just like the trophies you have
received today with their Pillars of Hercules and the saying ‘Plus Ultra’, or
‘everything lies beyond’, Thailand must go forth into the next century standing
on the twin pillars of sound macro-economic management and economic liberalisation.
The time for discussion is past. It is now time to act. And if we do, everything
lies beyond for Thailand and we can move forward with confidence. I
congratulate all of the recipients of tonight’s Management Awards. You are amongst
not only Thailand’s best, but Asia’s best. I ask that all of us here this evening,
help our nation to remain one of Asia’s best as we move to liberalise our economy. Thank
you. (CJ note: Quotes from current sources
e.g. AFTA Monitor may not be appropriate given Khun Anand’s standing.) |
Address
by Anand Panyarachun Chairman of Saha-Union PCL at the second
Convention of the International Bottled Water Association (Asia Chapter) at
Shangrila Hotel, Bangkok August 26, 1994 The
world in which we live in 1994 is a vastly different place from the one that existed
in past decades. Fundamental changes have occurred at frequent intervals and have
made such a positive impact on the global and regional scenes. The
resumption of the people’s Republic of China’s representation in the UN in 1972
was the beginning of the process. Recognition of China’s existence and its role
in international and regional affairs has brought about geo-political developments
which undermined the almost monopolistic status of the two super-powers; namely,
the United State of America and the Soviet Union. The momentum for change subsequently
accelerated and a series of adjustments, political and economic, followed in such
substantive and rapid manner that none of us could have envisaged or foreseen. The
collapse of the Berlin Wall, The reunification of the two Germanys, the breakup
of the Soviet Empire and the market reform measures in Eastern Europe were truly
momentous events in Europe that practically spelled the end of the Cold War. On
the East Asian side of the world, conflicts gradually receded into the background.
China began its second long march towards market economy and, hopefully, political
reform. Japan, a long-recognized economic giant, slowly assumed its rightful role
as a major power in global affairs. There also emerged the four little tigers
in East Asia which are on their way to becoming formidable players in international
trading systems. The countries of East and Southeast Asia have been at the forefront
in this unprecedented global economic change. The
rapidly growing economies of East and Southeast Asia have expanded over the past
several decades at rates considerably greater than the advanced western industrialized
countries. Since 1960, these economies have grown more than twice as fast as the
rest of Asia, roughly three times as fast as Latin America and South Asia, and
five times faster than Sub-Saharan Africa. They also significantly out – performed
the industrial economies and the oil-rich Middle East-North Africa region. Thailand
has been one of the leaders, even within this highly competitive group of economies,
and it has a useful part to play in encouraging and participating in the development
process for the rest of Southeast Asian mainland. Vietnam, with a population of
70 million people, is also committed to market-oriented economy, while still trying
to retain its political structure. Myanmar, with a population of over 40 million,
has already, albeit slowly, begun to come out of its shell and set up constructive
dialogues with the neighboring countries, particularly in the trade and investment
areas. Cambodia and Loas, much smaller in population and in theirs potentials,
are likewise following the same path. Curiously,
it is generally agreed that, for some time now, it has been primarily market forces
that have discovered and exploited the dynamic commercial opportunities of East
Asia. Accordingly, it is the market forces that have accelerated economic development
of East Asia counties, increased their economic weight in world trade and investments
and driven them at a rapid pace toward greater economic integration. The governments
of the successful countries in the region, especially those in southeast Asia,
have played a supportive role, first of all by adopting prudent macro-economic
policies, and secondly by creating an institutional framework in which markets
can operate freely and efficiently, with minimal distortion and influences from
government control and regulations. The
growth experience of Asian Pacific countries has led the rest of the world. If
one takes China, East and Southeast Asia together as a group, these economies,
at the current growth rates, could become as large as Western Europe in eleven
years. Fifteen years after that, they would become as large as NAFTA. If purchasing
power parity adjustments were made, the time frame would be even shorter. It
should be noted as well that the region as a whole also expanded its trade with
the rest of the world in a balanced manner. This is especially obvious if Japan’s
anomalous trade surplus situation is excluded from the calculations. It
has been, however, the acceleration of intra-Pacific trade which has attracted
the most attention. The share of intra-Asia-Pacific trade in world totals increased
from 19% to 29% between1980 and 1991. What this means is that nearly 70% of all
Asia Pacific trade is with fellow Pacific nations. In dollar terms, intra-Asia-Pacific
trade has already surpassed intra-EU trade. The
World Bank recently explained the phenomenal economic success of China, East and
Southeast Asia as being due mainly to their pragmatic and “market friendly policies.”
In particular, macro economic stability, investment in people and outward orientation
were the common attributes of their economic success. Deliberate intergovernmental
efforts to promote a regional economic integration are very low in the list of
explanations of what has happened. While ASEAN governments have conscientiously
made efforts to promote economic cooperation, the latest one being the formation
of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), their endeavours nonetheless lagged far behind
economic forces generated by the market. The momentum of the market forces will
continue unabated and will have far-reaching implications for the opening up of
markets, deregulation and decontrol, as well as competition. The
search for a new paradigm of international conduct is as likely as not to be piecemeal,
by trial and error, region by region. The
search for a new international economic and political order finds expression in
East Asia and the Pacific as well. It is repeated often that this region includes
some of the most dynamic economies in the world today, and that trade across the
Pacific has far outstripped Atlantic trade. In Southeast Asia, enterpreneural
skills, openness to foreign investment and export-driven economy have enabled
ASEAN members to achieve some of the fastest growth rates in the world since the
mid-1980s. The current decade will, however, force ASEAN countries to graduate
from labour-intensive and resource-based economy to knowledge-intensive, high-tech
and service industries. Whether they are equipped to move up the ladder depends
on how good their educational systems are. Human resource development, mobilization
of capital and infrastructure investments are priority features for the coming
decade. International focus on the environment and sustainable development will
bring to the fore new costs as well as new opportunities for business. The
growth in ASEAN countries can expect an even further boost from the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT and the growing number of complementary
economic integrative arrangements at different levels. The global regime and regional
frameworks must, however, be harmonized. The World Trade Organization, despite
some possible difficulties at first, will likely be a powerful force for global
free trade and economic cooperation. At the regional level, Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation, or APEC, is hard at work finding ways to sustain development and
growth as well as bridge the gap between its richer and poorer members. The ASEAN
Free Trade Area, or AFTA, promises to take advantage of regional complementarities
by dismantling trade barriers among the ASEAN members. There are also good prospects
for the emergence of sub-regional growth circles of adjacent areas straddling
over national boundaries. It is, however, too soon to say with real conviction
that we are at the dawn of a “borderless economy” era. The
globalization of trade, however, finds no parallel when it comes to security.
There is no effective organizational authority to build or maintain a stable regional
and international political order. Crises such as Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda only
point out how ineffectual even well-established organizations such as NATO and
the United Nations can be in the face of post-Cold War upheaval. International
organizations, I am afraid, are effective only insofar as their members wish and
make them so. The big question mark in
the Asia Pacific area, insofar as security is concerned, must be the Korean peninsula.
Current talks between the U.S. and North Korea have considerably reduced tension
in the area and we must be hopeful that they move forward steadily towards mutually
acceptable arrangement. The security question
is a pressing one for East Asia. All the economic accomplishments of the region,
and the vast potential that remains to be tapped, would be for nought without
a stable political order to underpin it. Although East Asia has never had the
benefit of the regional security arrangement along the lines of NATO, efforts
are underway to develop a new model of security cooperation in the region. The
ASEAN Regional Forum, convening for the first time in Bangkok at the end of July,
brought together the ASEAN countries, their dialogue partners, and concerned parties
for a series of bull sessions on common security concerns, as interpreted in much
wider context than in the past. The trust and confidence built through this kind
of ongoing dialogue will, with any luck, allow us to worry less about defense
buildups and expend more to improve the lives of our peoples. Granted,
Asia has its share of problems, but let me tell you why I remain optimistic despite
these developments. First I believe that
the absence today of a formal regional security framework in East Asia can be
worked around. While the region continues to grow, there is little danger of outright
conflict. In the meantime, the ASEAN regional forum, and perhaps other similar
fora, will evolve and put in place trust-building measures to which all parties
can subscribe. Second, I believe that the
obstacles to regional peace and stability can be managed, given greater empathy
and interdependence among the countries concerned. I see three categories of challenges
facing Asia in the decade ahead: domestic, regional and extra-regional. The
first challenge lies in how governments juggle pressures for political and economic
forum. The question of reform is a thorny one, particularly for the governments
concerned. We should not realistically expect countries with long traditions of
authoritarian rule to convert into full-fledged Western-style democracies overnight.
The example of the former Soviet Union has made reformers in Asia wary of proceeding
too quickly on the road to liberalism. For some countries, such as China and Vietnam,
the dilemma seems to be how to liberalize the economy while maintaining a steady
grip on political power in order to ensure the country’s political stability and
ethnic harmony. With their growing prosperity, these countries may become even
less receptive to prodding by foreign governments on what are arguably domestic
matters. This is not to say that democracy is a hopeless cause. As we have seen
in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, affluence, through expanding middle class,
can generate its own pressure for political reform. The
second domestic challenge is the issue of political succession. The death of Kim
IL Sung has left the future of the Korean peninsula an open question. Since North
Korea was not the only tightly-controlled regime in Asia, we can also expect similar
questions of political transition to arise in China and Vietnam, especially in
combination with increasing pressures for structural reform. At
the regional level, danger of another sort lurks. Disputes over territory and
natural resources have the potential to flare up and escalate it left untended.
Dialogue is one way to prevent such conflicts from breaking out. But dialogue
without interdependence is likely to produce little more than words. When there
is interdependence, grievous conflict is automatically ruled out, for harming
the other is tantamount to harming oneself. The increased economic interaction
among the Asia-Pacific countries will, therefore, diminish the likelihood of armed
conflict. The disputes themselves may linger, but compromise will tend to be the
order of the day. Last, but certainly not
least, is the extra-regional challenge. The single most influential stabilizing
factor in Asia-Pacific since the second World War has been the regional presence
of the United States. Like a benevolent big brother, the US made it possible for
its allies in the region to thrive and prosper by engaging in collective defence,
dispensing its aid programmes and granting proportionately greater access to its
market. The strategic rationale for this
generosity disappeared with the end of the Cold War. America’s relations with
its Asian partners have become more businesslike, as Washington attempts to gain
better access to their markets and stave off foreign competition in its own. The
heavy-handed tactics employed, and the loud and harsh words accompanying them,
are replacing the perception of America as a benevolent big brother with an altogether
different image. Uncomfortable as these
tactics make them, Asians generally still welcome America’s engagement in Asia.
But the quality of this relationship depends on whether Washington will continue
to follow its policy of strident evangelism towards its Asian partners. There
are occasions that call for this sort of approach, but dealing with friends is
not one of them. Human rights, labour rights, environmental protection, and free
trade are all worthy causes. But surely, they do not necessarily take precedence
over regional peace and stability. Nor can they replace development and national
cohesion and harmony. Very often they demand trade-offs, and priorities must be
set. There is a sense that the United States is more interested in shaping Asia
in its own image than in accepting Asia on its own term. If the US continues to
want its cake and eat it, too, its Asian partners may find it increasingly difficult
to respond. Fortunately, senior US policy makers are now beginning to recognize
this shortcoming in US policy, and the coming years should see less US rigidity
and righteousness, resulting in improvement in US relations with East Asia. President
Clinton said that democracies do not make war on one another. I might add that
countries whose economies are interdependent and growing in step with one another
also have little reason to wage war. Before we can begin to share the same values,
we must share the same interests. The next decade will be one in which Asia and
the Pacific build these commonalities, through formal cooperative frameworks and
through their own development processes. We may encounter some speed bumps on
the road ahead, but we can look forward to an exciting ride. |
Address
by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman of Saha-Union Public Company Limited At
the Asian Investment Conference Hosted by Merrill Lynch at
the St. Regis Hotel, New York City July 20, 1994 The
world in which we live in 1994 is a vastly different place from the one that existed
in recent decades. Fundamental changes have occurred at frequent intervals and
have made such a positive impact on the global and regional scenes. The
resumption of the People’s Republic of China’s representation in the UN in 1972
was the beginning of the process. Recognition of China’s existence and its role
in international and regional affairs has brought about geo-political developments
which undermined the almost monopolistic status of the two superpowers; namely,
the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The momentum for change subsequently
accelerated and a series of adjustments, political and economic, followed in such
substantive and rapid manner that none of us could have envisaged or foreseen. The
collapse of the Berlin Wall, the re-unification of the two Germanys, the breakup
of he Soviet Empire and the market reform measures in Eastern Europe were truly
momentous events in Europe that practically spelled the end of the Cold War. On
the East Asian side of the world, conflicts gradually receded into the background.
China began its second long march towards market economy and, hopefully, political
reform. Japan, a long-recognized economic giant, slowly assumed its rightful role
as a major power in global affairs. There also emerged the four little “tigers”
in East Asia which are on their way to becoming formidable players in international
trading systems. The countries of East and Southeast Asia have been at the forefront
in this unprecedented global economic change. The
rapidly growing economies of East and Southeast Asia have expanded over the past
several decades at rates considerably greater than the advanced western industrialized
countries. Since 1960, these economies have grown more than twice as fast as the
rest of Asia, roughly three times as fast as Latin America and South Asia, and
five times faster than Sub-Saharan Africa. They also significantly out-performed
the industrial economies and the oil-rich Middle East-North Africa region. Thailand
has been one of the leaders, even within this highly competitive group of economies,
and it has a useful part to play in encouraging and participating in the development
process for the rest of Southeast Asian mainland. Vietnam, with a population of
70 million people, is also committed to market-oriented economy, while
still trying to retain its political structure. Myanmar, with a population of
over 40 million, has already, albeit slowly, begun to “come out of its shell”
and set up constructive dialogues with the neighboring countries, particularly
in the trade and investment areas. Cambodia and Laos, much smaller in population
and in their potentials, are likewise following the same path. Curiously,
it is generally agreed that, for some time now, it has been primarily market forces
that have discovered and exploited the dynamic commercial opportunities of East
Asia. Accordingly, it is the market forces that have accelerated economic development
of East Asia countries, increased their economic weight in world trade and investments
and driven them at a rapid pace toward greater economic integration. The governments
of the successful countries in the region, especially those in Southeast Asia,
have played a supportive role, first of all by adopting prudent macro - economic
policies, and secondly by creating an institutional framework in which markets
can operate freely and efficiently, with minimal distortion and influences from
government control and regulations. The
growth experience of Asian Pacific countries has led the rest of the world. If
one takes China, East and Southeast Asia together as a group, these economies,
at the current growth rates, could become as large as Western Europe in eleven
years. Fifteen years after that, they would become as large as NAFTA. If purchasing
power parity adjustments were made, the time frame would be even shorter. It
should be noted as well that the region as a whole also expanded its trade with
the rest of the world in a balanced manner. This is especially obvious if Japan’s
anomalous trade surplus situation is excluded from the calculations. It
has been, however, the acceleration of intra-Pacific trade, which has attracted
the most attention. The share of intra-Asia-Pacific trade in world totals increased
from 19% to 29% between1980 and 1991. What this means is that nearly 70% of all
Asia Pacific trade is with fellow Pacific nations. In dollar terms, intra-Asia-Pacific
trade has already surpassed intra-EU trade. The
World Bank recently explained the phenomenal economic success of China, East and
Southeast Asia as being due mainly to their pragmatic and “market friendly” policies.
In particular, macro-economic stability, investment in people and outward orientation
were the common attributes of their economic success. Deliberate inter-governmental
efforts to promote a regional economic integration are very low in the list of
explanations of what has happened. While ASEAN governments have conscientiously
made efforts to promote economic cooperation, the latest one being the formation
of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), their endeavours nonetheless lagged far behind
economic forces generated by the market. The momentum of the market forces will
continue unabated and will have far-reaching implications for the opening-up of
markets, deregulation and decontrol, as well as competition. In
the uncertain post-Cold War era, it is impossible to predict with any confidence
what the next decade holds in store. The recent G-7 summit in Naples, insofar
as it discussed political matters, only under-scored the elusiveness of the New
World order we had hoped for. The turmoil in the former Soviet bloc shows no sign
of abating. The industrial countries, led by the United States, have yet to agree
on how best to maintain peace, stability and development, not only in Europe,
but throughout the world. Such tentativeness
is to be expected in any fledgling world order. The search for a new paradigm
of international conduct is as likely as not to be piece-meal, by trial and error,
region by region. The search for a new
international economic and political order finds expression in East Asia and the
Pacific as well. It is repeated often that this region includes some of the most
dynamic economies in the world today, and that trade across the Pacific has far
outstripped Atlantic trade. In Southeast Asia, entrepreneurial skills, openness
to foreign investment and export-driven economy have enabled ASEAN members to
achieve some of the fastest growth rates in the world since the mid-1980s. The
current decade will, however, force ASEAN countries to graduate from labour-intensive
and resource-based economy to knowledge-intensive, high-tech and service industries.
Whether they are equipped to move up the ladder depends on how good their educational
systems are. Human resource development, mobilization of capital and infrastructure
investments are priority features for the coming decade. International focus on
the environment and sustainable development will bring to the fore new costs as
well as new opportunities for business. The
growth in ASEAN countries can expect an even further boost from the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT and the growing number of complementary
economic integrative arrangements at different levels. The global regime and regional
frameworks must, however, be harmonized. The World Trade Organization, despite
some possible difficulties at first, will likely be a powerful force for global
free trade - and economic cooperation. At the regional level Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation, or APEC, is hard at work finding ways to sustain development
and growth as well as bridge the gap between its richer and poorer members. The
ASEAN Free Trade Area, or AFTA, promises to take advantage of regional complementarities
by dismantling trade barriers among the ASEAN members. There are also good prospects
for the emergence of sub-regional growth circles of adjacent areas straddling
over national boundaries. It is, however, too soon to say with real conviction
that we are at the dawn of a “border-less economy” era. The
globalization of trade, however, finds no parallel when it comes to security.
There is no effective organizational authority to build or maintain a stable regional
and international political order. Crises such as Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda only
point out how ineffectual even well-established organizations such as NATO and
the United Nations can be in the face of post-Cold War upheaval. International
organizations, I am afraid, am effective only insofar as their member’s wish and
make them so. The big question mark in
the Asia-Pacific area, insofar as security is concerned, must be the Korean peninsula.
In recent months, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and her policy directions towards
South Korea and the United States have received world-wide attention and generated
intense debate among the countries directly concerned. No definitive conclusions
emanated from the process of assessment and analysis. At best, the conclusions
are still within the realm of conjecture and speculations. Before
the unexpected and sudden passing away of Kim IL Sung, the North Korean “respected
leader,” some of us and the specialists of North Korean politics, thought that
at least they were dealing with the “devil” they knew. But, did we really know
him? We knew him from his style of dictatorial rule and his iron grip over the
life and soul of his people. Nonetheless, could we have anticipated the apparently
spontaneous and unorganized outpouring of extreme grief and respect of the North
Korean people? Somehow, the old man must be larger than life itself. If his “stability”
was questioned periodically in the past, his people certainly did not seem to
share that view. There appeared to be a genuine rapport and special relationship
between their “great” leader and the subjugated citizens. Yes, it would have been
perhaps easier and more fruitful to deal with the “devil” we knew rather than
with the “devil” we don’t - as represented by his son and successor, Kim Jong
IL. So while the possibility of a nuclear
confrontation has been reduced or postponed for the time being, the negotiating
process on nuclear issues between North Korea and the United States on the one
hand, and between North and South Korea on re-unification on the other, must now
seem to be more arduous and complex than when the old man was still alive and
in complete control. What the future holds
for the parallel negotiations remains mysterious and uncertain. Let’s hope that
all sides concerned demonstrate common sense, calmness, objectivity and statesmanship.
We cannot afford any bellicose statements, belligerent attitudes and chauvinistic
policies. Most of all, we need to resort to a more quiet diplomacy and discreet
negotiating process. The stake is too high
and we must succeed in this common endeavor, or else the “Pacific” era which has
come so close to reality will remain just a dream and our people will once again
be condemned to another decade or more of devastation and instability. Surely,
we do not deserve it, and America does not need it. The
security question is a pressing one for East Asia. All the economic accomplishments
of the region, and the vast potential that remains to be tapped, would be for
nought without a stable political order to under-pin it. Although East Asia has
never had the benefit of a regional security arrangement along the lines of NATO,
efforts are underway to develop a new model of security cooperation in the region.
The ASEAN Regional Forum, convening for the first time in Bangkok at the end of
July, will bring together the ASEAN countries, their dialogue partners, and concerned
parties for a series of bull sessions on common security concerns, as interpreted
in much wider context than in the past. The trust and confidence built through
this kind of on-going dialogue will, with any luck, allow us to worry less about
defense build-ups and expend more to improve the lives of our people. Granted,
Asia has its share of problems, but let me tell you why I remain optimistic, despite
these developments. First, I believe that
the absence today of a formal regional security framework in East Asia can be
worked around. While the region continues to grow, there is little danger of outright
conflict. In the meantime, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and perhaps-other similar
fora, will evolve and put in place trust-building measures to which all parties
can subscribe. Second, I believe that the
obstacles to regional peace and stability can be managed, given greater empathy
and inter-dependence among the countries concerned. I see three categories of
challenges facing Asia in the decade ahead: domestic, regional and extra-regional. The
first challenge lies in how governments juggle pressures for political and economic
reform. The question of reform is a thorny one, particularly for the governments
concerned. We should not realistically expect countries with long traditions of
authoritarian rule to convert into full-fledged Western-style democracies over-night.
The example of the former Soviet Union has made reformers in Asia wary of proceeding
too quickly on the road to liberalism. For some countries, such as China and Vietnam,
the dilemma seems to be how to liberalize the economy, while maintaining a steady
grip on political power in order to ensure the country’s political stability and
ethnic harmony. With their growing prosperity, these countries may become even
less receptive to prodding by foreign governments on what are arguably domestic
matters. This is not to say that democracy is a hopeless cause. As we have seen
in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, affluence, through expanding middle class,
can generate its own pressure for political reform. The
second domestic challenge is the issue of political succession. The death of Kim
IL Sung has left the future of the Korean peninsula an open question. Since North
Korea was not the only tightly-controlled regime in Asia, we can also expect similar
questions of political transition to arise in China and Vietnam, especially in
combination with increasing pressures for structural reform. At
the regional level, danger of another sort lurks. Disputes over territory and
natural resources have the potential to flare up and escalate if left untended.
Dialogue is one way to prevent such conflicts from breaking out. But dialogue
without inter-dependence is likely to produce little more than words. When there
is inter-dependence, grievous conflict is automatically ruled out, for harming
the other is tantamount to harming oneself. The increased economic inter-action
among the Asia-Pacific countries will, therefore, diminish the likelihood
of armed conflict. The disputes themselves may linger, but compromise will tend
to be the order of the day. Last, but certainly
not least, is the extra-regional challenge. The single most influential stabilizing
factor in Asia-Pacific since the Second World War has been the regional presence
of the United States. Like a benevolent big brother, the US made it possible for
its allies in the region to thrive and prosper by engaging in collective defense,
dispensing its aid programmes and granting proportionately greater access to its
market. The strategic rationale for this
generosity disappeared with the end of the Cold War. America’s relations with
its Asian partners have become more businesslike, as Washington attempts to gain
better access to their markets and stave off foreign competition in its own. The
heavy-handed tactics employed, and the loud and harsh words accompanying them,
are replacing the perception of America as a benevolent big brother with an altogether
different image. Uncomfortable as these
tactics make them, Asians generally still welcome America’s engagement in Asia.
The quality of this relationship depends on whether Washington will continue to
follow its policy of strident evangelism towards its Asian partners. There are
occasions that call for this sort of approach, but dealing with friends is not
one of them. Human rights, labour rights, environmental protection, and free trade
are all worthy causes, but surely, they do not necessarily take precedence over
regional peace and stability. Nor can they replace development and national cohesion
and harmony. Very often they demand trade-offs, and priorities must be set. There
is a sense that the United States is more interested in shaping Asia in its own
image than in accepting Asia on its own terms. If the US continues to want its
cake and eat it too, its Asian partners may find it increasingly difficult to
respond. Fortunately, senior US policy-makers are now beginning to recognize this
shortcoming in US policy, and the coming years should see less US rigidity and
righteousness, resulting in improvement in US relations with East Asia. President
Clinton has said that democracies do not make war on one another. I might add
that countries whose economies are inter-dependent and growing in step with one
another also have little reason to wage war. Before we can begin to share the
same values, we must share the same interests. The next decade will be one in
which Asia and the Pacific build these commonalties, through formal cooperative
frameworks and through their own development processes. We may encounter some
speed bumps on the road ahead, but we can look forward to an exciting ride! |
Pacific
Regionalism and Global Business Strategies By Mr.
Anand Panyarachun June 6, 1994 Vice
Chancellor David Smith, Co-Chairman Derek Burney, Distinguished
Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen: This
year marks the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Thailand Development Research
Institute. Over our first decade, the Canadian International Development Agency
has been one of TDRI’s principal supporters. CIDA’s generous assistance has been
instrumental in permitting us to achieve our current status as Thailand’s premier
independent policy research institute. As we now move towards financial independence,
I wish to express our gratitude to Canada for a form of aid that we consider to
have been imaginative, path-breaking and of great importance to Thailand. We
are also grateful for the linkages that this assistance has facilitated with Canadian
policy researchers and advisors, as well as between our two business communities.
The partnership that has developed between the John Deutsch Institute at Queen’s
University, and TDRI has provided Thailand with what will be a long-lasting “window”
on the Canadian policy community. These same linkages will also provide Canada
with an important window on Thailand, and through Thailand, many of the other
emerging regional economies in East and South East Asia. The
distinguished audience and conference participants gathered here this evening
attest to the strength of the relationships that have been developed under CIDA’s
assistance to TDRI and other regional research institutes. I am sure that the
proceedings of the next two days will serve to broaden and further strengthen
these linkages. It is an honour and a
privilege for me to address this Conference on Pacific Trade and Investment:
Options for the 90’s. I don’t think that there has ever been a time in recent
history when we could look to the future with such confidence. This is especially
true for the countries of the Asia Pacific region, which has been widely acknowledged
as tile world’s growth centre for the remainder of this century and beyond. The
experiences of recent years have created a momentum which should be sufficient
to sustain regional growth well into the future. Moreover, the expanding economic
linkages that have been a part of this process have created in the Asia Pacific,
within a period of less than two decades, one of the world’s a most integrated
and dynamic region. It is curious, and to some quite remarkable, that
these monumental developments have occurred without any conscious policy direction
by governments. Indeed, it seems that politics is having a difficult the catching
up to economics, as leaders of the Asia Pacific are now grappling with the need
to find an appropriate political order for the region in the post-cold-war era. I
would like to begin, however, by briefly reviewing recent economic developments
in the Pacific region. I think we are now in general agreement that, for some
the now, it has been primarily market forces that have discovered and exploited
the dynamic commercial opportunities of the Asia Pacific. Accordingly, it is market
forces that have accelerated economic development of Asia Pacific countries, increased
their economic weight in world trade and investment, and driven them at a rapid
pace towards greater economic integration. The governments of the successful countries
in the region, especially those in Southeast Asia, have played a supportive role,
first of all by following prudent macro-economic policies, and secondly by creating
an institutional framework in which markets can operate freely and efficiently,
with minimal distortionary influences from government regulation. The
recent growth experience of Asia Pacific countries has led the rest of the world.
This is especially so for China, East and Southeast Asia. At current growth rates,
these countries could become as large as Western Europe in eleven years. Fifteen
years after that, they would be as large as NAFTA. If purchasing power parity
adjustments were made, the time frame would be shorter still. Similarly,
the share of PECC countries in world trade increased from 35 per cent in
1980 to 42 per cent in 1992. Again, China, East and Southeast Asia accounted for
much of the increase it should be noted as well that the region as a whole also
expanded its trade with the rest of the world in a balanced manner. This is especially
obvious if Japan’s anomalous trade surplus situation is excluded from the calculations.
In other words, the Pacific region remains open to the rest of the world. It
has been the acceleration of intra-Pacific trade, however, which has attracted
the most attention in the 80s and 90s. The share of intra-Asia-Pacific trade in
world totals increased from 19 per cent to 29 per cent between 1980 and 1991.
Putting it another way, nearly 70 per cent of all Asia Pacific trade is with fellow
Pacific nations. In dollar terms, intra-Asia-Pacific trade has already surpassed
intra-EU trade. The dynamism of the emerging
Asia Pacific region is even more remarkable, at least to some, when it is recognized
that it has been basically market-driven, and achieved in the relative absence
of government direction. The World Bank, for instance, explains the phenomenal
economic successes of China, East and Southeast Asia as being due mainly to their
pragmatic and “market friendly policies”. In particular, macro-economic stability,
investment in people, and outward orientation, were the common attributes of their
economic success. Deliberate inter-governmental efforts to promote regional economic
integration are very low in the list of explanations of what has happened. As
I have already mentioned, efforts at formalizing economic integration in A SEAN,
including the recent implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), have
lagged far behind economic forces generated by the market. The success of my own
country, Thailand, has been cited as having been attained without “visionary”
leadership A strategically important question,
therefore, can be posed at this point. Past economic successes of Asia Pacific
have clearly been market-driven, export-oriented and individual-country-based,
rather than the result of concerted international or regional coordination, For
the future, therefore, should we not simply pursue these same policies which have
worked so well in the past? Why not take the advice of some APEC members that
APEC remains as simply a consultative body? A grand trade liberalization plan
for APEC, according to this view, is unnecessary, and maybe even inappropriate,
if it were to put at risk or even supersede the new multilateral trade framework
recently established at Marrakesh. While regional trade liberalization on the
scale of that being undertaken in AFTA might be appropriate, grander schemes for
all of APEC, for instance, might be potentially dangerous. Time
consensus that emerges among Asia Pacific leaders on this crucial issue will largely
define the Asia Pacific region for the rest of this century, and weIl into the
next. I am inclined to disagree with these more cautious views about the future
role of APEC. I would urge our leaders to be bolder in hastening the process of
regional economic integration in the Asia Pacific. “Vision” is not really the
issue here anymore, since market forces and past successes have already shown
the way. I think, therefore, that consideration should be given to finding ways
to achieve broader region-wide liberalization. Unlike
past GATT trade rounds, the developing countries in APEC participated actively
in the most recent Uruguay Round of trade talks. In the light of our successes,
I would claim that we now have the confidence and the ability to push APEC into
the fore-front of trade liberalization. By doing so, APEC will lead, rather than
follow, the process of world trade liberalization. Notwithstanding
government decisions, market forces will continue to be the primary driving forces
of Asia Pacific economic integration. The question is really whether governments
will hasten the process and assist market forces to accelerate this trend, or
will remain on the sidelines. While
a “grand design” to liberalize trade and investment would have the greatest impact,
other less conspicuous measures could have considerable effects on regional economic
integration. As businessmen, we all understand the importance of a stable and
predictable economic environment. Thus, region-wide attempts to ensure predictability,
transparency and consistency of commercial and tariff regulations would contribute
towards promoting intra-regional trade and investment. Greater coordination of
and exchange of information about macro-economic policies would also be helpful.
Greater integration of newly emerging economies of Indochina would make a significant
contribution. Let me now turn to the implications
of Asia Pacific economic integration on global business strategies. Globalization
is a fashionable word that means many things to many people. The Canadian communications
guru, Marshall McLuhan, coined the phrase “global village” almost 30 years ago,
to refer to the ways in which modern communications and information technology
would shrink the planet and eliminate many existing barriers to international
transactions of all types. The recent successes of the East and Southeast Asian
economies is one indication of the implications of the forces which he was describing. Globalization
implies a radically different perspective on the way that firms conduct business.
The focus is on a “global market place” rather than on segmented national markets.
The technologies of telecommunications and transportation, combined with many
financial innovations, have made geographical differences a minor inconvenience
in global interactions-be they for commercial, social, or other reasons. Realizing
that it would be only self-defeating and counter-productive to do otherwise, forward-looking
governments are acceding to the forces of globalization by liberalizing their
countries’ trade practices. Globalization
and technical progress often mean also that mass production gives way to low-cost
customization, allowing for a proliferation of high-tech niche industries. While
product innovations will take place at an increasingly rapid pace, imitators will
also be able to “catch-up” and compete for your market more quickly. In these
circumstances, firms need to be dynamic and flexible. Production
processes are also becoming increasingly globalized. Functions such as design,
engineering, component production, and assembly will be able to be located according
to relevant cost factors for each operation. These will not necessarily be in
the same place. These are some of the implications
of “globalization”. From even this brief review, it is apparent that some of these
exotic concepts do not apply so readily to the circumstances of some of the developing
countries of the Asia Pacific. The rapidly growing incomes and increasing liberalization
of these economies -- and I think here particularly of China and Vietnam -- will
mean an expanding market for mass- consumption products. Standardized products
imported into these countries, or produced locally, often by branches of multi-nationals
will still be the predominant pattern of international economic inter-action with
many developing APEC economies. Global markets notwithstanding, the provinces
of China are, to all intents, separate and distinct. The
extraction of natural resources and energy exploitation are other “traditional”
activities of multi-nationals which will be have continued importance in the
future. There is nothing “global” -- at least in the more exotic sense of the
word -- about these activities, which require straight-forward negotiations for
market and investment access. Political stability, trust, and good relations among
States provide the necessary back-drop to the establishment of such commercial
ties. The post-cold-war era provides the best opportunity for countries in the
Asia Pacific to usher in a new order that builds mutual trust and confidence among
nations. The concept of “globalization”
seems more applicable to the emerging class of affluent, sophisticated, urban
East and Southeast Asians, Demand will grow very rapidly in this market for differentiated
“high tech” products, for international communications services, and for new technologies
to deal with pressing urban issues such as transport and environmental management.
Many new markets are emerging here, and there will be intense competition to participate. On
the production side, many of these countries now have the economic sophistication
to move “up the ladder” of comparative advantage, to compete in the production
of more capital and skill-intensive products, and even to participate in product
innovation, design and marketing. In the case of countries like Thailand, this
is now critical in sustaining our recent economic success. As business and investment
continue to migrate in response to new opportunities and to changing comparative
advantage, it is interesting to observe that entrepreneurs and business groups
in countries such as Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are now playing a role in
the transfer of investment and new technologies to China and Indochina. These
investors are now sometimes competing directly with multinational arms of Japanese,
North American and European firms. Past
patterns of vertically integrated production relationships seem now to be giving
way to more equal business partnerships, characterized by horizontal inter-dependence.
In other words, economic convergence between developed countries and the NIEs
and emerging NIEs will mean that time latter two groups represent distinct sets
of investment and market opportunities from the economies of China and Indochina. In
addition, I also observe that the rapidly expanding investment needs, in both
the private and public sectors of developing APEC economies, will generate enormous
opportunities for trade, technology transfer and financing services. By their
nature, financial services will be those that are most characteristically “global”
in the sense I discussed earlier. I foresee that the financial services sector,
which has already grown significantly in recent years will continue to be an area
of expanding opportunities in the APEC region. Capital mobility -- especially
in the Asia Pacific -- is linking regional financial markets in an unprecedented
manner. Among other things, this is presenting major challenges to governments
to reform their financial and tax systems. Increasing financial integration will
also have serious implications for the coordination of macro-economic policies
in the Asia Pacific. I would like to conclude
by simply under-scoring the fact that trade and investment opportunities in the
Asia Pacific region will continue to expand rapidly. The trend towards even greater
intra-regional trade and investment will lead to further economic integration,
with or without active government direction. There is much that governments can
do to facilitate and hasten this process, however, I also believe that, in view
of the region’s dynamism and economic size, its leaders should take further initiatives,
at the unilateral and regional levels, in pursuing economic liberalization. This
would further enhance the region’s vast economic potential, to the benefit of
the citizens of each of the region’s economies. In
regard to business strategies, it is clear that a variety of distinct markets
and opportunities exist -- from “traditional” trade and investment possibilities,
to those which need to be looked at from a “global” perspective. There will also
be intense competition to exploit these opportunities. However, the returns will
be equally rewarding. I wish all of you
the very best in your deliberations on these and other important issues over the
next two days. I hope that the fruits of this meeting will lead to further collaboration
among you and other colleagues from the research, policy, and business communities
in the countries of the Asia Pacific. Thank
you. |
Implications
of Rapid Economic Growth For Thailand’s Political
Structure By Mr. Anand Panyarachun 5th International Conference
on Thai Studies Soas, London July 5, 1993 Outsiders
looking to Thailand are usually impressed by its economic performance. In the
last three decades Thailand has chalked up economic growth rates that have averaged
in excess of 7 per cent per annum. From an economy once consisting mainly of poor
farmers, a largely Chinese trading class and a few wealthy individuals in Bangkok,
we now have a more diversified economy and a more complex social structure to
match. Those whose last visit to Thailand was in the late 1950s, will see vast
changes in the material fabric of Thai life today. If
you probe deeper and consider the way Thais think about their own society and
the world around them, there is less change to discern. You will, however, sense
considerable anxiety, because Thais have increasingly to square their very rapid
economic changes with the much slower changes in their beliefs and assumptions
about their society and the world. Furthermore,
different groups of people have benefited from economic growth at different rates,
leading to considerable shifts in the focus of economic and financial power. Again,
people’s assumptions about the functioning of the social system need to be adjusted. It
is in the political sphere that many of the anomalies that arise from rapid economic
growth come to a head. Unlike in the economic sphere, we of this generation have
not been left with a healthy legacy from our forefathers. The Absolutist State
of the early Ratanakosin era gave way to benevolent and enlightened absolutism
of Rama IV and Rama V. In their pursuit of modernism these benevolent autocrats
created a Western-style bureaucracy. It was a necessary component of their drive
for modernization, but in the end the bureaucracy turned against its masters and
in 1932 took over the helm of the state, supposedly in the name of the people.
Between 1932 and 1973, the civilian and military bureaucracies jointly held undisputed
control of the country’s economy and polity. The
long dominance of the bureaucracy over the political life of the country has been
detrimental to the development of rational political structures. The Absolutist
State acted paternalistically to raise the welfare of the masses as part of its
ideology. During the era of bureaucratic dominance, a similar emphasis on paternalism
continued. Instead of its being part and parcel of a monarchist ideology, which
emphasizes the loyalty to and the obligations of the King, in the post-1932 world,
the State--an abstract entity--was to be supreme and the fount of paternalism.
Ordinary people competed to obtain a share of the paternalistic largesse, but
they did not have any say on how the State was run, still less on who was to run
it. These prerogatives belonged firmly and squarely to the bureaucracy, particularly
its military wing. In this atmosphere,
it is not surprising that the development of political parties did not progress
very far. For one thing, their lives were often cut short by the frequent coups,
but even when they re-emerged during the infrequent democratic interludes, they
were short of policies, platforms and ideology. They had little money and lacked
good organization. Because they could not aspire to capture State power, they
continued to look at the State as the fount of patronage and encouraged their
voters to believe the same, by promising that they, rather than their rivals,
would be better at extracting that patronage from the State. During
this era, participation in affairs of State was not so much unthinkable as futile.
A culture of dependence on the largesse of an almost alien State took hold among
the non-bureaucratic sections of the population, not least among the businessmen
who wanted to move ahead. However, since
businessmen were the spearheads of Thai economic growth, their relationship with
the State evolved more rapidly and harmoniously than other sections of the population.
From being mere clients of the bureaucratic elite (primarily the military), businessmen
soon forged an alliance with them, and began to use State power to ensure monopolistic
control for themselves and protection for their industries. The
increased pressure of business interests among the bureaucracy soon led to the
erosion of the solid core of organizational unity that characterized the military.
After 1973, the total dominance of the military over the Thai polity in the previous
four decades could no longer be sustained. Extra-bureaucratic influences began
to exert more pressure on the levers of the State. Political parties, however
weak and disorganized, had now become permanent fixtures of government, becoming
among other things conduits of power for provincial business interests. Meanwhile,
on the economic front, radical changes took place in the international economy
in the aftermath of the oil crisis of 1973. Being an export-driven economy, the
need to adjust to the more demanding international environment forced the Thai
government to liberalize its economy, strongly led by its economic managers, commonly
termed the “technocrats”. The continued
growth of the economy also led to a massive expansion of the business sector,
creating in its train a sizable middle class that no longer needed to depend on
government employment. There was also a
discernible shift in the middle classes’ approach to politics. Although many businesses
continued to cut deals with politicians on behalf of their own interests, there
are now increasing numbers who disdain such deals and whose conscience and professional
management have led them to oppose such practices. Instead, these individuals
seek to promote more their class interest, to use an expression now somewhat out
of fashion. The growth in numbers and prestige of trade associations such as the
Federation of Thai Industries, the Board of Trade and so on is testimony to a
different outlook among businessmen. These organizations have become lobbyists
for large-scale legal and regulatory reforms. Associated
with this has been the growing internationalization of the Thai economy, which
demands that Thai businesses and other actors in the economy, not least the government
itself, increasingly conform to standards that are set abroad. These overseas
standards have to be met partly because of the competition in the marketplace.
However, we should not overlook direct pressures through such multilateral mechanisms
as the GATT or the unilateral coercion of the infamous Section 301 of the U.S.
trade law. In their attempts to come to
terms with the Thai State, the progressive sections of the business community
are finding that they are ill-served by the political parties, whose evolution
has been far less rapid than that of the business world. Their attempt to penetrate
to the corridors of power via the political parties have until recently been largely
unsuccessful, mainly because traditional political leaders remained suspicious
of these businessmen, although the events of 1991/1992 have changed that somewhat. Generally,
however, political parties still prefer to deal only with businessmen who have
stuck to the timeworn tradition of seeking special favours for themselves in exchange
for contributions to the parties or to party members. The reason for this preference
is clear. Parties need enormous sums to finance election campaigns, which have
become more and more expensive over the last two decades. Money-politics
has a long historical root. I have alluded to the political culture in which most
Thais, particularly rural Thais, look to the State as an alien power. In this
respect the State is a bit like the spirits and goblins that are such an important
part of Thai beliefs. To be sure, the State, like these extra-terrestrial beings,
has to be placated, but special favours can also be asked of it. In both cases,
there are procedures for obtaining favours, and there are selected individuals
who mediate between the requestor and the alien power. In the old days the mediators
between the State and the individual were the village headmen and the kamnans.
Now, the local Member of Parliament is increasingly assuming that role. While
this view of the Alien State, acting as a patron, is steeped in tradition, money-
politics is a cancerous outgrowth of the tradition. This cancer is on its way
to reaching catastrophic proportions, as it is affecting the economy on which
our political system has been feeding. There are now whole areas of business where
kickbacks are routine. It has been said that Thai industry rests not on “know-how”
but on “know-who”. Another impediment
to the development of clean government in Thailand is the over-developed sense
of gratitude ingrained in the Thai character. If you do me a good turn or do me
a personal favour, I and my family, shall forever remain indebted to you. Payment
in kind -- votes promised and delivered -- is a rule rather than an exception,
particularly in the rural areas. Money-culture
is also a worrisome feature of our society. So long as wealth, irrespective of
how it is derived, is viewed with awe and respect and tends to be synonymous with
power and authority, potential candidates and members of parliament are directly
or indirectly encouraged to go out of their way to amass fortunes. Wealth
commands following and status and is often sought after unscrupulously. Men and
women of integrity and honesty consequently find electoral process and politics
incompatible with their moral ethics and show reluctance to be involved. Corruption
is indeed a fact of life in Thailand today, but it is a fact of life which is
widely abhorred. Thus the military has found in corruption among our elected politicians
the best excuse for coups d’etat since the demise of the Communist threat. It
is of course an excuse, but the excuse has worked because there is a deep thread
of public disaffection with electoral politics and its associated corruption. There
is thus a new label, a new justification for attacking government institutions,
including democratic ones. The watchword is “corruption”. The
metaphor of corruption as cancer suggests that the root cause of corruption arises
from deep within the society, and that its cure will be daunting, perhaps even
unattainable. The current electoral law does not have sufficient safeguards to
deter the influence of money-politics, and the system of multiple-member constituencies
may actually encourage it. Political parties continue to be a euphemism for clans,
and have only very recently begun to attract well-educated and experienced individuals
to go through the electoral process. Under-lying
these problems is the vast social and economic gap between urban and rural Thailand,
which generates a set of attitudes on both sides that do not make for good and
responsible citizenship. Rural Thailand looks to Bangkok as the eternal fountain
of wealth which is to be tapped by their members of parliament, and opts
to elect those candidates whose main qualifications are their ability to
deliver the goods to their home constituencies. Urban Thailand tends to look down
on these representatives who place parochial interests over and above greater
needs of the country. Consequently, while Bangkokians have taken to the streets
to fight (and die) for democracy, they have tended to be quickly disillusioned
by the results of the democratic elections for which they fought. The lack-luster
performances of a large majority of members of parliament have given rise to this
disenchantment. There is, let there be
no doubt about it, a strong current in Thailand, as in Japan and Italy, in favour
of “clean hands” in politics. The central question which awaits an answer is “Who
will bell the cat?”. We do not have the institution of the magistracy that has
been such a powerful instrument in the current revolution in Italy, nor is our
prosecutor’s office as potent as the Japanese one. Consequently,
many among us have always had a hankering for “knights on white horses” to release
us from the thrall of corruption, notwithstanding the fact that many of these
“knights” were themselves notably less than paragons of honesty and integrity. Do
we then have no grounds for hope at all? I believe we have, but the first condition
for hope and for solution is to stop searching for the “quick fix”. Despite a
long tradition of coups and general political instability, I believe that Thai
history has been marked by slow, continuous evolutionary change rather than by
radical moves in political structure or ideology. I therefore expect future changes
to be more in that tradition -- a muddling through, rather than a sudden dawn
of enlightenment. If we put ourselves in
that frame of mind, then I believe there are some grounds for hope. Thailand has
been singularly fortunate among the developing countries for being a relatively
homogeneous country, ethnically and religiously, and with an enlightened and highly
revered monarchy as the focal institution for the nation as a whole. Because there
are no over-riding ethnic, religious or ideological differences among the various
sections of the population, pragmatism is allowed a full play in our approach
to political and economic problems. It
is because of these reasons that the wounds inflicted by the events of May 1992
are being quickly healed. Since then, the
institution of the parliament has emerged considerably strengthened. It appears
that the current government will last through its normal term. In any case, there
is every reason to expect that the current constitutional system will not again
be aborted by another coup d’etat. If so, then a few more successive elections
will ensure a firmer foundation for the full development of political parties
and system in Thailand. The balance of political forces will hopefully shift from
a patronage-based political system toward a more issue-oriented one. If this happens,
politics will begin to attract a different and, I dare to hope, a better kind
of politician into the fray. Finally, the
long period of economic growth that Thailand has been enjoying will begin to yield
political dividends. Thais are now living in urban areas in larger numbers than
ever before. We all know that this rapid urbanization is exacting a high social
toll, but in the urban constituencies, with higher educational content, will be
a force for improvement. There is an urgent need, however, to raise the overall
level of education. These are the sorts
of things I see occurring “naturally” in the normal course of events. That does
not mean that we cannot give history a little nudge. I have already identified
the underlying cause of the Thai political malaise to be the vast social and income
gaps, between the rural and urban populations. Attacking this problem is to me
an essential ingredient in any attempt to improve the political climate of the
country. A two-pronged approach appears
to me to be necessary. At the individual level, improving the rural population’s
access to a higher level of education is an essential first step. While more than
90 per cent of children now attend primary school, attendance at the secondary
level is still low. For the children of today’s farmers to improve their lot in
a more competitive world of the future, a longer period of schooling seems be
a necessary first step. Expanding educational
opportunities without a vibrant economy in rural Thailand will lead to its rapid
de-population-witness what is happening now. The individual rural family’s access
to education must also be complemented by its access to more rural jobs and information. It
is imperative that the industrialization now taking place in Bangkok and its environs
be spread more evenly around the country. If and when this takes place, we can
see an emergence of a rural middle class that can make better and more effective
use of their greater autonomy in managing local affairs and issues. Decentralization
of authority and the national budget to the provincial level would also accelerate
the efficacy of democracy at grass roots. Success
of democracy is also predicated upon well-informed public. The right to be informed
and un-encumbered access to information is a necessary pre-condition for active
public participation in decision-making processes. This trend is becoming increasingly
evident in present - day Thailand. All
in all, therefore, despite a history in which political development lags well
behind the growth of the country’s economy, I am cautiously optimistic that, with
proper management, politics in Thailand will become more participatory and cleaner--and
above all, more transparent and meaningful. When
one looks at Thai history, one can see that the Thai nation has weathered many
storms over the past 700 years. Because of our resolve and fine sense of balance,
we have managed each time to overcome these crises and survived as a national
entity. True, we may be agonizingly slow in coming to a solution, but in the end
we always muddle our way through. I have no reason to believe that history will
not repeat itself! |
The
Future is Ours to See Closing Address by H.E. Anand
Panyarachun At the 42nd PATA Annual Conference in Honolulu,
Hawaii May 13, 1993 Distinguished Participants:
Ladies and Gentlemen: (Introduction) In
Thailand, I am known for wearing many hats. Today I have been asked to try on
a new one: to forecast travel trends. As an outsider to the travel industry, I
can only offer a layman’s perspective of what I see taking place. I shall touch
on global as well as regional trends that are relevant to the industry. I shall
look at the tourism situation in Pacific Asia - how it has evolved, what factors
are affecting it, and what the future holds. Within the span
of a few years, it seems, the world has suddenly become a vastly more complex
place. The advent of the so-called New World Order has deluged us with a bewildering
array of plausible scenarios of what the future holds. We now recognize that the
world is being shaped by forces that have grown and evolved independently of ideological
considerations. The currents of change
are a mixture of forces old and new, contrary and complementing. Just as we are
finding our bearings, it seems that everywhere, norms of behaviour and fundamental
axioms are being called into question. Assumptions about how the world works,
in diverse fields ranging from international politics to mathematics are being
challenged by new developments and theories. (The
Attractions of Pacific Asia) Tourism
in Pacific Asia has evolved as well. Pacific Asia has long been a popular destination
for romantics of all persuasions. The early travellers were people with missions
- adventurers, merchants and missionaries, who enthralled their countrymen with
stories of the mysterious East. Adding to the mystique, popular art, novels and
musicals tantalized winter-weary Europeans with their portrayal of life in these
tropical climes. With advances in technology,
Asia came within reach of the masses. Television became the vehicle for arousing
the people’s curiousity about Pacific Asia’s exotic locales. The globalization
of business stimulates travel and its inseparable activity, tourism. The
yen to travel has been made much easier to fulfill. Economies of scale and stiff
competition have made air travel affordable for millions of people. In response
to the growing demand for travel, innovations have been introduced to aircraft
in order to cater to the whims of travellers. Airplanes are getting bigger, more
comfortable and luxurious. Flying has become a more common feature of life. With
commercial aviation opening up the world, the hotel industry naturally followed
suit. Now, not only do chain and independent hotels vie to provide travellers
with all the comforts of home, they are also branching out into the convention
and conference business. This has allowed professionals from around the world
to conduct business in pleasant surroundings. Never has travel been made easier
or more attractive. With these developments,
it was no wonder that Pacific Asia became a top tourist destination. The uniqueness
of the region’s rich cultural heritage, ancient architectural splendours, and
natural beauty, as well as the grace of its people more than lived up to the promises
of the travel brochures. What is more, all this came at a very affordable cost. (The
Impact of Economic Development) At
the same time, countries in the region are becoming more industrialized and developed.
With more leisure time and more disposable income, a new class of travellers within
the region was born: the generic tourists. These are people whose main purpose
when travelling is to shop and visit famous landmarks. These are average working-age
people who pay their own way for a vacation or are rewarded by their employers
with an all-expenses-paid package. The increasing affluence of Pacific Asia means
an increasing number of tourists will be from within the region, and their tastes
will influence the way tourism is conducted, as I shall explain later on. With
industrialization comes not only affluence, but also a host of side-effects that
inevitably affect tourism. Modernization carries a price. The trick is to look
at the price tag before buying. The problems
will be familiar to anyone who has visited mega-cities in Asia and Latin America.
We can dismiss them as growing pains - after all, didn’t England go through the
same ordeal during its industrialization period? - but it may be more useful to
analyze and see what we can do about them. For
many of these mega-cities, rapid growth has outpaced the development of infrastructure.
Infrastructure, which may be quite adequate for the local populace may be stretched
far beyond its capacity by years of double-digit growth. A concurrent boom in
tourism only adds to the strain. The Bangkok
of today, for example, is virtually un-recognizable from the Bangkok of fifty
years ago. As the nation’s booming industrial and business centre, the city is
a magnet for migrant workers from all over the country. Population
growth has created demands on the city’s resources far in excess of the expectations
of its founders. The canals, which once served navigation and drainage purposes,
giving Bangkok its nickname Venice of the East, have been paved over to make way
for more roads. Huge shade trees lining the avenues have been cut down to make
way for more lanes. The temple spires that gave the city’s skyline its distinctive
look have been obscured by a geometric jumble of concrete and steel. Bangkok from
a distance is practically indistinguishable from any other modern metropolis. With
the growth in population and the economy, the relaxed, unhurried lifestyle that
has evolved over the generations is being replaced by the high-stress, fast-paced
tempo of cosmopolitan life. The city’s notorious traffic jams require many of
us to leave home for work before dawn and return late in the evening. It seems
we are working harder and making more money, but we have less time to be with
our families and enjoy ourselves. The environment
is suffering as well. Pollution and destruction of natural resources have reached
alarming proportions. With all these troubles, it would seem tourism would be
the least of our problems. Yet, they are related. The same combination of mis-management
and narrow self-interest that undermines the local quality of life also threatens
the very qualities that make a country appealing to visitors. (Impact
of Economic Growth on Tourism) The
tourism industry needs to take the longer view with respect to these problems.
Tourism is closely linked with development. Many developing countries depend on
the industry for a large part of their income. Tourism can thus be a force to
ensure that development proceeds in a balanced and sustainable manner. The
environment and infrastructure are issues that affect tourism directly. Pollution,
is it land, air, water or noise, should not be allowed to ruin what should be
a positive holiday experience. Despoliation of natural attractions, such as the
littering of national parks and the destruction of coral reefs, is bound to decrease
a country’s tourism value. It will not do to allow the situation to deteriorate
to a point of no return, before taking action. Tourism
would be a major beneficiary of conservation and anti-pollution efforts. It therefore
makes sense for those in the tourism business to be at the forefront of efforts
to fight environmental damage of every kind. This has been slow to happen, for
obvious economic reasons. (The Tourism
Resources Dilemma) There is a dilemma
here, involving something economists call public goods. These are things that,
once provided, can be equally enjoyed by all and cannot be withheld from anyone.
The tourism industry in many developing countries relies to a large extent on
public goods: things like image, air and water quality, infrastructure, and so
forth. Public goods are not always free.
In most cases, the public pays for them through taxes. In the tourism industry,
operators have the greatest stake in preserving the environment, but lack the
economic incentive to do so. Take, for
example, an average-size hotel that is considering treating its waste water before
releasing it into the sea. The equipment and the costs of operation and maintenance
require a substantial investment. There is no guarantee that the hotel’s competitors
will take similar action and bear similar costs. Nor does the hotel’s action result
in perceptible improvements in the sea water quality. In other words, the individual
operator’s marginal utility is so small relative to the cost, and the benefit
of its action so diffuse, that there is no economic incentive for him or her to
take civic-minded action. A unilateral
commitment to environmental conservation means higher costs, which in turn means
either a smaller profit margin or higher prices. Individual business operators
do not want to pay for infrastructural improvements and environmental conservation
if it means reduced competitiveness. Based on the peculiar properties of public
goods, environmental protection is an external cost no one wants to bear. In
the short term, it may be feasible to seek maximum profits without caring about
external costs. In the long run, however, these external costs have to be factored-
in and accounted for. Although the bottom-line
usually determines business and management practices, moral factors must also
be considered. As tourism often has a major impact on the host country, tourism
operators must be aware of their responsibility towards society. They must realize
that they have an ethical obligation to serve to the best of their ability their
fellow citizens as well as their clientele. In these times when tourists are more
ecologically conscious than ever, tourism operators will be amply rewarded for
doing what is right for society. In the
meantime, a higher authority is required to provide the moral stimulus, enforce
collective action and plan incentives to ensure that the burden is shared equitably
among those who would benefit most disproportionately. In
Thailand, the government plays a leading role in both infrastructural improvement
and environmental conservation. Ring roads and expressway systems now under construction,
promise to ease the lives of Bangkok commuters in a few years. The telecommunications
network is being expanded apace. Plans for a new, state-of-the-art international
airport serving Bangkok have been approved. To
encourage environmental conservation, an Environmental Protection Act was recently
passed. Under the Act, monetary, fiscal and tax incentives are provided to promote
private sector participation. The National Environment Board, or NEB, is being
upgraded to a ministerial-level body. Minimum standards are being set to control
pollutants at their source. The NEB is empowered to designate environmentally
protected areas and pollution-controlled areas to facilitate conservation measures
by the government. The first areas to be protected under this provision include
Phuket, Pattaya and Phi Phi Island, some of Thailand’s most popular resorts. The
brunt of the task, however, must fall on the travel industry itself. It is heartening
to note that an environmental consciousness seems to be emerging in the industry
at large. The European Association of Travel Agents has launched the so-called
Blue Flag campaign, under which travel operators in Europe will send tour groups
to only hotels and resorts that meet a certain environmental management standard.
Closer to home, the PATA has a Code of Environment-Friendly Tourism, to which
the Tourism Authority of Thailand subscribed last year. The code requires all
members to set their own environmental standard requirements to promote environmental
awareness among tourism operators. Locally, the environment wave is catching on
as well. By the very nature of tourism,
we must constantly ask ourselves if our efforts are adequate. The travel industry
faces a peculiar situation, a “Catch-22”, if you will. In order to keep attracting
more visitors year after year, a country’s attractions must be preserved and cared
for. Yet, as more visitors flock in, such maintenance becomes more difficult.
A tourism boom attracts investors and support industries, adding to the strain
on local resources. The crux of the dilemma,
as I have mentioned, lies in the economics involved. From a business standpoint,
it does not pay for a business to undertake environment-friendly measures, only
to lose its competitive edge through higher costs. Taking a broader view, however,
efficient and cost-effective environmental conservation, undertaken collectively,
can actually enhance competitiveness vis-a-vis competitor resorts and countries. (Tourism
and Cultural Diffusion) For all our
efforts to minimize the adverse impact of tourism on local life, we can never
entirely dis-engage the two. Whether we like it or not, tourism plays a role in
shaping local life. Unlike any other industry, tourism is about contact with the
unfamiliar. It satisfies that singularly human urge to explore alien settings
first-hand, even if it is just buying souvenirs at a roadside stall. Tourism involves
not only monetary transactions, but also exposure - to different viewpoints and
outlooks, customs and mores - for visitor and host. As a result, both walk away
from the encounter with a change in perspective, no matter how slight. It
is this exposure - this feeling that one is not in Kansas any more - that makes
travel special. I see two major trends that will have an impact on Pacific Asian
tourism in the years ahead. One is the Westernization of Asia, in particular the
newly industrializing countries. The other is the growth of mass tourism, the
invasion of the generic tourists. It is
not difficult to see the Asian “love affair” with the West. Michael Jackson and
Madonna are readily recognized even in restrictive China. Fast-food hamburger
outlets and pizza parlours are staking out territory in practically every Asian
capital. Disneyland Tokyo has proven wildly successful. The reverse flow of tourism
from East to West suggests Asia is not only a destination, but also a source market
of great potential. The popularity of Western
culture and the globalization of business, among others, are potent forces that
are transforming the face of Asian society. This Western influence is changing
the way business is conducted. It is changing consumer habits. In short, it is
changing the way we live. Some call it
cultural imperialism. I call it an inevitable course of development. The gospel
of materialism, preached through glossy television commercials and shows, is pervasive.
It promises to fulfill our cravings for comfort and pleasure, for prestige and
status, without any great effort on our part. Use this product and it instantly
identifies you as a suave individual. The creed of materialism is a great equalizer. Call
it what you will, Westernization or modernization, this phenomenon has the potential
to erode the individuality of cultures. Culture is becoming increasingly homogenized
around the world, with Western culture setting the trend. This may gradually undermine
the very core of tourism. Tourism is one industry that thrives on differentiation.
You don’t fly half-way round the world to see something you already have at home.
You want something different, something that’s not available anywhere else. Disturbingly,
we find travel destinations becoming increasingly like source countries. The
effects of modernization apart, tourism develops its own dynamics that contributes
to this trend. The age of the swashbuckling traveller is past. The proliferation
of generic tourists requires that accommodations be familiar and entertainment
accessible. Travel will become an increasingly sanitized experience, removed from
the reality of the host country’s society. The element of adventure, which implies
some possibility of risk, will be minimized. This
reflects what I call a ‘theme park syndrome.” Theme parks are safe environments
where roller-coaster rides satisfy our craving for excitement; animal and animatronic
shows with their informative voice-overs entertain and educate us; and gift shops
around every bend beckon our wallets. Theme parks give us enough of the unfamiliar
to stimulate our sense of adventure, while providing all the creature comforts
of home. As developing countries seek to
attract tourists, and as generic tourism increases, the qualities that make theme
parks so successful will become more evident. Culture is being tailored and packaged
for the mass market. Indigenous ceremonies are simulated for the benefit of snapshot-happy
tourists. Tourist traps are mushrooming in the unlikeliest corners of the globe.
Simulated adventure will become more attractive. Conservationists
bemoan the commercialization of culture, but this is according to the laws of
the market. The long-term effect of this trend is that we will no longer be able
to recognize the difference between one metropolis and another unless we visit
the tourist attractions. The long-term
survival of the tourism industry depends on maintaining differentiation, not on
promoting homogeneity. Preservation of cultural uniqueness and identity is crucial,
for once homogenized, there is no turning back. From
this angle, we can readily discern the new frontiers of tourism. The splendours
of Angkor Wat, Myanmar (or what was known as Burma) and Southern China, all easily
accessible from Thailand, are some of the unspoiled attractions awaiting the adventurous
traveller. Should the governments ruling them decide to promote tourism, I fear,
they can be quickly ruined by the inevitable rush of generic tourists. Management
and planning, preferably by travel associations such as the PATA, are required
to ensure their enjoyment by future generations. The
fortunes of the travel industry are, of course, also linked to forces within which
it has no control. Global economic downturns can cause a slump in tourism. With
the Cold War over and countries setting up trade blocs and bracing for trade wars,
it is possible that we will have a rough ride up to the 21st century. Worldwide
competition for tourist dollars under such conditions is tougher. it
is likely, however, that tourism in Pacific Asia will emerge relatively unscathed.
The growing volume of Asia-Pacific trade and increasing economic cooperation within
the region will to some extent cushion us from severe shocks. (Conclusion) The
best way to stay competitive is to follow the law of comparative advantage. Make
the most of the resources you already have. Build on the advantages already existing,
rather than attempt to emulate the success of others by starting from scratch.
The successful countries will be those that manage to strike a balance between
private gain and public responsibility, between homogeneity and differentiation. As
the world shapes tourism, so does tourism change the world. It is up to us to
make tourism a force for the common good. The most pressing issues of the day
require us to take a pro-active approach, to ensure that tourism goes hand-in-
hand with sustainable development. This way, the future is not only ours to see,
it is ours to build. |
IFCT
Nomura/JAFCO Holdings Co., Ltd. Seminar on Venture
Capital Business Address by Mr. Anand Panyarachun in Thailand April
29, 1993 Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, I
am indeed honoured and pleased to be invited to address this impressive gathering
of entrepreneurs. We are well into what many people refer to as the “Pacific Decade”,
the decade in which economic growth in the Asia Pacific will out-pace that of
any other region in the word. The thrust throughout Asia will be to increase value-added,
export oriented industrialisation, expand technological development, and to massively
improve infrastructure. I sincerely believe that the nucleus of that thrust will
come from entrepreneurs like yourselves. I
would like to begin my address by highlighting a major economic development in
South East Asia. ASEAN At
the ASEAN Summit held in Singapore in January 1992, member-nations endorsed the
formation of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). After a decade of buoyant economic
growth, the Governments of the ASEAN nations have boldly stepped into a new era
of regional economic liberalisation and integration. The
vision to attain free trade within ASEAN in 15 years is another “feather in the
cap” for ASEAN and its member countries. Already, ASEAN has been recognised and
respected within global circles as a cohesive economic unit intent on promoting
regional cooperation Now with the creation
of AFTA, this new spirit of economic cooperation will not only raise trade and
investment linkages between member countries, but also strengthen and better insulate
the region against recessions and protectionism in the world market. Furthermore,
the economic development of ASEAN will have far reaching effects on other nations
in the Asia Pacific. Because of its strategic location and vast natural resources,
the region will see increased trade activities with its neighbours, particularly
China and Indochina. I am sure that many opportunities can be created to combine
the respective strengths and resources in the finance and investment areas of
ASEAN and its Asia Pacific neighbours. Thailand,
being a member of this privileged group of economies, is poised to regain its
economic momentum and shift into a higher economic gear. Thailand Thailand
has made a dramatic transition from an agricultural and resource-based economy
into a more export-led economy - one that combines agriculture, agro-industry,
manufacturing and services. After low growth in the early 1980s, Thailand embarked
on a comprehensive transition and structural programme to unlock the vast potentials
of a free enterprise economy, achieving a GDP growth of 6.8 % in 1992 in the midst
of a global economic downturn. This “open
door” policy emphasized the promotion of the private sector role in economic development.
The private sector will continue to lead Thailand’s economic growth in the 1990s.
Privatisation will be the Government’s route for mobilising investment priorities,
particularly the development of new infrastructure. With
the Government taking a secondary role, room is made available for strategic alliances
to undertake to develop, expand, and steer the Thai economy into the Pacific Century. The
Government has adopted rational tax policies to encourage domestic consumption
and investment, and maintain the country’s relative competitiveness. The introduction
of a value-added tax and the reduction of both personal and corporate income tax,
and import tax on capital equipment will boost the level of investments. The
key to Thailand’s continued economic transformation, I believe, will be to implant
regulatory reforms that diminish risks for investors, yet at the same time enhance
the flow of investments from domestic and international sources by making domestic
markets more accessible. This brings me
to comment on the importance of small and medium-sized businesses in the economic
evolution of Thailand. Small and
Medium-Size Enterprises (SME) Small
and medium-size enterprises or businesses are the key elements of economic development.
Contrary to popular belief, it is the SMEs that drive a nation’s economic growth,
not large conglomerates. It can be evidenced from some of the OECD nations, that
emerging small and medium-sized companies provide key support to the vitality
of a nation’s economy I wish to cite the
United States as an example. In the early 1970s, instead of relying on a handful
of multinationals, SMEs were encouraged to participate in the country’s economic
growth. They would share the economic burden, and with it, the economic rewards.
Today, with the systems infrastructure firmly set in place, many SMEs have become
corporate giants, and they would be expected to lead the American economy out
of its recession. Thailand has a diversity
of small and medium-size businesses. From agriculture to manufacturing, tourism
to retailing, Thai entrepreneurs have been the cornerstone of the early development
of these sectors, and have laid the foundation for their continued expansion.
This diversity contrasts with other ASEAN nations, whose focus has been on the
electronics sector. Unfortunately, in the
past, Thai entrepreneurs have lacked the necessary direction to expand their businesses.
This is partly because appropriate guidelines were not formulated to assist Thai
entrepreneurs. Now with the liberalizing of the financial systems and minimising
of bureaucratic processes, corporatisation of businesses has been very much facilitated.
Next, barriers that prevented foreign investments have been removed and joint
ventures encouraged. Finally, Thailand’s international competitiveness has been
greatly improved by the adoption of rational fiscal and monetary policies. Thailand
will continue to experience strong demand for capital in the next five to seven
years in order to fund the country’s rapid economic expansion. Infrastructure
development is a key Government priority - massive sums will be required in the
years ahead. Thailand’s Capital Market Thailand
has historically developed largely shorter-term funding. This is because the capital
market is relatively under-developed and greatly needs to emulate standards set
by leading international markets. The short-term focus of the Thai market will
make it difficult to encourage equity market investment in infrastructure projects,
especially in the near future. As the market matures towards the end of the decade,
the private sector will begin to focus on longer-term capital funding needs. Therefore,
in the medium-term, the foreign investor will be of vital importance to Thailand.
The country’s current levels of domestic savings, are insufficient to satisfy
the massive sums of capital urgently needed for development, particularly infrastructure.
As such, many ventures or projects will need to be funded primarily by foreign
capital sources. Towards the end of the decade, domestic savings will have grown
rapidly and will be directed by the Government through the private sector into
mutual funds, provident funds and insurance companies, which will emerge as significant
sources of capital for the domestic financial markets. There
has been an explosive growth in the number of shares traded on the Stock Exchange
of Thailand (“SET”). Last year alone, 34 companies were listed on the SET. I believe
the emphasis will increasingly shift to quality. Listing procedures will be made
simpler and quicker, but listed companies will be forced to disclose significantly
more information, to strengthen investor protection. Further, the establishment
of Thailand ‘s OTC market will open the door for equity financing to emerging
companies, now that a secondary market similar to NASDAQ in the US will soon be
made available to investors. These measures will more effectively mobilize both
domestic and foreign capital to support strong private sector investment growth. IFCT-NJH In
this respect, I am pleased to learn of the establishment of IFCT NOMURA/JAFCO
HOLDIINGS CO., LTD. in Thailand. This corporation was formed by one of the most
established and dynamic institutions in Thailand, together with Japan’s largest
investment group, to support fast-growing small and medium size businesses, by
offering much needed medium to long term equity funds and corporate alliance advice
and services. On a broader scale, Thailand
will need higher technology, along with greater amounts of capital and skilled
professionals in its next stage of industrial development. The greater need for
technology transfer can be greatly assisted by joint efforts by organisations
such as IFCT-NJH and the private and public sectors, particularly in facilitating
the diffusion of Japanese technology and management skills, as well as the building
up of Thailand’s technology infrastructure and support systems. I
wish IFCT-NJH and its business partners in Thailand every success. I am confident
that their endeavours will prove rewarding, not merely for them alone, but for
Thailand as a whole. |
Management
And Society In The Asia of Tomorrow by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Chairman
of Saha-Union Corp., Ltd. Delivered at the Asian Institute of Management International
Conference Shangri-la’s EDSA Plaza Hotel Manila, Philippines February
18, 1993 We are living in a world of momentous, far-reaching
changes. Film devotees among members of
this distinguished audience may be familiar with a recent motion picture called
“Forever Young”. It is a story of a young man frozen in a capsule decades ago
as part of a scientific experiment, who now wakes up to face an unknown and mysterious
world - “a terra incognita”, full of strange objects, customs and life-styles.
A sort of latter-day Rip Van Winkle, one might say. A
student or practitioner of international affairs, similarly frozen and now woken
after some thirty years of slumber, would similarly find himself on a very unfamiliar
terrain indeed, a terrain where many old landmarks have disappeared and have been
replaced by new features, motifs and forms. He
would be faced with a strange, bewildering world.
- A world where the Cold War, a divided Germany, the Soviet Union
and the Soviet Empire have become history.
- A world where the rulers of
Moscow, successors of Lenin and Stalin, speak the same language of freedom and
democracy, market economy and peace as their counterparts in Washington, DC.
-
A world where the United States of America, remains the sole super-power but has
much less influence to shape her own and the international community’s destinies
than before; a world where the achievement of American strategic and ideological
primacy is rendered largely inconsequential, firstly by rapidly growing global
inter-dependence, secondly by the emergence of economics as the issue of paramount
concern, and thirdly, by the emergence of new centres of economic power
and political influence.
- A world where enduring geo-political and ideological
schisms between East and West have given way to shifting, pragmatic alignments
of States; a world where stark disparities between North and South have been obfuscated
as a result of the economic stagnation of many an industrialised nation, and the
successful economic performances of several dynamic economies in the developing
world, particularly in east Asia.
- A world where more and more governments
have begun, to conceive the meaning of the word “security” in a more comprehensive
and constructive manner: that is, not only in terms of strategic and military
requirements, but also in terms of fulfilling their own people’s demands for better
standards of living, improved quality of life and greater participation in decision-making
processes. In terms of addressing some of the broader issues, relevant to the
well being of the international community as a whole, particularly where the questions
of human rights and environmental protection are concerned.
- A world where
the primacy of the concept of “raison d’état”, which places the requirements
of the nation-state before all else, is being visibly challenged by the spread
of the notion of individual rights, that transcend the concerns and interests
of the nation-state.
To be sure,
the Cold War world had been a dangerous one indeed, with the vast arrays of nuclear
weapons, posing an apocalyptic threat to the existence of mankind. I
believe that, during the nearly five decades of its existence, in many ways it
had also been a world of enduring simplicity, a world of seemingly black-and-white
clarity. For, over that lengthy period
of time, there appeared to be clear lines of division and patterns where the questions
of human rights and environmental protection are concerned. Allegiance among protagonists;
clear distinctions, between what was right and what was wrong, between those who
were rich and strong and those who were poor and weak. What the rich and strong
could rightfully do and what the poor and weak could not. There also appeared
to be clear problems to be addressed and un-ambiguous approaches to their resolutions. In
such a context, the task of leadership in both diplomacy and governance, I believe,
was also relatively simple. It was primarily the organisation and application
of political power in accordance with certain sets of priorities and in pursuit
of certain sets of goals. The post-Cold War world, on the other hand, is one of
change and complexity. It is a world characterised
by moral and ideological ambiguities and certainty; by changing norms and values,
attitudes and beliefs: by shifting priorities and allegiances, shifting political
alignments and patterns of power distribution. By an ever-increasing multiplicity
of strategic, political, social and economic demands and requirements, generated
by a variety of sources and pursued by a variety of actors, ranging from nation-States
to NGOs, organised interest groups and “ad hoc" coalitions of individuals. In
the post-Cold War world, the task of leadership in both diplomacy and governance
is one of immense complexity. Organisation and application of power, continues
to be important, for politics is still politics, and in politics, power continues
to be an important source of influence. Where the challenge
is to respond to a wide-ranging set of demands and requirements in a context of
change, uncertainty and ambiguities, the quality of leadership rests on the capacity.
Firstly, to utilise one’s limited resources to address as many issues of concern
as possible. Secondly to reconcile such demands and requirements where they conflict.
Thirdly, to re-organise the use of one’s limited resources and to re-formulate
the existing agenda in such a way, that one’s future capacity to address the issues
of concern and reconcile the conflicts among them is enhanced. At
the present juncture of history, the primary task of leadership is to manage a
complex and sophisticated agenda, taking into full account the diversity of views
and setting correct priorities. It is also to manage in such a way that leads
to a consensus on the vision for the future. In
this era, politics is not the art of the possible as such but, more accurately,
the art of managing the seemingly impossible in the most effective manner! The
conception of leadership, in terms of management, has been popular for some time
in the western world. It has been generally perceived to be only applicable in
the context of western societies’ diplomacy and governance. Certainly
very little has been written or said about the relevance of this concept of leadership
to Asia. I suspect that one cause of this omission is the assumption, held in
many quarters, that Asian societies are traditional, by nature, and in Asian traditions
there is a preference for strong -- or some might even say, authoritarian-- leaderships,
which leave little room for alternative types of leaderships. Another, and I suspect
the more underlying cause, is culture-bound mind-sets: Management is all about
modernity, thus how can Asian societies, most of which have only recently emerged
from the state of political and economic under-development, possibly understand
and benefit from such a modern concept? Diplomats
and businessmen are taught to be realists. As an ex-diplomat working in the business
community, I am very much a realist. Thus I will be the first to admit, that there
are some grains of truth in many westerners’ conclusions regarding the traditional
nature of Asian societies and their affinities to strong leaderships. This is
perhaps most evident in the fact that, while the communist regimes in the former
Soviet Union and eastern Europe have collapsed to be replaced by a variety of
democratic arrangements, communism as a system of governance has still survived
in some parts of Asia. To dwell on traditions
and traditional affinities is to overlook or ignore the essence of many a contemporary
Asian society. The fact is Asia, particularly in its eastern-most stretches, on
the rim of the Pacific Ocean, is the most rapidly changing continent in a world
of momentous and far-reaching changes. Because of the nature and extent of the
changes that have taken place, as well as the complexity that these changes have
brought to Asian societies, it, is my belief that the most necessary and appropriate
concept of leadership for Asia, now and for the foreseeable future, is management
of political, economic and social issues in a balanced manner. Let
me explain: During the last two decades,
and particularly during the last ten years, Asia’s economies have expanded at,
an unprecedented rate, despite the persistence of a number of serious regional
conflicts. During this process, many of
these economies, mostly located on the western Pacific rim, have become, and continue
to be, increasingly diversified, industralised, and integrated with rapidly growing
global systems of trade and investment, banking and finance, communication and
telecommunication, technologies and information. The most notable cases are the
four so-called “Tigers” of East Asia, and some aspiring “Tiger Cubs”. These
changes in turn have transformed, and continue to transform, Asian societies,
with far-reaching implications or consequences for their systems of politics and
governance. As a result of unprecedented
economic expansion and multi-dimensional integration with the various global systems,
Asian societies are becoming increasingly pluralistic. This
pluralism is manifest in terms of the emergence of new social groups, especially
the educated and the middle classes. Of political-cum-economic constituencies,
connected, for example, with agriculture, manufacture and industry, commerce,
banking and finance, or a combination of these. It is also manifest in terms of
multiplicity of issues that are of concern to members of these changing societies,
ranging from questions of international trade, investment and finance, to problems
of prices of agricultural products and quality of land and management of water
resources in various localities. Also as
a result of the processes of growth and integration, educational systems have
been and continue to be significantly improved and expanded, and accesses to domestic
and trans-national sources of ideas and information enhanced in both quantity
and quality. These changes, in turn, serve
to raise the level of political awareness, making such questions as political
rights and economic freedom, personal liberties and community interests, political
participation and accountability, critical issues in the government and politics
of these societies. Heightened political awareness, increases the possibility
of political mobilisation, not only over these fundamental political principles,
but also over specific problems thought to be affecting the well being and the
progress of individuals, groups, communities or societies at large. Ranging from
conditions of work, to environmental protection and access to land and water resources. To
put it plainly, contemporary Asia is characterized by change and complexity. In
this context, the task of leadership in Asia, I believe, is necessarily one of
management: that is, one of managing rapidly changing societies, which are deeply
affected by rapidly changing times and circumstances. Are caught up by rapidly
growing multiplicity of demands, generated by a variety of sources and by a variety
of actors. I would venture to argue even
further that, given the pace and extent of change in Asia, the need for management
as a tool of leadership is much more pressing here than elsewhere in this global
community of ours. In the context of change
and complexity in economic and trade areas, the task of leadership is to manage
the process of integration so that the country benefits more and suffers less
from inter-acting with the outside world. It
is not in question whether one should opt for security or development, “guns or
butter”. For security without development, creates conditions for political and
economic malaise, which can ultimately undermine security. At the same time, development
without security can make the nation and the people prey to external interventions.
In this question the task of leadership is to manage the allocation of scarce
resources to buy sufficient “guns” to deter threats and spend enough on “butter”
for the people. It is not in question whether
one should choose economic growth or environmental protection. Growth without
conservation means sacrificing one’s long-term future for momentary gains and
creating conditions for political, social and economic conflicts and tensions,
which can undermine future growth. Conservation, without growth, is Utopia to
champions of the cause of environmental protection, but calamity to others who
expect, and have the right to expect, improved livelihood. The task of leadership,
therefore, is to manage the process of growth, in such a way that it is ecologically
sustainable. Finally, I believe that it
is no longer in question whether one should opt for economic development or democracy.
The twain must proceed together. Much has
been written and said about the necessity for choice in this question in the context
of Asian societies. Asians, so one argument runs, have no democratic tradition
or democratically oriented political culture. Thus economic development should
be given priority in the short-to-medium term, so that it can give rise to social
and economic conditions more conducive to the development of democracy in the
longer term. Asians, counters another argument, have become so closely integrated
with the outside world and come to share so many political, social and economic
expectations with the outside world, that democracy is the only possible form
of governance which could provide the requisite political and social under-pinnings
for promoting human rights, future material well-being and progress. Both
arguments are prisoners to cultural mind-sets. Economic
development, without democracy, creates, on the part of the regime, a propensity
towards continuation and entrenchment of authoritarianism, which, if not addressed,
could generate grievances, political mobilisation and unrest, and ultimately constraints
on further economic development. Democracy
without economic development is inherently unstable. On the one hand, emphasis
on the exercise of political freedom, without due regard to the question of performance
and responsibilities of governance, could give rise to potentially dangerous irresponsibility
and license. On the other hand, failure to deliver the “economic goods”, failure
to meet expectations of improved livelihood, could only lead to questions regarding
the legitimacy of the system of governance itself, and to conditions which may
finally cause a disillusionment and rejection of that system. The
task of leadership is to manage the allocation of political and economic resources
in such a way that economic development and democratisation can proceed hand in
hand, progressively and steadily steering a middle course and avoiding attaching
too much importance to one at the expense of the other. This
task is by no means an easy one. There is no single blueprint or textbook that
can be applicable to all Asian societies. At minimum, I believe that the task
of management in this question must be discharged in accordance with two fundamental
principles. The first is that the challenge
must be undertaken in an “Asian” way, that is not through borrowing ideas and
experiences indiscriminately from western societies, but through building upon
indigenous cultures and strengths. In particular, this means that the “democratic
revolution” should be promoted in an evolutionary manner, with emphases on consensus-bui1ding,
tolerance, and pragmatism. However, this
first principle is not sufficient in itself. An
evolutionary process of democratisation is necessary, but it. May lead to too
great a stress on the form, rather than the substance, of democracy, thus rendering
the system of governance superficial and ultimately fragile. Consensus-building
is also necessary, but it must not be an end in itself, For it may lead politicians
merely to cater to the demands and requirements - and whims - of their constituencies,
and thus generate political parochialism which has no place in today’s world. Furthermore,
too great an emphasis on consensus building may cause excessive caution and hence
political in action. The second necessary
principle, is that the evolutionary process of democratisation itself must be
managed, so that at critical points the process can be “fine-tuned” to respond
to changing times and circumstances, or can be pushed forward where there are
hesitations and obstructions. This in turn requires the “traditional” qualities
of statesmanship, namely competence, vision, commitment to principles, unquestioned
integrity, courage of conviction, and willingness to make sacrifices, on the parts
of leaders. A democratic regime, to be
sustainable, must be one which represents the main-stream of society, respond
in an effective and tangible manner to the aspirations of the people, and above
all act as the final arbiter of the many diverse and special interest groups. President
Truman wisely put it in simple terms, “The buck stops here”! |
A
Vision for Thailand: Toward the Year 2000 A keynote
Address by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Delivered Extemporaneously at the Opening
of a Seminar on “Project Management: A Strategic Approach” AIT
Centre August 3, 1989 Khunying Thongthip, Dr.
Edger, Mr. Vanderloo, our Friends from the University of Calgary, and Participants: Normally,
when a speaker comes up to the podium and delivers an address, he or she, whatever
the case may be, would normally thank the hosts for having invited him and accorded
the honour to be a guest speaker. Well, I must confess that I cannot honestly
say that I’m too delighted to be here, in a sense that there comes a time in your
life when you try to keep a rather low profile. But with the feminine charm and
the friendly persuasion from Khunying Thongthip, I found it practically impossible
to resist the approach, and as a result, I stand here before you. Now that I am
up here, I cannot help but be reminded of a remark made by Zsa-Zsa Gabor’s sixth
husband, when on the eve of his wedding to Zsa-Zsa Gabor, he was asked by a reporter
how he felt about the wedding the next day. “Well, I think I know what is expected
of me. The problem is how to make it interesting!” You
may have noticed that in recent months, the whole nation of Thailand is in a sort
of euphoric mood. Not a week passes by without someone standing up and saying
that we are going to become a NIC in three years time or five years time. I think
only last week, there was another seminar, and a number of distinguished speakers
emphasized the same theme. They talked about the future of Thailand toward the
year 2000. They listed the problems that we would be facing, but they’re all very
bullish about our country. A couple of years ago, I think that people were still
a little uncertain. The recognition given to Thailand mostly by outsiders, by
foreigners, has helped to convince the Thai people and particularly the government,
that yes, perhaps there is something about this prediction of the future of Thailand.
If you look back at the development in the past two decades, one must admit that
we have come a long way. I still remember the time in the 60’s when we were still
not quite sure whether we would survive internally. We were facing frequent numbers
of coup d’états, military takeovers, and political in-fightings. Externally,
the environment was very uncertain, with the Vietnam War and the communication
of Laos and Kampuchea in the 70’s. So, the periods in the 60’s and 70’s were decades
of grave concern for Thailand. Somehow we managed to survive. We plodded along.
The government, perhaps in its own style, did a few good things intentionally
or otherwise. The economy was diversified. Political stability was gradually -
brought in. The financial stability was, of course, the order of the day. There
was no self-indulgence. The Thais were not particularly prone to creating “white
elephants”. We did not - overspend. Cynically, we might say that, yes, we did
not over-spend because we could not make quick decisions to undertake big projects
in the 70’s or in the early 80’s. As a result, because of that rather fortunate
in-action, we did not build up the debts that many developing countries did in
the early 80’s. We’re now starting on a grand scale: the Eastern Seaboard development,
the National Petrochemical Complex Phase I is coming up. The NPC II is on the
way. The economy of Thailand has been transformed
rather drastically from an agrarian society in the early 50’s into import-substitutions,
into processing, into agro-industry and into light manufacturing. In the 90’s,
we can look forward to much larger projects, more complex projects and considerably
much larger capital-intensive projects. The question is “Are we really convinced
of this future of Thailand?” It’s not for me to answer the question. I have long
believed, that somehow or other, the fact that Thailand has been able to survive
as an independent nation for nearly 800 years, against all odds, against the major
colonial powers, must be due to something that we did right in past centuries.
Perhaps some of the inherent assets that we possess are not even realized by the
Thai people themselves, or otherwise, how could one explain that we have been
able to survive and to prosper moderately for several hundred years. I
happen to believe that in Thailand, within our society, there is a fundamental
strength. You can talk about the importance of the monarchy; you can talk about
the homogeneity of our society. You can talk about the soothing effect and the
tolerance of our religious teachings. You can talk about the absence of racial
strife or religious conflicts. You can talk about the good fortune that we have:
the natural resources, the human resources, the fact that we are not affected
by major natural disasters like earthquakes, cyclones, typhoons, and what-not.
You can talk about a country with a relatively large land area with plenty of
water, with plenty of forests (I beg your pardon!). We can talk about the adaptability
of the Thai people, the pragmatism and the ability to improvise. I think the Thais
have somehow demonstrated these capabilities without having to go through MBA
courses or business schools abroad. The pragmatic approach, the ability of the
Thais to roll with the punches, to adapt to new circumstances and to respond to
the changes that take places everyday. I call it “the improvisation.” Some people
may say “the advocacy”. To me, that is also an asset, because, without having
been colonized, we did not inherit any proven system of a former colonial master.
We built up our own civil service system. We built up our own business system.
We try to build up our own trade union system. We are not bound or constrained
by past practices or past systems. We can afford to be innovative; we can afford
to be a little bit more daring. So it’s a combination of pragmatism and systematic
approach that one has to look for in the future, and the reason is very simple,
because of the rate that Thailand is going. I
still remember a few years ago when there was a down-turn, in the world economy
and all the commodity prices were going down as a whole, and when the global trading
volume expanded less than one percent. Even countries of such sophisticated system
and systematic approach like Singapore, with all the scientists and engineers
and managers that they had, and still have, registered a negative growth in 1984.
That year, Thailand somehow managed a 2.8 % annual growth. That was the year that
the world started to look at Thailand seriously, and began to ask the same question
that I alluded to in the beginning: “What was it that made Thailand “tick”? I
think the Thais had not that reputation of being good planners like the Koreans.
The Thais not be as productive as the Japanese or the Taiwanese. The Thais not
have the reputation for working things out systematically. But somehow we got
through. That was the turning point. Since
then, the prediction that Thailand was going to be “the dark horse” of this decade.
Now the prediction that after the four newly-industrialized economies, Thailand
is going to be the next one. I personally am not too concerned whether we’re going
to be a newly industrialized economy, or not, because after all, what is the yardstick?
Is it per capita income? Is it a percentage share of the manufacturing sector
to the total GDP? Is it the rate of export growth? No, I don’t think figures mean
very much. Winston Churchill once said that there were three kinds of lies, “Lies,
damn lies and statistics”. So I don’t think that the Thai should be so overly
concerned whether to become a NIC or not. I think, rather, we have to, we need
to, create a new scenario, a scenario which will take into account the quality
of life of the people, the more equitable distribution of income among people,
the combination of agriculture and industries, a way to develop a new democratic
system which would suit its own genius. Look around, the four NICS, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, Korea, and Singapore. I had a choice, I would not volunteer to be one of
them. I think in our case, we have a much larger stake. We have assets, which
do not exist, in those four countries. Of course, we have problems, which do not
exist in those four countries either. But problems are created to be solved here
we have a large domestic market, one which is larger than Singapore, Taiwan or
Hong Kong. In Thailand, a food-surplus country, something, which cannot be, claimed
by the other four. It will remain a food-surplus and a food-exporting country.
It is essential that the agricultural sector not be neglected. Now
f or the first time in the region, a “wind of change is blowing”. I’m using the
words of our Prime Minister. Things are moving very rapidly around the world.
It is no longer the free world versus communism. Ideological conflict is gradually
decreasing. Yes, ideological rivalry is still there. The communist system has
a built-in destructive process. It is just not working, it is not functioning
politically and economically, so out of necessity it has to turn to other alternatives.
In recent years, the words most frequently used are “Perestroika” and “Glasnost”.
These two words are becoming fashionable in every communist country. Naturally,
each country has its own problems. The pace of change of those countries towards
a more open society, towards a market-oriented economy is going to be different.
We wish them well, we wish them success. Whatever the case may be, the trend is
irreversible because war is no longer a valid or a viable alternative to peace. Governments,
whatever their systems, whatever their preferences, have now realized that the
most important thing in life for their own survival as a system, is to try to
furnish the needs of their people. I think for the first time in many decades
there is hardly any fighting war going on. I am talking about fighting war in
the classical sense of the word, trying to acquire territory or trying to overthrow
a certain system. Even though areas of conflict are still there, the Middle East,
South Africa, Central America, and a few other places. Now people talk about economics
and development. People talk about consumer goods. People talk about infrastructure.
People talk about industries and factories. So here we have a new environment,
an environment which exists now in 1989 and is likely to remain up to the year
2000 and beyond. One that economics has taken over politics. External environment
is becoming more and more conducive to faster growth, to expanding economy, to
expanding global trade volume, and also to the inter-dependency of all nations. What
about in Thailand? Here again, either by design or otherwise, we have been able
to maintain this political stability, and that political stability is going to
continue in spite of the fact that you will hear more and more constructive criticisms
in parliament or outside parliament. These are part and parcel of the democratic
process. Here, we are moving into a new era, an era which needs a more thorough
preparation than what we had in the past. From now on, we are not going to deal
with industries or with projects of 20 million Baht or 40 million Baht. We are
not going to deal with projects, which employ thousands of people using relatively
cheap, but productive work force. We are not going to deal with projects, which
are unsophisticated. Instead we are going to deal with projects using up thousands
of millions of Baht or tens of thousands of millions of Baht. The question is,
if you are confronted with that kind of situation, and in order to sustain that
kind of development, can we in Thailand afford to make use of only the past practices
and past systems? To me, the answer is “No”, we cannot. I think we have to think
bigger, we have to dream bigger, and we have to prepare ourselves. We have to
prepare ourselves because these large projects need careful preparation, be it
in terms of feasibility study, be it in terms of planning, of execution of the
projects or commissioning of the projects. These projects are not exclusively
tied down to the domestic market, so we also have to know more about the world
outside Thailand. I refer to inter-dependence. That word was used when I was stationed
in New York, in the United Nations, twenty years ago. We were all paying lip-service
to that concept. Inter-dependence is no longer a concept. It is now a reality,
a reality which will be the governing force in future decades. In our region,
with the domestic market of 60 million people, if peace should return to this
area, then you have Vietnam with a population of 70 million people. We have Burma
with 40 million people. We have Laos. We have Kamnpuchea. The location of Thailand
is just right, as the centre for manufacturing as a regional centre for trading
activities, and as a regional centre for service industries because Thailand provides
the gateway to all these countries. I referred
earlier to the transformation of our economy. I have talked about the very rapid
development and modernisation of our country. I have also mentioned that, along
the way, there would be problems. We are all familiar with the problems that we
are now facing and some of the problems that are going to be worse in the next
few years. The inadequacy of the infrastructure, the shortage of technical personnel,
and “what-not”. These problems can be resolved. I’m certain of that. The main
thing is that, with the new economy that we’re going into, there is a need to
prepare ourselves psychologically, because the problems that businessmen or government
people may be facing in the future years will be more complex, will be more involved,
and perhaps need a slightly different approach to tackle them. The name of the
game is management. We in Thailand, while
we must not lose sight of the assets that we have, we must also open up our minds
to new systems. It has to be a combination of the old and the new in the area
of management of our economy, of our finance. We did not do too badly on the management
of our democratic process. We did rather badly, and we’re still doing rather badly,
on the question of management of resources, of natural resources and human resources.
We have not been doing too well in the area of management of the environment,
and waste. We have to learn now, the new are of management of technology. We have
to learn to manage the quality of technology and level of our productivity. We
have to learn to manage the quality of life of our people. In one simple term,
what we have to try to learn is how to manage change.
We’re living now in a very exciting and challenging period. Political developments,
outside and inside Thailand, are moving very fast. The inter-action between politics
and economics will also be an essential feature in the thinking of businessmen
of the future. We have to cope not only with the economic changes, but also with
the changes in the trading systems and trading practices. We also have to cope
with the political changes, economic growth and informatics. Are we in Thailand
sufficiently equipped to take up this opportunity and challenge? Yes, I think
we are. The seminar provides one example of this kind of preparation. It is the
beginning of the process. With vision, commitment, and determination, we the Thais
can rise to the occasion. We can strive to become truly and effectively a part
of this exciting and challenging time. So without further ado, let’s get on with
our immediate task, the beginning of the process, to transform this vision into
a reality. Thank you very much. |
Towards
An ASEAN Common Market - Thailand’s Perception:
The Private Sector View by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Executive
Chairman of Saha-Union Corp., Ltd. Putra World Trade Centre, Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia October 30, 1986 The title of the talk
assigned to me today is “Thailand’s Perception: The Private Sector View”. In accepting
the honour of representing the Thai private sector, I must, however, forewarn
all of you here, that it is perhaps a little presumption to attempt to speak on
the subject. The Thai private sector, like any other, is an unwieldy group of
disparate interests. It would be foolhardy for anyone to arrogate to himself the
right to speak for the sector as a whole. At best, one can only try to review
the situation objectively, and provide an assessment based on one’s own perception.
It is only within this context, that I stand here before you to speak on the subject
at this conference. Let me first of all
begin by describing how we in the private sector in Thailand feel about ASEAN.
After over twenty years of existence, ASEAN has emerged as a distinct regional
entity. It’s main function, as a regional organization has been to bring, initially,
the five member nations, and now six, to cooperate and work together in several
areas. In this regard, we have been told frequently by our own governments, of
the success we achieved in political cooperation. So much so that some cynics
in Thailand have begun to call ASEAN a one-issue organization. We know that ASEAN
governments, in developing a common position, and operating as a group, have gained
more leverage in dealing with major economic powers on trade and business matters.
This, however, does not mean that we are necessarily successful in our negotiations
with them. What it does mean is that we stand a better chance and, therefore,
this is a preferable option. At the people-to-people
level, we have, through ASEAN, gotten to know one another better. We may or may
not like one another more, but we are no longer strangers to each other. We have
gradually acquired a sense of ASEAN identity - which, I hope, will eventually
lead to a true sense of ASEAN partnership. All
in all, ASEAN has become an integral part of our National policies and thinking.
The fact remains that the cooperation generated by ASEAN, or within the framework
of ASEAN, has been predominantly in the domain of member governments. Inter-governmental
cooperation, multi-lateral or otherwise, has taken the forefront. Private sector
business cooperation, in spite of their past initiatives in formulating the ASEAN
industrial complementation schemes (AICS) and the ASEAN industrial joint ventures
(AIJV), has hardly taken off the ground. The efforts and time expended by the
ASEAN private sector through the ASEANCCI, on these projects have produced only
a few tangible results. ASEAN endeavours
to increase intra-ASEAN trade have focused primarily on providing member states
with preferential access to each other’s markets. The Agreement on ASEAN Preferential
Trading Arrangements (PTA), signed in 1977, has become the basis for the system.
With subsequent adjustments and the adoption of across-the-board tariff reductions
on non-sensitive items the number of products to be traded under the PTA has indeed
become impressive. Because of some loopholes - which I need not elaborate - the
actual economic impact on intra-ASEAN trade has been rather limited. Efforts to
inject some vitality into the PTA continue to be made, but a more radical approach
may be required, to attain a meaningful expansion of intra-ASEAN trade. It
is, therefore, no exaggeration to state here that the Thai private sector, with
the exception of some incorrigible optimists or idealists, of which I am one,
has become frustrated and disenchanted with ASEAN economic cooperation. In
all honesty, if ASEAN capitals had not offered the traditionally friendly hospitality
and a fair degree of extra-curricular incentives, the ASEANCCI meetings in the
last few years or, for that matter, in the future, would attract only the hard-core
idealists and functionaries. I say all
this, not with a view to denigrating ASEAN and its achievements in some areas.
Rather, my objective is to serve notice to my own government and other ASEAN governments,
that time is long overdue for placing strategic planning and action programmed
for ASEAN economic cooperation, above all other forms of inter-regional cooperation.
Something must be done to revive the interests of our private sector. Something
needs to be done to involve the private sector in mapping out the future direction
of ASEAN and in enlisting their active participation in future ASEAN economic
cooperation. Obviously, the path to greater
and more meaningful economic cooperation among ASEAN is still strewn with obstacles,
real and imaginary. Some will be very difficult to surmount. Political will is
required. Where there has been a lack of political will in the past, the present-day
economic necessity may give an impetus to the generation of that political will. The
past few years have not been kind to the ASEAN economies. The rapid growth rate
of National economies, experienced by all ASEAN countries in the sixties and seventies,
is no longer the order of the day. The eighties have witnessed many negative trends,
namely, the plunge in oil price, the slump of commodity prices, agricultural subsidies,
raging protection mood and measures, slow-down of global economy, volatility of
exchange rates, high interest rates and unemployment in industrialized countries.
All these factors, together with external debt burden, have contributed to the
present unhealthy state of ASEAN economies. While
each ASEAN country is adopting and implementing its own National strategy to cope
with the recession - with varying degrees of success; more attention is being
directed at the ASEAN internal market. In the past, ASEAN cooperation, in so far
as it dealt with resource pooling, has evoked relatively positive response from
member countries. However, in terms of market sharing, we have not been equal
to our tasks. Each member state has its own philosophical approach and hang-ups
that need to be taken care of. They must first all agree on the adoption of a
market-oriented approach. Under the present
circumstances, Thailand has adopted an export-led growth strategy. This strategy
pre-supposes three important elements: 1.
Productivity and diversification 2. Competitiveness 3. Investment What
are the implications for such a strategy? As I see it, technical know-how and
foreign capital are needed. Promotion of the free enterprise system must be pursued
through market-forces and price mechanisms. There will be discernable decrease
in governmental protection of inefficient industries and businesses. Competitiveness
of its own industries must be achieved by management control of the production
cost. Improvement of the International division of labour needs to be made within
the region. Tariffs must be gradual reduced. There is also a need to find markets
- one large ASEAN? market (rather than six separate ASEAN markets) to attract
from overseas projects which are capital intensive or require economics of scale
in production. It is perhaps too premature
for me to say right now whether we should aim at an ASEAN common market. The term
implies free movement of goods and factors of production including labour and
capital. Perhaps this could be the ultimate aim of ASEAN. Before proceeding to
such exalted height, we may initially have to aim at a less ambitious and more.
practical objective, namely an ASEAN model of a free trade area which would gradually,
and progressively, reduce and eventually abolish, within a fixed time-frame, tariffs
of all goods of ASEAN origin among member countries. Each party may, however,
have its own separate tariffs vis-a-vis the outside World. Taking
into account the varying stages of development and different nature of ASEAN National
economies and tariff regimes, an ASEAN model, while adhering to the basic principle
underlying the establishment of a free trade area, may not take-off at the same
time for all ASEAN countries. To start with, there may be a nucleus of three or
four members. Then the other member states may opt to accede to the programme,
at a time agreed to be appropriate. The basic agreement and action programme nevertheless
should be as far as possible reached by consensus. It
is often said by potential investors that the lack of an “ASEAN common market”
is the single most disincentive to large-scale foreign investment in the area.
To make our region more attractive to all investors, including ASEAN Nationals,
we therefore need to provide them with a larger ASEAN market. It
is my understanding, that each ASEAN government is in the process of holding consultations
with its private sector. Naturally, the private sector does not and will not have
a uniform position. Its views and observations will merely provide an important
input for the consideration of its government. In the final analysis, it is the
individual member government which will judge the merits and demerits of the case
and adopt its own policy which will serve the overall and long-term interests
of the Member State as well as those of the ASEAN Nations. In
this exercise, the governments will have to take a leading and decisive role in
charting the future course of ASEAN economic cooperation. There must be political
commitment given by all ASEAN governments to a defined future direction. Or else,
ASEAN as a regional organization, will become less and less relevant to the activities
of the ASEAN private sector. In such event, ASEAN is likely to be of peripheral
interest to the private sector and may well pass into oblivion - a fate that I,
for one, am most reluctant to see. |
Economic
Development Strategy of ASEAN Countries by Mr. Anand
Panyarachun Executive Chairman of Saha-Union Corp., Ltd. Seoul,
Korea September 12, 1986
I should first of all like to say, how pleased and honoured
I am to be invited to be a speaker at this international seminar, which is held
in connection with the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the founding of
The Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). Korea's
phenomenal progress and extra-ordinary achievements since the end of the Korean
war, earn the admiration of all, and have often inspired countries in the third
world to attempt to emulate the Korean model of economic development. Such attempts
do not necessarily produce the desired results, because the Korean success is
premised, not only upon the government's far-sighted policies and well-orchestrated
measures, but also upon the many attributes of the Korean people. The Korean private
sector, particularly members of the FKI, have shown themselves to be astute and
daring in their corporate planning and strategy. Their enterpreneurial skills
and hard-headed determination provide the corner-stones for the edifice of their
newly industrialised society. It is, therefore,
with great pleasure that I partake in this special event, and join all of you
in this festive occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of The FKI. The
subject of my talk to-day is "Economic Development Strategy of ASEAN countries".
As you are all familiar, ASEAN, a regional grouping comprising six nations, with
a total population of 260 million and a total GDP of about US$250 billion, have
up to recent times been doing well together as well as separately. Their performances
in the 60's and 70's may fall short of those of the newly-industrialized countries,
but on an average and relative to the developing countries in the other parts
of the world, their progress has been substantial and consistent. So much so,
that their collective strength has rightfully become a significant component of
the Asia-Pacific growth. In the last couple
of years, however, ASEAN countries which have been primarily resource-based, and
competitive economies, have suffered a severe set-back. Global recession, world-wide
protectionism, drastic and across-the-board depression of commodity prices, and
other factors, have all militated against the expansion of their economies and
rapid growth. Drastic fall of oil prices, collapse of commodity prices, sluggish
trade and increasing foreign debt burden, had such an adverse and immediate impact
on the ASEAN states that their annual economic growth were considerably reduced.
In some cases like Singapore and the Philippines, even negative growth was registered
in 1985. All ASEAN countries have open
economies, with international trade accounting for a high proportion of Gross
National Product (GNP). The total value of the combined exports and imports, to
GNP, varies from 40 per cent in the case of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand
to almost 100 per cent for Malaysia and as high as 300 per cent for Singapore. Average
international terms of trade for ASEAN, began to worsen in the mid-70's, but the
deterioration was more pronounced and substantial from 1981 to 1985. From 1976
to 1985, Indonesia, The Philippines and Thailand were the hardest hit in this
area, deteriorating by 20 to 30 per cent. For Malaysia, the extent of terms of
trade deterioration, was more modest at 8.4 per cent, while Singapore suffered
least with its terms of trade declining slightly by 1.1 per cent. As
a consequence of this depressing scenario in the international terms of trade,
real economic growth of all ASEAN countries during the 1981-1985 period (Brunei
is excepted, throughout the address, because of unavailability of data). The Philippines
showed no real growth. , Indonesia slowed down from the average of 7.9 per cent
during 1976-1980 to 4.4 per cent a year during 1981-1985. Thailand's rate came
down from 7.6 per cent to 5.3 per cent a year. Malaysia from 8.6 per cent to 5.8
per cent a year.' Singapore from 8.8 per cent to 5.9 per cent a year. To
counter declines in terms of trade, Singapore and Malaysia adopted expansionary
domestic investment policies, in expectation of maintaining high economic growth
rates, while Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, on the other hand, pursued
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. The
prospects for meaningful economic growth for ASEAN countries for 1986 are not
too good. Indonesia and Malaysia are expected to have a marginal growth. The Philippines,
depending on the continued political stability and success of measures taken so
far, may this year have a small growth. Singapore starts to show signs of recovery
and may come up with a modest positive growth, as against a negative growth of
2 per cent projected early in late 1985. Only Thailand is able to revise its forecast
of 3.5 per cent up to 4.5 per cent growth in 1986. There
are, however, some disturbing signals, which need to be attended to. ASEAN countries,
excepting Singapore, whether adopting expansionary or restrictive investment policies,
failed to mobilize an adequate level of domestic savings to finance their domestic
investment programmes. Their investment outlay far exceeded domestic savings -
pointing to their heavy reliance on external borrowing and foreign debt, to finance
their current account deficits. Rapid increase
of foreign debts and subsequential debt- servicing obligations, have now become
major issues, in varying degree, to be tackled by the ASEAN governments, with
the exception of Brunei and Singapore. It has been suggested that a two pronged
strategy may be adopted for the future. First,
every attempt should be made to keep the level of domestic investment on the same
par as domestic savings. This strategy does not preclude the possibility or even
the desirability, that under certain circumstances and in a given year, governments
may prudently undertake stimulative investment policies, to attain acceptable
levels of growth, income and employment. In the long run, such expansionary policies
should be coupled with effective domestic savings mobilization policies and measures,
so as not to raise further the already critical level of external debts and current
account deficits. Secondly, the private
sector themselves, have to make efforts to restructure their corporate financing,
by reducing debts, and relying more on equity financing, both in the form of corporate
stocks and long-term debentures. Development of capital market and financial instruments,
appear to be urgent tasks. What I have
just related, is not really applicable to Singapore, whose economy is dis-similar
to those of the other ASEAN states. Singapore. has no debt problem. Her national
savings rate, remains one of the highest in the world. She could, and still can,
afford expansionary investment policies. But she is facing a different kind of
problem, of equal seriousness. Since 1980, an increasingly large share of capital
formation has been in the construction and property development. Infrastructure
and housing are essential, and productive forms of capital investment, but there
is a limit to the amount of infrastructure and housing the economy needs. The
high construction investments turned out to be a mis-allocation of resources.
The necessary investments, on the other hand, were not going into productive equipment
and machinery. Such investments in terms of dollar value even declined, when measured
as a proportion of her GDP. In addition,
there continues to be a weakness in domestic demand, caused not only by the slump
in construction but also by a continued high rate of national savings, that cannot
be channelled into productive domestic investments. Since
Singapore's economy overwhelmingly depends upon a healthy international trading
environment, the slow-down in world trade and increased protectionist pressures,
have forced Singapore to revise her past policies, in order to regain competitiveness
in the keenly-contested international trading. Lowering of corporate and personal
income tax, adoption of tax-incentive schemes, reduction of employer contribution
rates to the Central Provident Fund, wage restraints and privatization of government-owned
enterprises, are the major policy changes that have taken place recently. Singapore,
like all other ASEAN countries, will strive to build on her strengths and develop
new advantages. Her expertise in banking and financial services is generally recognised.
While Singapore is already an established production base, she also plans to become
an international total business centre, for manufacturing and services. She has
a comparative advantage in exporting services, which she plans to promote vigourously. In
order to create a conducive business environment, Singapore may also have to engage
in some de-regulation exercises. The regulatory environment is likely to be eased
to encourage greater private sector initiative. Indonesia,
a primarily oil-based economy, was compelled to adopt austerity measures, and
had to re-schedule or scale down many of her ambitious investment projects. She
is not yet “out of the woods,” but she has in the recent past exercised greater
discipline in financial and development management. She plans to conduct a nation-wide
efficiency and austerity movement and further adjust the programmes and plans
for development projects, to the financial resources available. The
government of Indonesia, however, is determined to continue the policies of stimulating
and making domestic industry sound, by providing, among other things, various
tariff concessions on duties for the import of raw materials and intermediary
goods, which are essential for the manufacture of high value-added products. She
will also accelerate her efforts 'to develop non-oil/gas sectors to broaden her
foreign exchange-earnings base. Indonesia's
priorities are as follow: First, to finish
projects currently under construction. The amount of funds to be made available
will be matched by the ability to use them. Second, to supplement the rupiah
funds by obtaining project-aid from abroad. Third, to continue projects
that have the character of establishing equity, and of expanding employment opportunities. Fourth,
to provide funds for the operation and maintenance of projects that have been
completed. At the beginning
of this year, the President of Indonesia proclaimed that in the fiscal year 1986-7,
there would be no new projects. Indonesia
nevertheless expects to see a greater role of the private sector in stimulating
the economy and maintaining the pace of development -- particularly by the banking
sector in the mobilization of funds and in the channelling of those funds to productive
economic activities. The Philippines is
one country that needs all the help she can get. After the traumatic ordeal that
the country and people went through in the last several years, the relative peaceful
transfer of power, engineered last year by the Filipinoes themselves, is a cause
for rejoicing. It is our fervent hope that the present political leadership will
be able to enhance the political and economic stability which can in turn generate
respectable economic growth for the country in the near future. The
Philippine government's economic development programme has two major goals: economic
recovery in the short-term, and sustainable growth in the long-run. To achieve
these goals, the government has opted for an employment-oriented, rural-based
development strategy designed to improve income in the rural areas, where some
70% of the population lives, and thus perk up market demand. One
major concern of the government is to provide a policy environment that is conducive
to agricultural growth and productivity. Towards this end, a number of specific
policies will be pursued, which would include, among others, the encouragement
of crop diversification, improvement of market infrastructure, implementation
of agrarian reform programmes, and expansion of agricultural credit. The government
will also support policies that will promote small-scale and labour-intensive
enterprises in the rural areas. It will, among others, promote the nucleus concept
of developing cottage, small and medium industries; institute a more open-trade
regime that will expose domestic producers to fair foreign competition, and induce
cost-reduction and increased productivity; simplify investment incentives, particularly
on exports, to encourage and facilitate export activity; and encourage foreign
investments in high value added, export-oriented and employment generating activities.
The government will also adopt an expansionary monetary policy, to stimulate economic
activity and a demand-led growth in the short-term and a policy that will promote
and maintain a more stable and efficient financial system in the long-term. The
government will play a limited role in economic activities to allow private business
to become the prime-mover of growth. The scope and coverage of government will,
therefore, be reduced through the abolition, divestment or re-privatization of
government corporations whose activities directly compete with, or are equally
or more efficiently managed by the private sector. In
view of resource constraints and im-balances, Malaysia is pursuing a strategy
of moderate growth with stability - without large scale borrowing as in the past.
Towards this end, concerted efforts will be made to increase domestic savings,
mobilise domestic resources, attract foreign investment and harness the available
resources in the most efficient and productive manner. In
Malaysia's fifth plan, various strategies will be adopted to stimulate growth. The
manufacturing sector has been earmarked to provide the growth impetus. The agricultural
sector will be re-vitalised to increase farm earnings and be a productive source
of employment. Raising of productivity, tax incentives, private sector participation
in economic activities, are all parts of the overall strategy. The
public sector will no longer play a leading role in stimulating growth. Steps
will also be taken to gradually reduce the size and role of public sector in the
management of public enterprises. The private sector is being encouraged to be
more enterprising and resourceful. The government is prepared to de-regulate the
economy in stages, and to promote greater private sector investment, especially
in local food production. The private sector is also induced to participate as
partners, in a Government-sponsored land development scheme. Now
we, come to my own country - Thailand. The new government, which was set up in
August after the general elections, announced a set of policies to the Parliament.
The highlights pertaining to the economic sector are as follow: - Prime consideration is to be given to limitation of resources
and maintenance of fiscal and monetary stability. - Further diversification
of the economy. Restructuring of the tax system to improve business climate. -
Streamlining of fiscal administrative system and monetary system. - Promotion
of the free-enterprise system through market force and price mechanism. In such
promotion, the government's role will be changed, from that of the director or
regulator to that of the promoter or supporter, in providing better facilities
for economic activities, particularly in the export area. - Greater role
of the private sector in national economic development and tourism promotion.
Promotion of labour-generated and resource-based industries. - Promotion
of agricultural productivity, better coordinated strategy for production and marketing
of agricultural and agro-based products. - Science and technology will have
a more prominent role in the national development. - Development of human
resources. - Rationalization of law and regulations governing investment
promotion. - Streamlining of State enterprises by more business-like management
or by privatization. - Development of the capital market. - Furthermore,
the Thai government also plans to revitalize the country's hydrocarbon exploration
and production, which has slowed down, because of low oil prices and uncertain
outlook. This is in line with the government's energy policy, of placing priority
on the lessening of dependence on imported energy, as well as on the development
of indigeneous energy resources. I
have so far, tried to deal with ASEAN on a country by country basis. While the
problems and challenges faced by each nation are not exactly the same, the responses
would therefore differ, both in substance and degree, from one country to another.
Yet the following common patterns may emerge.
1. All ASEAN countries need to adjust their mentality and expectation to a
future of slower growth than that of the 60's and 70's. 2. Their expansionary
economic policy to counter recession will be selective, circumspect and flexible,
tempered by the limited public funds. 3. Their adoption of export-oriented
policy will force them to be highly competitive in the world market. Tax reform
and restructuring, market infrastructure and export facilities, will be high on
their agenda for cost reduction. 4. Their commitment to a free and fair
international trading system will be put severe test. Their clamour for greater
access to major foreign markets, will be answered by an equally earnest call for
ASEAN countries to be less protectionist themselves. 5. Unemployment and
under-employment problems continue to be serious. Labour-generated and resource-based
investments are essential. 6. Private sectors are being called upon to be
engines of growth. Here lies the opportunity to emulate our friends in Korea,
provided that the ASEAN governments are prepared to introduce concrete 'and practical
measures to make business environment conducive to investment, export and other
economic activities. 7. The governments' interventionist and regulating
role will be reduced. 8. Agricultural production and productivity, with
better marketing techniques and strategy will receive priority attention. 9.
Rural development is to be accelerated. 10. Defence and national security
requirements, need to be placed in the context of overall national objectives
of measured growth and controlled expenditures. The
need for all ASEAN countries to attract foreign investments and have better access
to foreign markets cannot be over-emphasised. Up to now, we have been acustomed
to depending on the markets of industrial nations, particularly the United States
and EC countries. Japan, which has been relatively a closed country, is being
pressed by the United State and European Economic Community, as well as by the
recent substantial appreciation of their yen currency to seek goods and services
from ASEAN. At the same time, we also want to promote a two-way trade with your
country. In this respect, Korea should embark on a new set of measures to open
up your market to ASEAN- manufactured and agricultural products. Larger Korean
economic presence in our countries is also welcomed and encouraged. I
should now like to touch upon the future direction of ASEAN from the regional
point of view. It is true that even though
ASEAN cooperation in general, and in the political area in particular, has been
more than satisfactory, its achievement in the economic cooperative undertakings
has been rather limited. While all ASEAN countries were enjoying a rapid and high
growth in the past two decades, the need to promote intra-ASEAN trade and investment
did not appear to be too urgent. The general slow-down of our economies and unfavourable
economic conditions in the industrialized world, had the effect of changing our
fundamental perception and vision. What was then unthinkable and unrealistic,
now becomes a reachable and imperative objective. Soul-searching
exercise is being conducted in all ASEAN capitals The starting point is that the
present arrangements in ASEAN economy cooperation are not adequate, and more far-reaching
programmes, with proper time-frame, are required to enlarge the "ASEAN market",
so as to stimulate internal growth of ASEAN member States and provide an additional
and important incentive for foreign investments in the ASEAN region. Preparatory
work for the next ASEAN summit to be held in the Philippines in July 1987 appears
to be moving in the direction of gradually and substantially reducing tariffs
among ASEAN States, so as to create an ASEAN free-trade area before the end of
the century. Whether a relatively free-trade
area or a rudimentary form of a common market will emerge in a blueprint from
the summit, remains to be seen. The prospects for such a reality were never better.
The momentum is there. The question is whether the ASEAN government, and private
sector leaders have the fore-sight and the will, to embark on such a cooperative
venture which, based on the principles of free-trade and competition, comparative
advantage, international division of labour and economies of scales, will in the
long run serve the interests of ASEAN countries individually, as well ASEAN as
a regional organization. My own personal
view is that such a programme of action for trade liberalisation, to be taken
and completed within a period of 10 to 15 years, is likely to be the future direction,
of ASEAN. I would, therefore, invite my friends in the FKI to start thinking and
planning for a possible future Korean role in the deeper ASEAN economic cooperation
and larger ASEAN market. |
ASEAN
and Its Future Keynote Address Given by Mr.
Anand Panyarachun Executive Chairman of Saha-Union Corp., Ltd. at
the International Conference on the Role of Private Enterprise in Intra-ASEAN
Trade and Investment, Chiang Inn Hotel, Chiangmai January
16, 1986 I should, first of all, like to express my deep
appreciation to the organizers of this international conference, Chiang Mai University
and the Asia Foundation, for their wisdom and generosity in convening this timely
and important meeting. The fact that this conference has been able to attract
many distinguished participants, both from public and private sectors, from all
six member countries of ASEAN, is a testimony to the increasing awareness of the
central role that ASEAN can play in the national and regional affairs. Obviously,
an invitation to spend a few days in Chiang Mai, especially during the balmy days
of January, is a temptation that few people can afford to resist. For me, I am
very pleased and flattered to have been asked to deliver a few remarks at the
opening of the Conference. In all ASEAN
countries, private sectors are often referred to as “engines of growth”. As in
all developing countries, ASEAN governments do have varying degrees of involvement
and participation in the economic activities of their countries. By and large,
ASEAN member States follow and believe in a system of free enterprise, and have
essentially a market economy. On that basis, the role of private enterprise, in
intra-ASEAN trade and investment is an indispensable one. In this connection,
I should like to commend the Department of Economics of Chiang Mai University
for their initiative in selecting the topic. As
one who at one time was directly involved in the ASEAN matters on the governmental
level and who, for the past seven years, has been closely associated with the
workings of ASEAN on the private sector side, I naturally maintain my interest
in ASEAN, its development and its future. As the great Chinese philosopher, Confucius,
said, centuries ago, “Prediction is difficult ... especially if it is about the
future”. Acting on that advice, it would be foolhardy on my part to attempt to
predict -- let alone to predict about the future of ASEAN. My present exercise
is merely to try to paint what I hope to be the future scenario of ASEAN. There
is no need for me to go into the history of ASEAN -- the motivations which led
to its formation in Bangkok in 1967, the first decade of its existence as a regional
mechanism for getting to know one another, dispelling mis-trust and mis-understanding,
pursuing modest forms of cooperation, and laying the ground-work for wider and
more significant measures for economic and political cooperation. Then came the
regional political crisis in 1975 when South Vietnam fell, and the dominoes in
the Indo-Chinese peninsular fell one by one. In response to that critical situation,
which could have far-reaching implications for the independence and territorial
integrity of the ASEAN member nations, the ASEAN political leaders rallied together
and convened the first ever ASEAN Summit at Bali in February 1976. The meeting
of the Heads of Governments, prompted by political factors, turned a new chapter
for ASEAN cooperation in trade and industry. Out of the summit meeting, there
emerged the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and other agreements, which reflected
a renewed determination of the then five ASEAN governments to embark on more meaningful
forms of regional cooperation. First came
the AIPs - ASEAN. Investment Projects - undertaken at the government level. Then,
the ASEAN private sectors, spear-headed by the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce arid
Industry, ACCI, were the prime mover in launching ASEAN Industrial Complementation
Scheme (AIC) in 1981 and ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIJV) in 1982. The private-sector
modalities initially raised high hopes in the ASEAN business circles, but since
then have encountered many difficulties and impediments. So much so that industrial
cooperation on the private sector side has a rough going not dissimilar to the
AlPs which fall into the governmental domain. On
the intra-ASEAN trade, the story is not too bright either. The ASEAN Preferential
Trading Arrangement is a sound conceptual framework, but when put into practice,
national interests invariably dominated the process of negotiations. Regional
interests are usually accorded priority, only if they coincide with or promote
national interests. Economic cooperation has greater possibility when measures
pertain to pooling of resources, but ASEAN governments up to now have not demonstrated
their political will to share the markets. Clearly, financial restraint is a major
hurdle. So long as governments place heavy reliance on import tariffs as a major
source of revenue, any attempt to reduce the income from that source, is bound
to be resisted strenuously by the Ministries of Finance. ASEAN
governments and, indirectly, their private sectors’ desire to protect their industrial
base and their markets, also contribute to the slow progress in the regional economic
cooperation. Having just given you a not
too cheerful side of ASEAN, I should be remiss in my duty if I were not to portray
the positive developments of ASEAN as a regional body. To start with, the formation
of ASEAN in 1967, in the midst of intra-area rivalries, distrust and ominous aspirations,
was already an achievement in itself. Against
the 70’s troubling background the creation and evolution of ASEAN has provided
a focus for stability in the region, and a bulwark for the preservation of international
law and order. Its role in the region is vital, and generally recognized as a
regional device for peace, progress and prosperity for individual member States,
as well as for the area as a whole. What
I should, however, like to raise at this meeting, pertains more to the policies
and directions which, if left blurred and undefined, would unavoidably impede
the pace of progress of ASEAN regional cooperation, and might even stunt the normal
growth of ASEAN, to such an extent that ASEAN would become less relevant to the
critical issues of the “nineteen-eighties”. The
first question which, in my view, needs to be clarified, is how do governments
in ASEAN countries in 1986 envisage the future of ASEAN. Is ASEAN, a regional
organization set up in Bangkok in 1967, to remain as a collective vehicle for
regional cooperation in all fields and for all purposes, deserving more or less
equal attention and priority? Is it moving, systematically or otherwise, in the
direction of horizontal growth - that is all round expansion of cooperation in
general? Or is it about to focus itself on some specific areas, which should have
priority of interest and consideration? I believe that while enlargement of ASEAN
cooperation, in general, was necessary and desirable in the initial stage, the
time has now come for governments to place special emphases on two particular
areas, namely economics and politics. On that basis, member governments must be
prepared to give priority attention and resources to the economic cooperation
which has been lagging far behind the ASEAN political cohesion. Closer and broader
cooperation in the political and economic fields would strengthen national and
regional resilience and deepen the bonds of friendship among ASEAN nations. In-so-far
as political cooperation is concerned, it is generally recognised that ASEAN has
made long strides in this direction. The evolutionary process of consultation,
coordination and eventually harmonization of positions on international, political
and security questions has gained for ASEAN an enviable position in international
conferences, and has made ASEAN an important factor for peace and stability in
the region. The psychological and historical impediments to close cooperation
in the political area have been either removed or set aside. This is another success
story of ASEAN. However, in looking to
the future, I cannot help but feel that the ultimate objectives of “peace, progress
and prosperity” in the entire region and the creation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom
and Neutrality in Southeast Asia prove to be quite elusive. Our success so far,
in the political realm, has not brought ASEAN much closer to the goals we set
in the Bangkok Declaration and other subsequent declarations of intent. ASEAN
governments should continue to re-examine their perspectives of the regional scene
and review their positions as to whether the present trend is in fact contributing
to the achievement of our long-term objectives. One
main stumbling block impeding the progress towards the realization of peace in
Southeast Asia, is the question of Kampuchea. In this respect, while ASEAN policy
and measures in the past have generated close and effective political cooperation,
which inevitably redounds to the credit of ASEAN, it should be realized that our
successes in the United Nations and other international gatherings have a limited
scope. Amore comprehensive strategy is required, to set in motion a process for
negotiation, for the political settlement acceptable to all parties concerned. It
is, therefore, my view that ASEAN governments, individually and collectively,
should persist in and intensify their search for a political solution to the Kampuchean
problem by exploring all possible avenues and modalities which would realistically
and effectively lead to, the early attainment of ASEAN’s basic objectives. The
present stalemate caused by the intransigent stand of Vietnam lessens the possibility
of creating conditions conducive to the organization of peace and stability in
the area, which is a pre-requisite to the eventual establishment of the Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ASEAN
commitment to ZOPFAN needs no re-affirmation and yet, because of other pre-occupations
in the region, efforts to promote the concept and gain its acceptance within and
outside the region have slackened, and the momentum was lost in the process. I
believe that renewed efforts should be made to bring about greater understanding
for ZOPFAN in ASEAN countries, as well as with other powers which are in a position
to contribute to the establishment of ZOPFAN. Political
and all other forms of cooperation have important roles to play in facilitating
the orderly development of effective and meaningful economic cooperation. The
slow progress made in this area is due to the differing perceptions of national
interests, and not sufficiently high priority given by member countries to ASEAN
economic cooperation. Economic nationalism plays a dominant role in the formulation
of national policies. This in-grained attitude of governments cannot be easily
swept aside, but must somehow be adjusted. Economic cooperation, whether in the
trade or industrial sectors, would entail short-term and long-term losses and
gains for each member. The criteria, which should govern any ASEAN arrangement
of economic cooperation should, therefore, be as follows: 1.
Benefits to participating member countries should exceed the costs. 2.
Member countries, in participating in any ASEAN cooperative arrangement, would
gain more economic benefits through such participation, than they would have been
able to obtain through their own individual national programme. In
view of the fact that all six members of ASEAN, which now includes Brunei, have
essentially private enterprise systems. It follows that ASEAN efforts to achieve
effective and meaningful economic cooperation should be directed towards setting
up a business-orientated framework, and ground rules which would enable the ASEAN
private sectors to translate economic cooperation intentions into actual business
cooperative ventures. Putting aside the
question of political cooperation, which appears to be moving on course, we are
now left with one key area of concern. That is ASEAN economic cooperation. It
assumes increasing importance in the light of current economic performances of
member states and current international economic trends. The wholesale slump of
commodity prices, debt problem, modern technology and world-wide protectionism
measures and threats, have all combined forces, to place in jeopardy our national
economies and stability, as well as our progress towards full democracy. The
regional political crisis in 1975, led to the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976,
which reaffirmed our political commitment to ASEAN, and opened the way for concrete
actions on ASEAN economic cooperation. Is it too much to hope for, that the sluggish
economic outlook for 1986 may spur member governments into holding another summit
meeting in the course of the year? -- A working forum which can renew member States’
political will and spell out their common political commitment, to widen the “ASEAN
market” in order to promote the establishment or enlargement of industrial enterprises
in any ASEAN country for intra-ASEAN trade, as well as for export to other nations.
The political commitment, given jointly by the heads of governments of member
States should, in my view, lay down political guidelines and framework in which
ASEAN economic cooperation would operate. The
widening of the market, which would attract larger foreign investment into the
ASEAN area, cannot obviously be a comprehensive one, but may be applied on a sector-by-sector
or product-by-product basis - qualified by a realistic time frame and workable
procedures. Such specific guidelines could be established at the highest-level
political meeting, and endorsed by responsible national bodies, government officials
and national delegations. As a result, those who have to draw up ASEAN agreements,
in the direction set by their superiors, will not feel vulnerable to any charges
of sacrificing their national interests. There will also be instilled a sense
of regionalism -- a sense of ASEAN identity, which will forge closer relations
among ASEAN members. The adoption of this
strategy, will compel member-States to take ASEAN cooperation into full account
as an important factor in their national development policies and planning. This
will not only benefit cooperation in trade and industry, but will enhance further
cooperative measures in social and cultural areas, as well as in science and technology. Needless
to say, the entire ASEAN organizational structure will have to respond to, and
be compatible with, the new policy frame-work further the ASEAN Secretariat may
usefully have greater input into the ASEAN decision-making process. ASEAN
in its 18 years of existence has more than adequately served the member- nations.
It is a regional grouping that has proved its worth. It has a vast potential,
which is not yet fully explored and exploited. With more determination and greater
vision, ASEAN can be developed into a more dynamic regional organization. It is
high time we pledged our political commitment to meaningful and wider economic
cooperation. In this joint venture between government and industry, the ASEAN
private enterprises, I am confident, will not be found wanting. |
Issues
Facing the Pacific Cooperation by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Vice-Chairman
of Saha-Union Corp., Ltd. at the International Symposium on “The
Outlook of the Pacific Economic Community Concept” Tokyo, March 15,
1985 (Organized by The Japan Member Committee of the Pacific
Basin Economic Council) All of you who
are present here to day need no sermon or enlightenment, on the positive aspects
of Pacific cooperation. Rapid economic growth around the Pacific rim, and its
increasing share of global trade, have rightly caught the attention of the world,
and convinced many people that the 21st century would in fact be the “Pacific
Century”. It is, therefore, not my intention to preach to the converts, but rather
to remind and to raise with you, many of the issues and problems which can retard
the pace of the development in the direction that we all desire. “Pacific
cooperation” is a slogan, which has been bandied about in the last two decades.
Admittedly, it is a term which, like motherhood, nobody “can vote against” and
is so general and innocuous that each one of us finds no difficulty in accepting
the idea. Only when we begin to examine
the term do we find that discrepancies arise - resulting in differences in concept,
approaches and perspectives. Yet, in spite of the painstakingly slow process of
crystallization of the concept, a measure of cooperation in the Pacific area already
exists. Through some existing international organizations, forums and panels,
certain progress, in limited areas and scope, is being made. The question, therefore,
is not whether there shall, or shall not, being Pacific cooperation, but how to
find ways and means of maximizing the potential and promises of the Pacific century. Undoubtedly,
there is already increasing inter-action among the nations of the Pacific, of
which some are instances of cooperation. A multilateral effort, on a scale that
encompasses the length and breadth of the Pacific Ocean, is a phenomenon whose
time has not yet come. So, to talk about cooperation among all States of the entire
Pacific region, is not only unrealistic, but would also be a mis-direction of
our approach and mis-application of our efforts. A
State only wants to “cooperate”, if its national interest is served by such cooperation.
Even in the absence of clear-cut advantage to its national interest, that State
may be prepared to give the idea the benefit of the doubt, if it can be convinced
of the desirability of joining “the club”. That desirability may derive from its
sense of belonging, not in geographical terms though, to the area in which “the
club” is formed, or the “cooperation” is to be devised. Such
desirability existed, when ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was
formed in Bangkok in 1967. There was already an initial sense of belonging in
Southeast Asia and growing consciousness of a “community of interests”. Such was
also the case, when the European Economic Community was founded in 1951. The question
we should ask ourselves now is whether this sense of belonging in the Pacific,
is so widely prevalent, as to assure the desirable degree of cooperation. My own
answer is “not yet”. It is to be recalled
that the post-war era of Pacific Asia was one of political turmoil – nation-building
and its attendant problems before and after independence - and linkages between
those nations were only forged one or two decades after 1945. In contrast, a greater
sense of community long existed in Europe, and the War was only an interregnum.
The post-War period in Europe was merely one of economic reconstruction, to restore
the previous linkages temporarily broken. The
Pacific, on the other hand, denotes a much vaster geographical area, where homogeneity
is an exception, rather than a rule. It consists of several regions or sub-regions
in which many societies do not share a common history or common roots and traditions.
Moreover, they are diverse in their views and outlooks, and have different levels
of political, economic and social development. The
notion of a Pacific identity is still lacking in the area, and this may prove
to be a major impediment to the fostering of the growth and enthusiastic acceptance
of the concept. Government Statements, policies and actions are important educational
tools to change the environment and adjust the people’s attitude. On this score,
growing protectionist measures, restricted market access, and more nationalistic
economic policies do not auger well for the future. Clear and positive signals
from countries concerned, particularly from the industrialized States, are the
pre-requisite to the implementation of the Pacific cooperation concept.
In my view, our efforts should be directed primarily at the core members of the
group, which inevitably should include the six ASEAN States. This approach is
by no means designed to give “The Pacific club” a sense of exclusivity. The selective
approach is based entirely on the practicality rationale. With such diverse interests,
national priorities, regional preferences not to mention varying levels of development
and trade sophistications -- it is well-nigh impossible to identify common aspirations
and objectives in a full-fledged group. From the practical point of view, preliminary
discussions and consensus would be more easily held and attained in a smaller
group of key countries, on both sides of the development fence, leaving a way
open for others to comment and suggest amendments to be taken into account in
the final form. There is one caveat here,
however, just because a State is geographically located in the Pacific area, or
around the Pacific rim, does not automatically mean that the State must at all
costs aspire to or be included in the framework of Pacific cooperation. Geographical
identity should not precede the national interests of the State. Nor should it
prevail over the over-riding interests of the Pacific-group as a whole. I
have so far dwelled on the subject of “The Pacific”. The crucial problem is whether
there is a meeting of minds on the term “cooperation”. Are we meaning the same
thing when we refer to “cooperation”? It is easy to say: “let us cooperate” but
“cooperate to achieve what, and in what manner?” In short, under what terms? In
any cooperative arrangement with a super-power - and in this case both Japan and
the US are economic super-powers, smaller nations simply cannot have an equal
role, or equal say, on the subject matter. Hence, uneasiness and reluctance on
their part to embark on this venture, on a negotiating basis. At
this juncture, it may be useful to recollect the ideas and proposals that have
been used in the past as “trial balloons”. The concept of Asian-Pacific economic
cooperation originated in the mid-1960s with the stimulus coming primarily from
Japan. It owes its genesis to:
a) the rapid economic development of countries in Northeast
and Southeast Asia. b)
the desire to create a new growth centre in the world economy.
c) the calls being made upon Japan to undertake greater responsibilities
for the security and economic development of the Asia Pacific region. The
Japanese, along with the Australians and the New Zealanders, have been deeply
conscious that they alone, are neither fitted historically nor endowed financially
to meet the security and economic needs of the Pacific, in general, and Southeast
Asia in particular. Businessmen in Japan
have been in the fore-front in formulating ideas, in regard to Asia-Pacific sphere
of cooperation. The Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC) was thus founded in
May 1967 by business leaders from Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the
United States. The organization, however, started off on the wrong foot in so
far as it included only industrialized countries of “The North”. This glaring
lack of “cooperation” with the less developing countries in the Pacific region,
tarnished the image of PBEC, and portrayed it as an example of self-centered interest
on the part of the developed countries. Efforts, however, are studiously and conscientiously
being made to rectify the short-coming. Discussions
at businessmen’s level have also promoted parallel discussions among the academics.
In 1968, the first Pacific Trade and Development Conference was held in Tokyo
and considered the ideas of Professor Kiyoshi Kojima of Hitotsubashi University,
for achieving closer economic cooperation in the region. Central to Professor
Kajima’s ideas was his proposal for a Pacific free-trade area. Analysis of trade
flows indicated, however, that Japan would benefit more than any other country
from a Pacific free-trade area. The proposition, therefore, did not gain much
ground and was regarded as premature. Another
proposal advanced at the first Pacific Trade and Development was for an Organization
for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD), modelled on the OECD. The proposed
OPTAD was to have provided a forum for the discussion of trade and development
issues, and the promotion of economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region.
Issues relating to membership, organizational structure and functions of such
an inter-governmental body were left unresolved. During
the time Mr. Ohira was Prime Minister of Japan in December 1978, he together with
Dr.Okita, who subsequently became his Foreign Minister, also advocated the concept
of the Pacific Community. Studies, discussions, ensued, but the “community” concept
was not readily acceptable. The reason was the absence of a sense of community
within the area. The State of mind was not there, and the common interests were
not yet perceived. The Korean proposal
for a Pacific Summit Conference, received polite, but lukewarm, interest. It was
envisaged as a scheme with political over-tones and unlikely to achieve anything
substantive. What lessons do we learn from
all these past endeavours? From each of the experiences I have related, I believe
that we can draw the following lessons. Lesson
I: Any system, governmental or private, for Pacific cooperation, must not be seen
to be exclusive or selective, only among those with “developed” status. Any attempt
to forge the cooperation should as far as possible involve the potential States,
both developed and less developed, from the very beginning. Lesson
II: While cooperation is a two-way street, no scheme for Pacific cooperation is
viable unless and until the “South” of the Pacific is convinced that it stands
to gain as much as ”The North” in such a cooperative plan. Lesson
III: Any proposal, which leads to the creation of an organizational structure
with wide authority, while the question of membership remain un-resolved, is too
premature. Lesson IV: A sense of community,
particularly for an area as vast as the Pacific, cannot be imposed or directed
from the top. Much ground-work needs to be done, and due recognition given, to
the heterogenous nature of the region. Lesson
V: Any scheme which tends to give the impression of being politically inspired
or security-oriented is least likely to be acceptable. On
the basis of these lessons, I venture to suggest the following approach: 1.
Don’t be too ambitious. Japanese political leaders were on the right track when
they decided to shelve over-ambitious plans for Pacific cooperation. The ideas
of Pacific free-trade area, OPTAD, Pacific Economic Community are simply not practical
for the 1980s and 1990s. Their turn may yet come in the 21st century. 2.
Be pragmatic and adopt a step-by-step and sector-by-sector approach. We should
concentrate on areas, which are the least controversial and most conducive, to
cooperation. Such selective approach would bring about harmony and gradually promote
the spirit of cooperation among the participants. In the process, constant fear
by less developed countries of being dominated or pressured, would lessen and
we in “The South” would gain self-confidence in dealing with our big brothers
on more difficult and complex issues. 3.
The United States and Japan, and to a lesser degree Australia, New Zealand and
Canada, need to pursue policies, and adopt measures, which give clear signals
to ASEAN and others in the area, that their actions correspond to the words they
repeatedly utter. In the present circumstances, their increasing tendency and
more subtle methods, to restrict their markets and indirectly to stifle our economy,
is viewed by ASEAN with grave concern and has a most serious negative impact on
the evolution of the Pacific cooperation concept. 4.
If ASEAN is regarded as an essential element of Pacific cooperation, as it is
generally recognized, ASEAN should be given better opportunity in terms of trade
and development to be able to sustain their growth and organize themselves into
a more cohesive economic grouping. Strengthening of ASEAN in the economic and
trade area would help to accelerate the realization of Pacific cooperation. ASEAN
with its inner strength and greater confidence, would be your better and more
effective partner than it can be at present. For
the advocates of The Pacific Cooperation, the future has begun! For us in Southeast
Asia-ASEAN, we would like to share the blessings and the benefits of the future
- provided we also have clear perceptions as to where the future is taking us! |
Multi-National
Corporations in Thailand An investor's point of view By
Mr. Anand Panyarachun Vice Chairman of Saha-Union Corp., Ltd. at
Asia Pattaya Hotel July 7, 1984 "Multi-national
Corporations" (MNCs) is one of those subject matters which in recent decades brought
about sharply-divided opinions among governments, planners and board-rooms. This
division often pitted the industrialized countries against the impoverished, and
developing nations, because their political system and economic orientation were
not compatible with one another. Initially, this was not an unexpected or surprising
phenomenon. After all, MNCs in the “fifties” and “sixties” invariably originated
in, and operated from the affluent and market-economy countries. Since these powers
were perceived by their ex-colonies, which only recently gained their independence,
and had yet to develop their own political and economic order, as masters of exploitation,
so were the MNCs based in these developed countries. With
such political over-tone and simplistic assessment, a large majority of the Third
World countries, encouraged and abetted by centrally-planned economy representatives,
became severely critical of the role and purpose of Western multi-national corporations.
At the same time, some of these multi-nationals, driven excessively by profit-motive
and un-restrained by any sense of social responsibility, did in-deed pursue a
course of blatant exploitation and even adopt some corruptive practices, which
lent further credence to the already-prejudiced views of the members of the Third
World. The “sixties” and early “seventies”
were then a difficult period for rational and objective discussions on MNCs. The
North-South dialogue became a forum for polemics and rhetoric. Each side was trying
to make and score a point. The spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding
was lacking, and multi nationals were easy victims of confrontation and economic
nationalism. What went by the wayside was the contribution that MNCs could make
to national development of the receiving countries, if their role and responsibility
were to be defined, and terms of entry worked out between them. There
were, however, some countries, unfettered by narrow nationalism and political
bias, which owed the original success of their semi-industrialized economies,
to the massive inflow of multi-national ventures. This group of countries, led
by the economic "Gang of Four" as they are known - Hong Kong, Singapore, South
Korea and Taiwan, concentrated on exchange-earning export- oriented industries
of textiles and electronics. Their elevation to the category of "New Industrializing
Countries (NICs)" has, therefore, placed the role of MNCs in a more balanced perspective. Infusion
of foreign capital, either direct or in the form of joint ventures, has been viewed
by these countries as an important source of much-needed finance. Furthermore,
because of their capability to provide technology and know-how, MNCs have thus
been regarded as major vehicles for transfer of technology. Foreign
capital's contribution to growth assumes that those industries that are being
financed, act as catalysts for growth, in other sectors of the economy. In poorer
countries, however, MNCs may not be the ideal source of finance or technology.
Technology may be cheaper elsewhere-and may not necessarily be appropriate, that
is, not easily adapted and assimilated locally. It
is hence the prerogative of each country to be selective, and to determine for
itself the advantages and disadvantages of inviting MNCs, be they from the West
or the East, to set up their business. Thailand - free from Western colonialism,
did not feel inhibited in trying to attract the interests of multi-nationals.
Our success in this area is, however, limited and not one of which to be proud!
There are a variety of reasons for such short-coming, many of which are real and
internal and others - bureaucratic and artificially-created. When we look back
to the “fifties”, we know that both South Korea and Taiwan (and even Singapore)
were way behind us in the manufacturing sector. Yet, not only were they able to
catch up with us, but in 1984 they are so far ahead of Thailand that it is practically
impossible to keep pace with them. The
Role of Multi-national Corporations (MNCS) as perceived by foreign investors I.
Multi-national Corporations' prime interest is in carrying on a viable business
operation over time, while earning satisfactory returns on their investment. Profits,
of course, are essential to provide some of the funds for future reinvestment
and for distribution of dividends to shareholders. However, MNCs are not in business
in Thailand, or any country, to earn quick returns, recover their capital and
then withdraw. On the contrary, when an MNC embarks on a new venture or makes
new investments for expansion and modernization, it intends to remain in that
country for an indefinitely long period -- for as long as successful operations
can be carried out. II. MNCs
invest abroad-generally in response to attractive opportunities, and Thailand
with its relatively stable political environment, strong economic performance
and growing domestic markets has attracted great interest. Thailand's abundant
natural resources have attracted sizeable investments in the exploration for oil
and gas and minerals development, such as tin mining. Competitive-cost conditions,
proximity to low-cost material inputs, availability of appropriate labour, a growing
domestic demand, and foreign barriers to import, have spurred foreign investment
in other areas such as manufacturing.
In responding to these competitive factors, it is important to note that MNCs
do not cause shifts in international trade competitiveness among nations, but
are responding to shifts which are already taking place. MNCs have an extraordinary
capacity to take risks and mobilize resources, on a scale that is difficult or
impractical for many national companies. In doing so, MNCs are promoting international
specialization in production among nations and increasing the benefits of international
trade to both importing and exporting nations by helping to raise overall living
standards. III. When considering investments,
MNCs are concerned that the basic "rules of the game" affecting foreign investment
will remain relatively stable or predictable over time. MNCs also want a fair
shake, a chance to compete fairly without policies which discriminate against
them or favour local companies. Changes in tax/fiscal regimes, import/export quotas,
controls on prices and profit repatriation as well as enforced sell-outs and expropriation,
are viewed negatively by MNCs. The right
of governments to adopt such policies is not disputed; however, such policies
often can disrupt the adjustment of an economy to current circumstances, rather
than furthering it. The MNCs cannot demand that relationships remain utterly unchanged
and MNCs must recognize the need for reasonable regulation; they must respond
flexibly to demands for new arrangements, and demonstrate that they too can make
sacrifices required for the common good. Host countries should ensure that new
rules and regulations are not arbitrary, and that they are likely to accomplish
the goals intended; that they allow the investment to obtain a return commensurate
with the risk taken; and that they are coordinated among the various government
agencies. IV. MNCs also have obligations.
MNCs generally see their most important responsibility as producing a high quality
product or service efficiently, at a competitive price, so to earn a profit. Profits
are not just a motive, but a standard of efficiency, in a competitive industry
and an essential condition for staying in business, thus enabling the MNC to provide
continued economic benefit to workers, consumers and host-governments alike. It
also goes without saying that in all of their business dealings, MNCs must abide
by the letter and spirit of all national laws. In these days of instant communication,
if a multi-national catches the headlines in one country, the news is quickly
flashed around the world (be that news good or bad). Thus MNCs cannot risk misbehaviour
as it could ruin their international as well as local reputation. Many MNCs have,
therefore, adopted strict and explicit policies, that demand the highest ethical
behaviour of its employees. As a result, practices unofficially yet commonly followed
in Thailand, often cause delays and inefficiencies in operations. A
second level of corporate responsibility lies in a sensitivity and responsiveness
to the indirect impact of business operations on the society-at-large. The operations
of MNCs must be consistent with national goals. Promoting economic growth, improving
the standard of living, reducing social inequalities, increasing employment and
expanding technical capabilities are but a few of the fundamental objectives of
government. MNCs generally accept these responsibilities and advance national
goals not simply because it is the right thing to do, but because such behaviour
promotes their successful long-term operation in the host country. Among
the most common ways in which MNCs have a positive indirect impact, is by training
nationals in technical/managerial skills, the introduction of more advanced technology
and environmental conservation. i) It is
the policy of some MNCs to train nationals to manage their affiliates worldwide.
Extensive training courses are offered both in Thailand and abroad, for Thai employees,
and rotational assignments overseas are provided for high potential employees. ii)
The size and resources of MNCs make them a prime agent in transferring and introducing
new technology across boarders. R&D programmes are costly, and the financial
capabilities and operating scope of MNCs allow support of the necessary effort. iii)
Protection of the environment is of great importance to MNCs, and energetic efforts
are continually made to improve their products and their manufacturing process. MNCs
also generally accept a third level of responsibility for the general well- being
of the society in which they live and work. MNCs provide financial and technical
support for programmes in health and education, community development and promotion
of national cultural activities. Such efforts reflect an awareness on the part
of the MNCs, that future operations will be affected by the broader social environment
of the country in which they operate, and it is in their interest to improve this
environment. V. Criticisms against MNCs i)
The large size of MNCs has been cited as evidence of power over national economies.
Because of their vast assets and geographic scope, MNCs are sometimes viewed as
immune from control by national governments and have been accused of bringing
about the rise and fall of currencies, impeding the development of local industry,
etc. MNCs typically make large investments
which can pay off only over long periods of time. Under-handed activities may
suffice to grab a quick profit; but will almost invariably hurt the good relationships
upon which long-term health depends. Most wealth is tied up in fixed assets which
are a hostage to good behaviour. Governments have established tax systems under
which MNCs must operate; they collect data on financial and operating results,
and they control operations through regulations and permits. MNC success does
not reflect an ability to avoid control; on the contrary, MNCs owe their long-term
success to their ability to adapt to national requirements and goals. An example
of this locally, is Thailand's interest to have local participation in multi-national
subsidiaries, resulting in a heavy influx of joint venture operations. ii)
MNCs are viewed as a potentially disruptive influence, particularly in developing
countries. The introduction of labour-saving technology when there is unemployment,
paying wages in excess of the going rate, increasing local incomes, which lead
to increased consumption of imports, the remittance of dividends and burdening
limited infrastructure are examples of such claims. These
situations do sometimes occur; however, they are not necessarily adverse to the
country. In aggregate, the benefits to the host country of direct and indirect
increases in employment, economic growth and overall balance of payments benefit,
often outweigh any individual negative impact. It is important, however, to keep
host governments informed about plans and to work out cooperative solutions when
problems do arise. iii) There is often
a concern over the division of benefits between MNC and the host country. This
issue is evident in Thailand very clearly in the government's negotiations for
price and equity participation, in the development of up-stream petroleum ventures.
Much of this concern is based upon the belief that there is a fixed amount of
benefit from foreign investments, although some benefits such as knowledge/skills
acquired by the labour force and subsidiary investment impetus are difficult to
quantify; and that one party can gain only at the expense of the other. As there
is no such fixed limit of benefits, the restrictive measures intended to increase
benefits to the country, are likely to have the effect of reducing such benefits
by discouraging foreign investment. MNCs are most likely to make their greatest
contribution where government policies are well established, predictable and non-discriminatory. iv)
It is often argued that MNCs prevent the growth of locally-owned enterprises by
aggressive and unfair competition. MNCs global operations do provide some advantages
in terms of operating flexibility and diverse sources of supply. However, many
governments have given special privileges such as tax incentives, exclusive dealing
rights and outright subsidies to national or state owned firms. What
do we, the Thai investors, look for in MNCs? i)
Mutual Benefits -- This is essential for any type of long-term relationship -
be it between individuals or organizations. Of course, we all have different ideas
as to what benefits we seek. Some look for sizeable dividends; others want to
reduce risk through diversification. If the benefits sought by the parties involved
differ too much, it is likely one or all will be dissatisfied. So, before thinking
about the specifics of an investment, the investor must have a general goal he
can look to for direction. I hope that
the Thai government, and we in the Thai business community, would always keep
this in mind. So that, when an investment is proposed, the first question asked
is: "Will this yield the benefits I desire?". The second question: "Does it yield
benefits desired by the other party?". If either answer is "no", or even "maybe",
chances for long-run commitment, enthusiasm and satisfaction diminish. In
so-far-as joint public/private sector projects are concerned, there is always
a possibility that the objectives and interests of the partners are not parallel
and such joint ventures may find it very difficult to operate. In that event and
in non-strategic sector, a 100% private venture with Government exercising all
the necessary controls through permits, taxation etc. may turn out to be the most
practicable mode of enterprise. ii) Value-Added
Product -- Thailand has long been a major food grain supplier to the world.
The importance of this grows, as grain exports of other countries decline. Our
major exports are rice, tapioca and corn -- typically in an un-processed form.
On the other hand, Thailand has relied on imports of processed consumer goods
to improve the standard of living. This is a common situation among developing
nations. Thailand's development is no longer
in the infant stage. Rather, we are now right in the middle of industrialization.
The Thai Government has urged the private sector to expand and modernize the country's
industrial base. The Board of Investment provides incentives to attract this kind
of investment. Most importantly, investors have responded by putting up their
capital. So value-added is no longer a good idea to which people pay lip service.
It is a good idea that is being put into practice more and more every day. Yet,
this is not to say there haven't been problems along the way. Nothing worthwhile
is ever trouble-free. Often value-added projects require imports of various raw
materials not available locally. Here investors face import duties imposed by
the government to alleviate trade deficits or protect a related industry. To avoid
these risks, Thai investors have become more interested in manufacturing products
which use locally abundant agricultural products as material inputs. Examples
are canned products, both fruits and sea food. An ideal but not yet fulfilled
example of high value added product using simple. agricultural raw material is
"chemo-papain", a pharmaceutical substance derived from papaya latex. iii)
Transfer of Technical Know-How -- Thai investors want to learn better ways
of doing things. We are interested in the latest production technologies, computer
systems and management practices. To obtain this knowledge, we look to the multi-national
corporations who are in the fore-front with modern techniques. Traditionally,
technical transfer has meant management training of staff. But now as one finds
more Thais, and fewer expatriates, in management positions, this type of transfer
has acquired a low priority. Instead, Thai investors now look for better and cheaper
methods of production. Of course, not all new processes and methods will be adopted
immediately; many are more advanced than Thailand needs, in its present stage
of development. As we continue along the development path, more and more of these
innovations will be added. It is from the multi-nationals where Thai investors
will expect guidance to come. As Thailand
strives toward full industrialization, it is clear that progress in the agricultural
sector is of paramount importance. Although our country is rich in resources,
there is great opportunity to increase production yields. For some crops, tenfold
increases are not un-realistic. Technical transfer is needed in areas such as
genetic engineering and breeding, as well as new techniques for planting, harvesting,
and applications of fertilizer, herbicides and insecticides. Besides
production, technical transfer is necessary for the manufacturing, processing
and the marketing of the products. Appropriate technical “know-how” in processing,
is crucial to the concept of "low cost/high quality". Thai investors are skeptical
about the reliability of the claimed “know-how”. Therefore, we are usually seeking
for the processing technical know-how that has been proved successful elsewhere
at the commercial scale-as opposed to just the laboratory level. Regarding
marketing, the effective know-how of marketing management is needed for corporate
survival in this immensely competitive world. Most Thai investors are very reluctant
to enter into a joint-venture project which has no pre-arranged or contracted
market. Thus, MNCs that are themselves the world's major distributors or users
of the proposed product are the main attractions of the Thai investors. iv)
Broadening the Industrial, Commercial and Finance Base Thailand
has great opportunities to expand in these areas. To start toward this, we would
like to see the multi-nationals already here, increase their investment profile.
Those involved just in trading might progress to assembly. Those now doing assembly
could move to manufacturing. To get this type of commitment, the Thai Government
ought to provide an effective tele-communications system, a fair tax structure,
workable immigration laws and reasonable foreign exchange control regulations. However,
MNCs can help to broaden the business base in Thailand by making greater use of
Thai commercial banking facilities. For example, in addition to being a source
of short-term funds, Thai banks could be involved in exchange transactions as
well as participate in major long-term loan syndicates. v)
Compatibility with the Thai National Development Goals Thai
investors naturally feel attached to the goals laid out in the National Development
Plan. Not only is this good for the country, it is also good for the investor,
as attractive incentives are offered along the way. As such, the National Development
Plan does not require sacrifice from investors. However, it does require commitment
to the long-term well-being and prosperity of the nation. As
companies operating in Thailand, MNCs are expected to join in, and work to achieve,
the National Development goals. Important means to do this are: 1)
concentration on value-added projects; 2)
transfer of technical “know-how”; and 3)
expansion of the industrial base in Thailand. It should also be noted that this
might be best done in the abundant field of Thai agricultural products, on which
the country's economy is based. The growing
strength of the Thai economy, and the country's continuing political and financial
stability, are considered to be major incentives to increased foreign investment
in the economy, while bureaucratic red tape, cumbersome customs clearance procedures,
slow decision-making, ambiguous tax laws, exchange control problems, lack of adequate
patent/copyright protection and limits on levels of foreign ownership and ability
to establish branch operations serve as major dis-incentives. The
main task that lies ahead of Thailand is not so much in offering new incentives
or more attractive terms, but in removing disincentives to investment.
I respectfully suggest that this be placed on the future agenda of the committee
of Economic Ministers and the Joint Public-Private Sectors Committee. A comprehensive
review of the entire question is in order, and deserves priority attention and
remedial actions. Let's get on with the job of putting our house in order -- and
the rest should take care of itself. In
this fast-shrinking but highly competitive world, where technologies used in the
development of products, processes, and software are no longer the exclusive domain
of one country, every multi-national to-day -- and that also applies to a Brazilian,
Korean, Indian, Malaysian and Mexican, is obliged to develop a global manufacturing
and marketing strategy. The concept of national markets is rapidly disappearing.
There are now world markets of which advantage can be taken. The importance of
exports to every major economy of the world to-day, is greater than anything else
we have seen previously. Governments all
over the world have changed their basic attitude towards MNCs, and are assiduously
courting them. We in Thailand cannot afford to sit back and feel complacent about
the matter, or else we shall miss the boat once again. The
paper that I presented to-day is not intended to be a criticism of the past and
the present, but rather “food for thought” for the future. That Thailand has not
been doing too badly is generally accepted. The question we should ponder over,
is whether and how we can do better in order to reach our full potential. |
REMARKS OF H.E. ANAND PANYARACHUN TO THE IRISH INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
SEMINAR ON "UN REFORM: THREATS, CHALLENGES AND CHANGE"
Dublin, 30 June 2005
Excellences, Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends,
It is a great pleasure to join you for this conference. I wish
to thank the Institute for this opportunity. I would also like to
thank the Government of Ireland and Minister Ahern for generous support
to the work of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel, and for
unflinching commitment to the reform efforts underway.
Today, I would like to share some thoughts about current efforts in
New York and in capitals to address our most pressing challenges to
development, security and human rights, and how to mould the United
Nations to address most effectively those challenges in the 21st
century.
As you know, in September 2003, the Secretary-General told the
General Assembly that we had reached a "fork in the road." He
argued that divisions over the war in Iraq, and before that, the
terrorist attacks of 11 September, had generated deep divisions over
the threats we face and the ways in which we must confront them.
In that same address, the Secretary-General announced the creation of
the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
The Panel, despite its 16 members' wide range of views and
backgrounds managed to come to agreement on a wide panoply of
challenges. In that agreement, I believe that the
Secretary-General saw what I saw: If colleagues from former U.S.
National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to Secretary-General of the
Arab League Amr Moussa to former UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Sadako Ogata could all come to such wide-ranging consensus on both the
threats we face and how to renew collective responses, why not member
states?
So with his eyes on September 2005 and the five-year review of the
Millennium Declaration, the Secretary-General in March issued his own
report entitled "In Larger Freedom." Drawing on the Panel report
as well as the Millennium Project report on development, the
Secretary-General convincingly knitted together the strands of
security, development and human rights. He argued that one will
not be durable without the others. That report has now been the
object of intense discussion in the UN General Assembly, and in civil
society at large, and it was the basis for the summit Draft Outcome
document prepared by General Assembly President Ping just debated
recently in New York.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The stage is set for historic decisions; the summit in September
will convene nearly 180 heads of state and government — more than any
event ever before. And the opportunity truly is historic; as the
Secretary-General has argued, we have it in our power to pass on to our
children a brighter inheritance than that bequeathed to any previous
generation. We can, and we must, take bold and concrete decisions at
the summit that will strengthen the work of the United Nations for
development, security and human rights, and we must improve the
functioning of the Organization's decision-making bodies to ensure that
we are equipped to do so.
We live in a world unforeseen in 1945, when the United Nations was
formed. Collective security was then considered a question of
States, borders and battalions.
Today, that understanding must be broadened in light of a new
constellation of threats, interdependence and expectations of states'
responsibilities. Today's leading threats — terrorism, organized
crime, extreme poverty, environmental degradation, the spread of
disease, the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction —
transcend borders and require that all states are able to function and
exercise sovereignty responsibly.
The proposals being debated now in the General Assembly are meant to
help all states and their United Nations address those challenges more
effectively and more equitably. I hope the final outcome offers
an ambitious but pragmatic roadmap for fulfilling this responsibility.
In the way, there are still striking differences when it comes to
determining which threats should be our priority — and as troubling, an
insistence that we can address some threats but not others.
But in today's world, it is at our collective peril that we
emphasize
socio-economic threats, while giving secondary attention to weapons of
mass destruction. Our efforts to build durable peace after civil
wars may be futile if we neglect the urgency of human rights.
Terrorism, throughout the Panel's deliberations, proved a powerful
example of the interconnections between threats. Today the
developing world is just as affected by terrorism as any other
region. From Kenya to Indonesia to Peru, developing countries
know terrorism all too well. But not only that: According to
estimates of the World Bank, millions of people in the developing world
were thrown into extreme poverty as a consequence of the economic
shocks following the 11 September terrorist attacks. Catastrophic
terrorism involving a nuclear device would be far more devastating the
world over.
At the same time, the industrialized world has just as much interest
in
addressing all the threats that face us. SARS showed us how
rapidly a newly emerging infectious disease can traverse oceans and
continents, and expose the flaws of even modern health systems.
SARS spread to dozens of countries within weeks, killing hundreds and
infecting thousands. And if we are to believe what experts tell
us about avian influenza, which is now afflicting my own region, SARS
may have been merely a harbinger.
We simply cannot afford to choose among the threats we face.
In
an interdependent world, threats increasingly have a system-wide
impact. We must be serious about adapting our international
mechanisms, including the United Nations, to cope with the world of the
21st century.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
If
the reports of the High-level Panel and the Secretary-General have
exposed one glaring weakness of the UN system, it has been an
all-too-frequent paralysis in the face of the sustained but devastating
effects of ongoing violent conflict and persistent, extreme
poverty. The lethargy with which we have come to acknowledge the
prospect of catastrophic terrorism ominously follows this
pattern. But as our interdependence increases, and threats become
ever more interrelated, we must act early, decisively and collectively
against threats from HIV/AIDS to nuclear terrorism before they have
their most devastating effect.
The three basic freedoms outlined in the Secretary-General's report
— freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom to live in
dignity — hang in the balance.
If we are successful this September, the opportunities are
astounding. We could:
— reverse the onslaught of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases that
now
devastate societies and undermine State capacity;
— help to build states' capacity to provide basic services to their
people, and reduce vulnerability to state collapse, mass violence and
humanitarian disasters;
— with unity of purpose combat terrorism in all its forms;
— no longer allow half of all countries emerging from conflict to
lapse back into violence within five years;
— stave off paralysis in the face of genocide or mass slaughter of
civilians;
— reenergize consensus to staunch proliferation and advance
disarmament; and
— restore the central role of the UN in the international system.
Ambitious as it seems, this vision should be within reach. I
would like to highlight those actions that will be particularly
indispensable if we are to find ourselves in such a world.
First, the reports of the Panel, the Millennium Project and the
Secretary-General, and now GA President Ping's outcome document, have
all placed a very strong emphasis on development. This is not
only because development is vital in its own right, but also because it
is the most effective means of addressing so many of the threats we
face. Building states' capacity to exercise their sovereignty
responsibly is a foremost challenge.
Fortunately, Member States are showing signs of progress in this
area. There is an unprecedented consensus around the Millennium
Development Goals. More and more countries are adopting specific
time-tables for reaching the 0.7 per cent target for official
development assistance (ODA). G-7 Finance Ministers have agreed
to cancel ponderous debt burdens. And in a few days, we can look
to the G-8 summit in Gleneagles for more positive developments.
The summit in September should give impetus to vital progress in the
area of trade negotiations and affirm all of these positive steps.
Second, we must act collectively and decisively to prevent the
proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons —
particularly to keep them out of the hands of terrorists. In the
deliberations of the Panel, members were quite struck by the rate at
which globalization and technological advancement have outstripped our
multilateral instruments. The recent failure of the Review
Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to face up to
these challenges makes bold action in September all the more
imperative. The Panel has warned of a potential cascade of
proliferation if the NPT-based regime begins to erode, and I hope that
Heads of State and Government quickly grapple with this prospect.
Time is running short.
The Panel also drew attention to what has increasingly been
termed our "biological security" — security from disease
naturally emerging or deliberately perpetrated. SARS, as I
mentioned, was a harbinger. Today, the growing risks from avian
flu loom ominously, and a chorus of experts and leaders is warning that
we are ill-prepared for a large-scale epidemic. In the
short-term, we must fortify the World Health Organization's Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network. But the long-term challenge
is to build up public health systems in developing countries.
First and foremost, we must address HIV/AIDS, which has spread so
rapidly and with such devastation that life expectancies in some
African countries have plunged to levels not seen since the black
plague struck Europe in the 14th century. But viable health
systems are also essential to address naturally occurring outbreaks of
disease, and to counter the risk of biological terrorism.
Third, the UN has been to slow to mobilize a united front against
terrorism in all its forms. All states must speak loudly, clearly
and in unison in denouncing terrorism. And they must make the UN
an effective international forum for combating it. This will
require implementation of the new comprehensive strategy along the
lines recommended by the Secretary-General in Madrid earlier this
year. It will also require consensus on a common definition of
terrorism. Regardless of one's cause, killing or maiming of
innocent civilians and non-combatants can not be justified.
Period. That is terrorism, pure and simple. Such moral
clarity is imperative if the UN is to fulfill its potential in
combating terrorism.
Fourth, it is imperative to build consensus around the concept of a
responsibility to protect. Many countries maintain understandable
anxieties that this concept could be used as a fig leaf for unwarranted
interventions. But I am heartened to see that Member States are
earnestly trying to bridge their differences; we all share the
fundamental goal of preventing genocide, ethnic cleansing and mass
killing. Most striking to me in the Panel's and other debates on
this question is that few excuse the United Nations failure to
intervene amidst the Rwandan genocide. And yet the principle of a
responsibility to protect quickly induces reservations. No doubt,
recent failures of the international community to protect the
vulnerable have been a product of complacency on the part of those who
would endorse a responsibility to protect. But there is
nevertheless essential value in sending an unequivocal message that all
States must be united in the face of any future atrocities.
Finally, the UN must renovate its architecture to exploit a new
consensus on development, security and human rights for the 21st
century.
We must first restore human rights to its rightful place. The
Secretary-General has shared the diagnosis of the Panel regarding the
serious shortcomings of the current Commission on Human Rights.
That Commission has squandered much of its credibility, and the
reputation of the UN has suffered for it. The Panel did recommend
universalizing the Commission but it also recommended, in the longer
term, the establishment of a Human Rights Council. I welcome the
Secretary-General's boldness in seizing this opportunity now.
Human rights must be given the central place they deserve in the
institutional structure of the UN.
Leaders at the summit will also have the opportunity to establish a
new
intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission, which would play a central
role in helping States emerging from violent conflict. As the
Panel saw it, and the Secretary-General agreed, The Commission would
fill a real institutional gap by ensuring that all key players in
future peacebuilding endeavours share an understanding of the
challenges, needs and required actions.
The Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, donors must
work
in a more integrated fashion to ensure that states and societies
emerging from conflict are not betrayed by the failure of
well-intentioned but disparate actors across the international
system. It is particularly imperative that the Bretton Woods
Institutions and regional banks closely coordinate their vital
contributions to peacebuilding under the new commission.
Discussions in New York and in capitals reflect strong
support. I
hope there will be agreement to establish the Peacebuilding Commission
during the summit itself.
Member states must also agree to meaningful reform of the UN
Secretariat. While there have been enormous strides over the past
few years in operational areas, challenges in oversight, management
accountability, budgeting, financial disclosure and general performance
have become quite clear. The Secretary-General is undertaking
important measures on all of these fronts, but to fully realize the
Secretariat's potential, member states must in September give him the
authority he needs to effectively manage Turtle Bay's labyrinth of
departments, personnel and mandates with the authority of a chief
executive officer. They must also ensure that mandates given to
the Secretariat remain relevant, and that if they do, the Secretariat
is adequately resourced to execute them.
Last
but not least, the moment one either dreads or has been impatiently
waiting for: Security Council reform (or so goes the sentiment these
days in the august General Assembly). I am aware of the flurry of
activity in New York and capitals in the last few weeks, and of
anticipated action in the coming weeks. Ultimately, however, I
believe that the approach to this question should be rather simple:
There is no escaping that the present make-up of the Council reflects
the world of 1945, not that of the 21st century. We must accept
that the Council's effectiveness well into that century will depend on
its legitimacy in the eyes of the member states obligated to comply
with its resolutions. So we must reform the Council to include
Member States which contribute the most financially, militarily and
diplomatically, and also allow a broader, more representative
membership so that the Council is seen to be more democratic.
This important issue has been before Member States for over a decade,
and has been discussed extensively. I sincerely hope that a
decision will be taken this time around.
But
— and I cannot underscore this caveat enough — reform of the
Council may ultimately undermine its effectiveness if Member States do
not forge a new consensus on security, development and human
rights. That consensus must be the guiding constitution of a
reformed Council.
The agenda before the September summit gives us hope for such a new
consensus — a consensus in which the concerns of North, South, East,
West, powerful and poor can all be addressed effectively and
equitably. No doubt, one document will not solve all our
problems. But it could herald real progress toward a new future.
The Secretary-General, my former colleagues on the High-level Panel
and
I have been around for quite some time — all of us, in fact, longer
than the United Nations. If I may call upon that well of wisdom,
I believe that it will be many years before we are again presented with
such a promising confluence of ideas, proposals and engagement.
The opportunity is within reach; we must seize it.
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“The Role of the United Nations
Secretary-General:
The Past as Prelude to the Future”
by
Anand Panyarachun
U Thant Lecture Series
United Nations University
14 October 2005
Tokyo
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
I am pleased to be with you today to deliver this
year’s U Thant Lecture on “The Role of the United Nations
Secretary-General: The Past as Prelude to the Future”.
This is a very timely subject as we enter the final
year of the present Secretary-General’s tenure, and we begin to
think about the next Secretary-General and the challenges that he
or she may face. As you know the recent High-Level Event in
New York produced an outcome document which looked at a range of
issues and many recommendations for reform. But one area it
did not mention is the Office of the Secretary-General itself,
though I am sure in the coming months and year the nature of this
office and its future will become an increasingly hot topic of
debate.
When we talk about UN reform, we normally talk about
the Security Council, perhaps the General Assembly or ECOSOC,
sometimes forgetting that the Secretariat itself is a Principal
Organ of the UN, and perhaps the one which has developed, changed,
adapted and grown the most since the founding of the UN just over
sixty years ago.
We have had seven Secretaries-General, who have each
interpreted their jobs in very different ways, responding to an
evolving international environment. The Charter gives only a
framework, saying that the Secretary-General will be the chief
administrative officer of the Secretariat. It uses language
similar to what was in the Charter of the League of Nations, with
one important difference: Article 99, which says that ‘he may
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in
his opinion may threaten maintenance of international peace and
security’. It is this article, which implicitly gives the
Secretary-General room to act on his own, to monitor world events,
identify possible crises, and propose solutions, which gives him
space. How this space is used has differed enormously over
the past six decades.
Dag Hammarskjold set the standard. Brilliant,
innovative, a master strategist as well as tactician, he was able
to use his tremendous knowledge with great effect. Under
Hammarskjold, two key concepts were born, or at least grew up:
the idea of the Secretary-General’s ‘good offices’ and of UN
peacekeeping. On many occasions he demonstrated the value of
having the Office of the UN Secretary-General as a neutral focal
point, securing for example the release of American hostages in
China in the early 1950s. He also demonstrated in 1956 the
possibility of the UN fielding a small, lightly armed military
force as impartial observers and as a buffer between warring
states.
But we must recall that that was a different world.
When Hammarskjold was Secretary-General, the UN had only
fifty or sixty members, the United States of America easily gained
a majority in the General Assembly, Communist China was denied
membership, much of the world was still governed by European
empires, and the Secretariat was a tiny fraction of its present
size. More importantly, the death and destruction caused by
World War Two was only a few years past. The idea of the UN
was backed by a solid constituency, including by the United States
of America and elsewhere.
We must also recall that Dag Hammarskjold’s model of
a dynamic and creative Secretary-General, pushing the boundaries of
the office, also ran him into difficulty. It is a fact that
every Secretary-General has had a difficult second term and Dag
Hammarskjold was no exception. By the time of his tragic
death, he had run afoul of the French and the Soviets were barely
on speaking terms with him, hardly a tenable situation for any
Secretary-General.
Then we had U Thant, the namesake of this lecture
series. U Thant, as all of you know, remains the only Asian
to have held the office of UN Secretary-General. His
background could not have been more different from that of
Hammarskjold. Whereas Hammarskjold was an aristocratic Swede
from a well-off political family, U Thant was born a world away in
a little town in the Irrawaddy delta, the son of a minor landowner
and very much part of a small but prosperous Burmese colonial
middle-class.
U Thant spent much of his formative years, in the
1930s and 1940s as the headmaster of a school in his hometown.
He then went on to join the first independent government of U
Nu, soon becoming Secretary to the Prime Minister and U Nu’s right
hand man, especially on foreign and press relations. U Thant
was part of the Burmese Government when it was a democratic
government and struggling for its life against ethnic separatism,
communism and outside intervention. This was what shaped his
views about the UN and the role of the UN in protecting the
security of small states.
By the time Hammarskjold died in November 1961, the
notion of a strong independent UN Secretary-General was already
under sustained attack. It is to the credit of U Thant that
he was able to preserve the Office of the Secretary-General, even
strengthen it further, by taking a tact very different from
Hammarskjold’s, but effective nonetheless.
Hammarskjold was a great Secretary-General by force
of intellect as well as courage and creativity. U Thant was a
great Secretary-General because he brought to the Office a special
moral tone and integrity; because all sides were confident he would
take the correct action, no matter how politically risky and
dangerous. It was the concept of the Secretary-General as a
sort of secular pope, pioneered by Hammarskjold, but further
developed under U Thant. When U Thant publicly opposed the
American war in Vietnam, he was not thinking of political
expediency.
The Soviet Union had proposed a Troika arrangement –
to replace the Secretary-General with three Secretaries-General,
one from the West, one from the East and one from the Third World.
This would have destroyed the Office. It was to the
great credit of U Thant that with his election this proposal was
put aside and never mentioned again.
When U Thant became Secretary-General there were
dozens of new states being created out of old empires. The UN
went from being a mainly western club of 50 some odd countries to a
global organization of more than a hundred. The Non-Aligned
Movement gained an automatic majority in the General Assembly and
the needs of these new states became a priority on the UN’s
agenda.
This was during the height of the Cold War, when the
UN’s political potential could not easily have been realised.
But the UN remained high in people’s minds, because it had
acquired a new agenda – development – and it was during U Thant’s
day that much of the UN’s development aims and institutions were
built. UNDP, UNITAR, UNEP were created in the 1960s under U
Thant’s watch: as the man from colonial Burma, he believed
passionately in decolonization and its natural follow-up –
international cooperation for development.
U Thant also continued in the Hammarskjold tradition
of offering the Secretary-General’s good offices for settling or
preventing disputes. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962
and later in 1965 during the Indo-Pakistani War, the
Secretary-General assumed an all important role as a neutral focal
point for the warring sides and their allies.
In the 1970s and 1980s the UN entered a more quiet
phase, but then with the end of the Cold War suddenly burst into
entirely new spheres of activity. The collapse of the Soviet
Union allowed for the Security Council to intervene much more
directly in civil wars, and a new generation of peacekeeping
operations helped bring peace to Cambodia, Mozambique and
elsewhere. Under both Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, the
Secretary-General again took centre stage in developing new policy
ideas, with the present Secretary-General successfully championing
arguments for new ideas about state sovereignty and the need to
act, forcefully if necessary, against genocide, ethnic cleansing
and severe human rights abuses.
But all this clouded a different track the UN was
taking – a slow tract towards increasing bureaucratic complexity
and mismanagement. Except perhaps Hammarskjold, no
Secretary-General has excelled as a manager. The bureaucracy
remains in some ways a relic of the 1950s, designed to write
reports and organize conferences, but now saddled with huge field
operations, with little change in people or culture. It comes
as a surprise to many that the average staff age in the UN is
something like 55, with more than 50% slated for retirement in the
next few years. The UN is run by a generation hired in the
quiet days and it is perhaps no surprise that it sometimes must
strain itself to keep up with present day demands.
There is also the relationship with Washington.
Washington as the sole superpower is the UN’s indispensable
partner. In the 1960s the UN was able to maneuver between the
US and USSR and build a solid foundation of support amongst the
Non-Aligned Movement through its development activities. That
option no longer exists. The Secretary-General must at once
be independent of Washington but at the same time be seen by
Washington as a useful friend and partner. It is an almost
impossible balancing act and it is to the credit of Kofi Annan that
he has managed to do what he has for so long.
The Iraq war exposed new
difficulties, new conflicts amongst the Membership, new problems
with how the UN worked or didn’t work in the early
21st century.
It was in this context that I was asked to chair the
Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change. We were asked to provide a coherent analysis of
today’s threats, evaluate critically existing policies and
institutions, and recommend change at the UN.
We did not, amongst our 101 recommendations, make any
on the Office of the Secretary-General. We were even hesitant
to make recommendations on change in the Secretariat, though now I
believe this was a mistake and that change in the Secretariat
should have taken a more prominent place in our deliberations and
our recommendations.
The week our report was presented to the
Secretary-General was the very same week the scandal over the
Oil-for-Food Programme broke out. The need for Secretariat
reform is all too evident, whatever value one places on specific
allegations or analysis of blame. The Secretariat is riddled
with dated and cumbersome rules and regulations which cripple its
flexibility and make impossible any genuine system of
accountability. People are seldom rewarded for good work and
rarely is anyone punished for incompetence. It is only
against great odds and with the dedication of some of the excellent
staff the UN does have, that it is able, for example, to mount
peacekeeping operations in the field. It is no wonder that in
trying to manage tens of billions of dollars in oil-for-food that
there were problems of mismanagement if not outright
corruption.
And so what next?
As we all know, Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s term
will come to an end next year. A new Secretary-General will
be elected by December 2006, perhaps a little before, and we may
expect discussion of the succession to begin in earnest in a few
months time.
There is some acceptance of the principle of
geographic rotation, which would mean a Secretary-General from
Asia, the first since U Thant retired in 1971. And the Asian
region in UN terms means everything from the eastern Mediterranean
all the way to the South Pacific. What sort of
Secretary-General do we need? What challenges would he or she
face? And what lessons are there to be learned from the
past?
I’m afraid to say that any future Secretary-General
will face an environment more challenging, more difficult, more
filled with possible traps and pitfalls than any of his
predecessors. Even with Kofi Annan, a Nobel Laureate and
hailed as the best Secretary-General since Dag Hammarskjold, we
have seen what attacks he has had to face, and the scrutiny and the
pressure.
The next Secretary-General will almost certainly
inherit a portfolio where he will be in charge of huge field
operations. The UN now has over 100,000 soldiers in the field
in incredibly complex political environments. We sometimes
take for granted the fact that Kofi Annan, as a former head of the
UN Peacekeeping Department, knows these operations inside out and
is able to master the intricacies of everything from staff
deployment, to logistics to mandates to the politics of peace
implementation. It is unlikely any successor will come so
well versed in these things.
A new Secretary-General will also face a big
management crisis. The recent September Summit has asked for
a complete review of all mandates older than five years as well as
all rules and regulations related to the budget and human
resources. This is an Herculean task and may not be completed
until well after the new Secretary-General has taken over. A
big part of the job will be to manage the reform of the
bureaucracy, or enhance systems of accountability and oversight,
and promote the concept of meritocracy among Secretariat staff.
All these are necessary to rebuild Member States’ confidence
in the ability of the Secretariat to fulfill its mandate with
integrity and effectiveness.
A new Secretary-General will also face a world and a
UN where differences in perception, of the threats we face, are
unprecedented. Should the UN prioritize development? Or
are terrorism and nuclear proliferation the key threats? Or
civil wars and genocide? One cannot compare the
Secretary-General to the CEO of a company. A company has one
goal – to make money. In the UN there are 191 bottom lines.
Can we have a Secretary-General like Dag Hammarskjold
or U Thant? It’s hard to imagine. Its also hard to
compare today’s environment to any in the past. I suppose if
there is one thing in common with both men, it’s that they had to
reinvent the role of Secretary-General, taking the organisation in
a new direction. More importantly, both were men of
unquestioned integrity, courage and principle, all necessary
qualities for the new Secretary-General.
Will it be unrealistic to believe that the next
Secretary-General can in every respect be the world’s top diplomat
and a moral authority in his or her own right; one who understands
the management challenge and is able to oversee if not direct a
radical reform of the Secretariat; one who is a master tactician,
able to balance the needs and perceptions of the entire Membership
without compromising the core values in which the United Nations
was founded? If we can find such a man or woman, the UN will
have a good chance to remake itself. But without such a
person, the future of the United Nations will be under threat and
the world will indeed be a less secure one for our future
generations.
Let us hope that the best man or woman gets the
job.
Thank you.
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“Japan’s Role in the Coming Decade”
Keynote Address by H.E. Anand Panyarachun
Former Prime Minister of Thailand
GRIPS, Tokyo
January 31, 2008
President Tatsuo Hatta,
Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Before I begin, let me say that, like my fellow countrymen, I have great respect and admiration for Japan and its people. However, I cannot claim to have a profound understanding of Japan. All the same, I do believe that the future of Japan and the future of Asia and the world are inextricably linked. It is a bit like the way a man feels about a beautiful woman. One tries to understand her, knowing deep down that one never will, but also knowing that one’s future happiness depends on her. So I hope you will forgive me if my views are a little simplistic, for my ardour is genuine.
Over the past decade, many thoughtful people have pondered what role Japan should play on the global stage in light of the post-Cold War realities.
In six decades, Japan has picked itself up from the ashes of war to become the world’s second largest economy. It has become a powerhouse of innovation. Its automobiles and consumer products have conquered hearts and minds and pocketbooks around the world. Its companies are some of the world’s most admired. Japan is also a global cultural power. Japanese cultural exports – video games, manga, anime – are now part of the daily lives of young people the world over.
It is not only Japan that has changed. The world has become immensely more complex since the unipolarity of the immediate post-Cold War years. The United States’ air of omnipotence, once seemingly indisputable, has been deflated, with the costly misadventure in Iraq and subprime crisis likely to preoccupy it for years to come. China and India have awoken from their slumber and are poised to change the world’s power equation in the coming decades. Russia has gone from superpower to nearly failed state and back again to newly self-assured major power unafraid to assert itself in international politics. Southeast Asia is consolidating itself and stepping up the pace of its integration, with plans for an ASEAN Economic Community by 2020.
Of course, it would be foolhardy to predict what these developments portend for the next decade. But if current trends continue, a major power realignment looks likely. At least for the next few years, the United States will have to focus on regaining its economic health and restoring its credibility abroad. China and India, barring any upsets, are likely to continue their growth trajectory and emerge at the top tier of the world’s largest economies. South Korea will likely build further on its economic and technological accomplishments.
Amidst all this, Japan may find itself in the unaccustomed position of having to work more closely with its partners and potential competitors in Asia and less closely with its traditional main ally, the United States. As the much vaunted Asian Century becomes reality, a more proactive and independent role for Japan, a Japan that works in close partnership with its Asian neighbours, will be crucial. The idea of Japan as the lead flying goose may have to be retired, as the other geese will have caught up. In the always-on, interconnected world of the coming decade, Japan may need to change its metaphor and think of itself as a key node in a partnership network.
To play this role, Japan needs to articulate a clear vision and hone its political effectiveness.
So far, Japan has not shared with the world a clear vision of its future political and economic direction. The world, but in particular Asia, does not know how Japan will position itself in the emerging world order. Will Japan continue to be the US’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in East Asia, or will it seek greater policy autonomy?
Japan’s defense budget is now one of the five largest in the world (at more than $41 billion in fiscal year 2006). Japan is also expanding its security role, partly at the urging of the United States. But its domestic politics – its lack of a strong, coherent political leadership – seems to have held Japan back from formulating the vision it needs. With a growing military capability but without a clearly articulated vision and strategy, memories of the Second World War will persist, as will regional concerns over Japan’s intentions.
This is all the more reason for Japan to enhance its political effectiveness. Since the Second World War, Japan’s impact on international politics has been almost negligible. Japan has maintained a consistently low political profile, more befitting of a third-world country than an economic heavyweight.
The resulting perception is that Japan has not demonstrated a willingness or ability to raise Asia’s profile in international forums, whether political or economic, preferring the comfort and safety of America’s shadow. The attitude and mindset underlying this passivity must change if Japan is to take its rightful place as a positive political force in Asian and world affairs.
With Asia rising, it makes sense to engage more effectively within the region. To forge closer interactive relations with its Asian partners, Japan should take advantage of the groundwork that is already in place. Japan already has a significant economic presence in its partner countries. It needs to make use of this presence to leverage its political standing in the region.
To achieve this, I believe Japan will have to confront and address a number of issues. Failure to come to grips with these issues would continue to hold Japan back from its true potential.
The first issue I see is one that some may attribute to culture, but which can also be thought of as communication style. One reason the Japanese mind is so mysterious to outsiders is that communications are so stylized, so carefully controlled to ensure politeness and harmony. Japan, it seems, is a consensus society that goes to great – some might say extreme – lengths to avoid public argument and confrontation. But in today’s international relations, these things are often part of dialogue, the process by which the world is finding its way forward. To engage in dialogue, a willingness to argue and to put one’s face on the line is important.
This kind of reticence, of course, is not particular to Japan. It can also be seen in some other Asian societies, including my own, that value social hierarchy and political correctness over substance. We tend to fill our meetings with ceremonial readings of prepared texts rather than use the occasion for spontaneous exchanges of views that get to the heart of the matter.
But Japan is no ordinary country. Japan is Asia’s and indeed the world’s leading economic power. If it is to play a leadership role in regional and global affairs, Japan must be more direct – in a subtle way, of course. And it must be more willing to risk disagreement in pursuit of truthful, positive answers. Many countries look up to Japan as a model of democracy and free markets. It would only be natural for Japan to also set the standard for international dialogue and cooperation.
This communication style leads us to the second issue: the lingering contentiousness of World War II history between Japan and its neighbours. After 60 years, it seems, Japan is still unable to come to terms with some aspects of the Second World War. This is understandable, as these are aspects I am sure Japan would rather forget. What is rather surprising is that despite repeated apologies from Japanese leaders, there is a lingering perception that Japan prefers to remember history selectively and differently from the rest of Asia. This perception is not helped by the certification of revisionist history textbooks, nor by some past prime ministers’ visits to Yasukuni Shrine.
Germany, by way of contrast, has managed to move on. Not only did it accept the Holocaust, it has also shown its remorse through concrete measures, paying over 60 billion US dollars in reparations to Israel and victims of the Third Reich for decades after the war ended. The current generation of Germans may not know much about the darker aspects of German history and thus may not feel much guilt. But at least those Germans who bore witness to history have come to terms with that history.
Japan needs to come to terms with its history as well, if it is to move on. To convince others of its sincerity, Japan might consider communicating in a more direct and consistent manner. I am greatly encouraged that Prime Minister Fukuda has shown his sensitivity to international opinion early on by declaring that he would not visit Yasukuni Shrine. If Japan could take more concrete gestures to show that it takes the historical grievances of its neighbours seriously, I have no doubt that the past can be buried and all countries in the region can move forward together.
The third issue Japan needs to confront is its continuing dependence on the US security umbrella. Japan is closely – some might say too closely – identified with US foreign policy. The litmus test of Japan’s policy independence is not so much whether Japan can undertake proactive policies on its own. In areas such as official development assistance or ODA, Japan has certainly been quite proactive. Rather, the test is whether Japan can pursue policies that put the interests of Asia first and foremost, even in the face of US opposition.
Perhaps the best known test case is the proposal by Japan in 1997 to set up of an Asian Monetary Fund. Even before the details of such a fund had been worked out, Washington shot down the idea and it had to be quickly withdrawn. Only much later, when it became amply clear that the AMF would not replace the IMF, did Washington’s position soften.
If such a thing can happen on foreign economic policy, one would expect at least the same on political and security matters. I realize that in Japan, there is unease about this continuing sense of amae or dependence on the United States. The changing nature of security threats and the US preoccupation with terrorism and the Middle East call into question whether and how long the US nuclear umbrella will continue to effectively protect Japan. At the same time, the nuclear threat in Northeast Asia seems to be under control. The rapprochement process on the Korean peninsula and the discreet diplomatic role played by China should allay Japan’s traditional concern over Pyongyang’s perceived aggressiveness.
Without reducing this dependence on its big brother, it would be difficult for Japan to develop meaningful political relationships with other countries. As long as Japan is perceived to be such an integral part of the US security framework, nurturing the security dimension of such relationships would be a challenge.
I am not saying that Japan should decouple itself from the US security umbrella. Britain, Germany, France and the EU all depend to a considerable extent on the nuclear protection provided by the US through NATO. Yet these countries are still able to assert themselves in international forums more or less independently of the US. Japanese industry is brilliant at coming up with innovative products. The Japanese leadership is no doubt similarly capable of charting an independent foreign policy strategy that is in step with the changing landscape of Asia and the world.
These are the three main impediments I see to Japan’s playing a more significant role in the coming decade. To overcome them, Japan should be more assertive, show leadership, take the initiative, and be more innovative.
The changes need not occur overnight. Even rising Asian giants China and India will not catch up with Japan any time soon. But Japan will have to begin adjusting its attitudes, ambitions and mindset before too long, as the reconfiguration in global power is already underway.
The country that figures most heavily in this reconfiguration, of course, is China. China has enjoyed meteoric growth for over two decades and five straight years of double-digit growth. This year, it is in position to replace Germany as the world’s third largest economy. Most observers believe it is a matter of time before China becomes the number one economy not only of Asia, but of the world.
This is all the more reason for Japan to come to terms with history and work closely with China, rather than compete as rivals. This would also reduce the tendency of some smaller Asian countries to “play the China card” in their relationship with Japan. Differences in political ideology will always be there, of course, but China appears to be maturing into a responsible and pragmatic international player. So a Japan-China partnership as the main pillar of Asian stability should not be too far-fetched.
I was impressed with the good start Prime Minister Fukuda made right at the beginning of his administration by visiting the US and China. I was also pleased to note that the outcome of the visit showed Japan’s willingness to play a leadership role in environmental protection and combating climate change. This kind of high-level professional diplomacy should by all means be kept up.
To ensure that the partnership with China is well-balanced, ASEAN, with its 540 million people, and India should also be included in the picture. Together, the four power centers should form an Asian strategic rectangle that continues to engage closely with the West and other regional powers, including Russia and Australia. Twenty years down the road, this strategic rectangle comprising East Asia and India should be a core group, in much the same way that the UK, Germany and France are in the EU. As long as Japan is seen by others as too close to the US or Australia, it would have a hard time being recognized as a strategic power in its own right. Japan as part of an Asian partnership would find its leverage enhanced considerably.
As I noted earlier, much of the groundwork for this is already in place. Japan now needs to strengthen its partnership role in the region. There are several instruments through which Japan can do this. The Asian Development Bank still has much room for Japan to show its leadership, particularly with regard to the newer member countries of ASEAN. ASEAN+3 is a well-established forum where Japan can discuss any regional initiative it may wish to propose. Thailand also has mechanisms in place to assist the Mekong countries and would, I am sure, welcome Japan as a development partner to provide assistance to third countries.
Outside the region, Japan is uniquely positioned to help raise the profile of Asia in such forums as the G8. As the only G8 member from Asia, Japan can champion expanding the participation of China and India in the grouping, along with Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa. At present, these five major developing countries engage the G8 in what is called the G8+5. But this engagement is for a mere two hours over lunch, after the G8 has met for two days. Two hours may be enough time for country statements, but if we agree that what we need more of is dialogue, then the +5 component of the G8 should be augmented. Japan’s role here can make a real difference.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Prognostication is always an uncertain business. Even the best minds did not predict world-changing events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union or 9/11. So I would suggest that my crystal ball gazing into the coming decade be taken with the grain of salt it deserves. However, I believe the changes I have outlined can only do Japan and Asia good, not to mention the global distribution of power. The world is too complex and uncertain to leave it in the hands of superpowers, no matter how powerful. As the unfolding information era shows us, the future will be shaped by ever expanding networks of partnership. As part of the same network, let us draw upon one another’s strengths and manage the coming decade together.
I look forward to hearing your views.
Thank you.
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Record of Mr. Anand Panyarachun’s Address at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club (FCCT) on Wednesday, May 18, 2005
Introductory Speech by the President of the FCCT : It is a great pleasure to welcome back to the Club, not only one of Thailand’s most respected senior statesmen, but also a good friend of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand. Most of you are familiar with Khun Anand and the contribution he has made not only in Thailand but internationally over the years. Of course, the reason he is here to speak to us tonight is in his capacity as the Chairman of the National Reconciliation Commission. As you know, this was the Commission set up by the Prime Minister and charged with examining the problems in Southern Thailand and seeking to come up with suggestions for peaceful solutions. Many analysts characterize it as the last opportunity for that kind of solution. The timing, of course, is particularly interesting. The Prime Minister has been accused of taking a very militaristic line. Indeed, the reports that come out today from the international crisis group again charge the Thaksin Government for exacerbating the situation in the South. We have already seen a growth in the number and the sophistication of attacks in the South. Of course, last month there were bombings in Hat Yai. It was the first time we witnessed explosions of that type out in the deep South, coordinated and apparently targeted at international targets : the airport, a supermarket and a hotel.
Now, the Commission has 49 members drawn from many different walks of political, cultural and social life, and has been promised a large degree of independence in its deliberations. Indeed, Khun Anand has been to the South and has begun meeting and talking to people, community leaders down there. I will just add that, as well, of course, in his long career in politics and diplomacy, he was twice Prime Minister of Thailand, during which he tackled many difficult and challenging tasks. Being, I believe, the first leader in Asia to really recognize the problems of HIV/Aids and construct a programme to deal with it. More recently, he was intimately involved in drawing up a new Thai constitution in 1997, and also chaired the top UN Panel looking at the UN’s collective response to security threats.
Now, the Commission, which he now heads, was described by the Thai Rath newspaper as probably the best independent Commission we have ever had. But, I also suspect that of all the challenges that Khun Anand has faced over his illustratrous career in politics and diplomacy, few can be or cannot be a challenging as this. I think it would probably not be an exaggeration to say that this is one of the most important nights that we have at the Club.
It really is a critical time in the South, and the role of the Commission in examining the problems and coming up with solutions cannot really be underestimated. So, I would ask you to give a warm welcome to Khun Anand. Khun Anand :
Thank you very much, Mr. Williams, President of FCCT, and distinguished members and guests. I am not sure what the format is going to be, but I understand that you would permit me to speak about fifteen minutes, and then I will be subjected to your questions. I hope you will be kind to me.
First of all, it is a great pleasure to be invited back here. I recall that when I was Prime Minister, I did seize the opportunities of communicating with the members of the foreign press on what our Government had been trying to do and what our agenda would be. Thirteen years have gone by and much water has flowed under the bridge. I have assumed different incarnations : as Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee and as Chairman of the National Economic and Social Advisory Council. Last year was one of the busiest years I have ever had in my life. I had to chair a UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change. I am sure that not too many people understand even now what it is all about. The whole idea was to try to energize the United Nations system, particularly the Security Council, to engage in productive debates leading to collective responses and collective actions against threats to world peace and security. Now that job was completed, and I passed the buck back to Kofi Annan, and I think he is having a more difficult time than I had with my fifteen other members of the Panel.
Be that as it may, I thought this year is going to be a very easy year for me. I had long planned to retire. I promised my wife many years ago that I would retire at the age of fifty-six and I am getting on to seventy-three. Luckily she has not divorced me yet. Next year I promised myself that I would not accept any other call. But I make that pledge every year. So, you had better wish me luck.
What the King did next touched nearly every aspect of the lives of his people. Provincial administration was brought under centralized direction and augmented by specialized functional ministries. Modern law codes and other judicial reforms were decreed, and these went a long way toward pacifying the European powers’ discontent with the legal system. Fiscal administration was centralized and modern accounting, budgeting and auditing procedures were adopted. Roads and bridges, railways, telegraph lines, irrigation canals and water gates were constructed. Mining projects were launched. Mapping was introduced. The King also vastly expanded educational and medical services. The military forces were upgraded through conscription and the founding of a military academy.
Now, this National Reconciliation Commission is nothing new to you. Those of you who are based here and have been following the events in the South and how the Government, initially, with the emphasis on the word initially, tackled the problem. Mr. Williams did say that it is a Commission of forty-nine people and I disagree with one of your remarks. You said that I was promised a large degree of freedom. No, I was given total freedom and that was the condition I insisted on the Prime Minister and, so far, I think he has kept his word, and I give him credit for that.
We have a Commission of forty-nine people. I know about half of them personally, but the other half of the members were nominated to me, whispered into my ears or conveyed to me, and I studied their CVs. I asked a number of people on the credentials of these nominees. The qualification for being a member of my Commission is that he or she must have an independent mind, and that he or she must be committed to peaceful solutions of the problem in the South. I am not trying to have a Commission of those who speak the same language. I think it is important that I include a variety of opinions and judgments. But so long as they are committed to peace and peaceful solutions, that is good enough for me. I often said jokingly that my task of reconciliation started even before the Commission was set up because, initially, I have to have reconciliation with the Prime Minister, because he knows that on this particular issue and on some other political issues, I stand rightly opposite to his viewpoint. But I have always been honest with him, and I think be respects my independence and my freedom of action.
It took me two meetings to explain the facts of life to him and also to reason with him on the unproductive outcome of his past policies and also on the inefficiency of the management of the past policies. But, particularly on the mindset of a number of government leaders and public opinion moulders. I think he was kind enough to listen to me attentively and, at least, to agree to disagree with me on certain points. But, eventually, I think he was brought around to the positions that I thought I could accept. They were not identical positions but, at least, they would not be contradictory to what I have long planned to do. He was good enough to give me a free hand. I said that even though that Commission was appointed by the Prime Minister, I would not be engaged in this task unless I had a free hand.
I explained to him the structure of the Commission I was planning, and the division of labour. My viewpoints were that it needed to be led by the civil sector, the people, and that the Government and the politicians would take, I wouldn’t say secondary, but not a primary role, and that I would have full freedom to select whoever I thought fit. As for the structure, I would have eighteen or nineteen people from the area, and about six politicians, about ten or eleven civil servants and also a number of civil sector people outside the area. I included two Buddhist monks. I included a number of Islamic clerics. And even in the civil sector allocation, I even included a former commander of the forces in the South, a retired General who is a Muslim and who is well-respected in the area. And I included a number of politicians at my own choice, who would be sitting in my Commission as independent members, so they wear two hats. When they work for me in the Commission, they have to express their independent views. And the same would be for ten or eleven civil servants that I included. I even included a General who is the head of the…, I don’t know what the English term is but in Thai it is “กอ. สสส. จชต. : กองอำนวยการเสริมสร้างสันติสุขในจังหวัดชายแดนภาคใต้” something like a peace-building commission, or whatever. There were about eight ladies on our Commission, and I have people who are familiar with the culture, with the history, with the religion, both Buddhism and Islam, political scientists, NGO people and individuals who have long been involved in the conflict resolution exercise and people who know the area, know the people and can empathize with the people in general.
We have had three formal meetings, twice in Bangkok and once in Pattani. And only two weeks ago, I was down there with some fifteen members of my Commission, together with the people on the ground. We visited Narathiwat and Yala. We held public hearings. We held one-on-one conversations with the aggrieved, with the injured and with the relatives of the dead. But I think it is important at this juncture to tell you what we are and what we are not, because otherwise I am bound to get questions that I prefer not to answer.
First of all, the independent Commission is appointed by the Government, by the Prime Minister, and we have been given free hands. We have been given all the facilities; we will be given an adequate budgetary allocation. I do not report to the Prime Minister. I made it a point that it is an independent Commission. When I submit our report to the Government, perhaps early next year, simultaneously, I would release the report to the public. So there will be no questions on whether the report is the Government property or the property of the Commission.
I intend to operate the Commission in the most transparent and accountable manner. But we are not an executive agency; we are not an executive arm of the Government; we are not a law-enforcement agency; but it does not mean that we shift our responsibility. Since we do not have a police force under our command, or a military force or an intelligence or a civil service, we cannot be expected to deal with day-to-day events which occur. If you are going to ask me: why was it that since the Commission was initiated, the unrest has not died down? That is not our responsibility. When it is a question of the day-to-day events and incidents which occur, I stressed to the Government that we need better intelligence and better law-enforcement measures. We need to stress the need for protection of human rights and promotion of freedom in that part of the country. With the day-to-day incidents, I could talk to the Prime Minister or to some individuals who are in my Commission to convey messages – that is the most you can do.
Now, the second category of my mandate is that even though we are not responsible for the day-to-day events, past, present or future, we would do whatever we can to facilitate the co-operative atmosphere and co-operative relationship between the people and the Government authorities. We would allow ourselves to be a catalyst, a change agent. That is why we were not responsible for the setting up of the Commission or for their reports on Krue-Sae or Tak Bai. We did intervene and we did advise the Government that those reports should be released in full and the Government abided by our advice and passed on the authority to the Commission to consider whether the report or portions of the report could be released to the public. We did that about 3-4 weeks ago. We released the entire report with the deletion of names of certain individuals for the protection of their own identities, or in case it could impair or interfere with the course of justice that is being followed. But otherwise, the substance of the entire report was released, and we are urging the Government to withdraw the martial law. I am not going into details as to how I personally intervened in this matter and how I advised the Government.
Although these matters do not come, per se, within the scope of our responsibility, we thought that we could move them forward to create better atmosphere and better environment for the long-term reconciliation process. So, what is the long-term reconciliation process? Well, it is going to be long-term because, in my view, and I said it to the Prime Minister, the real issue is not separatism; the real issue is not terrorism. We recognize the seriousness of the separatist activities and also terrorist activities, but, to me and the members of Commission, those are not the front-line issues. They are, in my view, by-products of a much larger issue – and that larger issue, perhaps, involves the inability on both sides to understand each other. There have been incidents of injustices meted out by the Government authorities in the past, and also by the past policies, mistreatment of the people in the area, non-respect of the people of different cultures and religions, lack of awareness of the history of the area, and so forth; but the bottom line is that the people mistrust this Government, and there is no credibility. I mentioned this to the Prime Minister. Of course, he had the right to disagree with me. But I am sure that, at the back of his mind, he would have loved to say “yes” to me, that you were correct. I think it would be politically incorrect for him to make that pronouncement to me. I think the work of Commission could not be done successfully unless there is a clear understanding between me and the Prime Minister. I asked him to send a signal, a strong signal, to his people, firstly with members of his cabinet – which he duly did the next day after my second meeting with him. He even said at the cabinet meeting that he had a real conversation with me like a “farang to farang”, to quote the term used in some Thai newspapers. What Khun Thaksin meant to say was that we had a really good, honest and candid conversation. That same week he even told his cabinet meeting that I admonished him for listening only to his cronies; that if you asked people around, be it the cabinet members or his political party members, he would have different stories as to how successful he was in the South. So he said to his cabinet members at the meeting that he would try to listen more to the people who disagree with him.
So I think I have done a lot for the reconciliation process between me and the Prime Minister, and we still have good working relations!
I was glad I was away from Thailand for about a week. I came back feeling very groggy yesterday, flying from North Carolina back to Bangkok with a six hour lay-over in London, and subjected to all those anti-terrorist measures at various airports. I was scared to listen to today’s news report that he said he had given instructions to his people in the south. Sometimes they did follow his instructions, but some times they didn’t. I supposed he’d like to say that there needs to be established in this country a civilian rule over the armed forces. Now, I will explain to you what we are, and what we are not; what we can do and what we are not in a position to do. It’s a daunting task. You cannot expect quick results. But we hope that at the end of the day we have established certain policies, certain measures and certain guidelines that would, in our view, collective view, lay a good foundation for making it more difficult and more unpalatable to ill-intentioned people to engage in any violent activities.
I mentioned my initial reconciliation with the Prime Minister, but I think that my present task is also try to reconcile the differences within our own Commission. I have about ten months more, and I am aiming to achieve a consensus report. When you have Government officials and politicians in my Commission, I hope that eventually we would be able to reach a consensus on the long-term policies and measures. But what is more important is that what we submit in terms of report or in terms of recommendations, those are just written paper. People ask whether the Government would follow the advice. I said how should I know. I don’t’ even know who is going to be in the Government next year.
Secondly, this is a question, an issue, that cannot be left to the Government exclusively to deal with the situation unless the majority of the Thai people, particularly those who live outside the three southernmost provinces, also change their mindset, unless they reduce their prejudices and pre-conceived ideas, we will not be able to achieve anything. But I am still hopeful. Your President rightly said that, of all the challenges that I have been asked to face, this would be the most difficult. People are still wondering why on earth a man of my age who has stumbled through many hurdles in life, should decide to accept this responsibility. I recall that I gave an interview to the Bangkok Post three or four weeks ago, and the last question the gentleman asked me was : why did you accept it? So, I said to him “Oh, well, through my life, as if it were my fate, there is always a question not why, but why not?”
Thank you very much
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Questions and Answers Reception of the People in the South
I think that the setting up of the Commission and my past reputation, good or bad, have been well received and, of course, in my diplomatic, political and business career, I have made a few enemies in this country. So you still have some talk shows, some media people who would condemn me for whatever I do. This is a fact of life and it doesn’t bother me. Obviously, I’ve gone through some of the worst periods in my life when I was a victim. I don’t know whether many of you know that I was once accused of being a Communist when I was Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Service. And when it came to the October Event in 1976, I was suspended from duties. I was accused by the right-wingers, we had a mini McCarty period. I think Thailand is very much like an American society, very conservative and many times very parochial, and I suffered a lot, and my family too. I was accused by a certain group of military people and I was sort of vilified by a number of extreme right-wingers. Those people still exist in our society and you cannot get away from reality. This doesn’t bother me, and that’s that.
The report and the reception I received from the people in the area have been quite positive. I think you have to understand that the three southernmost provinces in Thailand constitute the upper part of the Malaysian Peninsula. Thanks to the UK colonial policy, Malaysia was divided up. The upper part of the Malaysian Peninsula were left under Thai control and the UK kept the rest. That was the result of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. And we all know something about the glorious days of the Pattani Kingdom that lasted over five to six centuries. Before that it was the Srivichai Empire.
So the difference between the people, the Muslim, the Thai Muslim in the South is that they are ethnic Malays. They are not like the Thai Muslims in Nong Jok or in two or three other areas in Bangkok or in Ayudhya, or in many other places in Thailand. We must recognize that fact and we must respect that fact. Now the population of the whole area is nearly two million people, eighty-five per cent of whom are Muslims, Malay Muslims. But, they are Thais. On my father’s side, I come from the Mon famil. My great grandfather, they came from Burma during King Rama IV and yet my grandfather rose to become Permanent Secretary of Defence. At that time, the Defense Ministry would have the administrative control of the South. On my mother’s side, I am Chinese, I am fourth generation Chinese. You look around the room – who is a Thai? Or what is a Thai?
So, I think this is something that all we Thais have to stop and think as to who we are and what we are meant to be, and what we should be. Out of two million people, eighty-five per cent are Malay Muslims, but they are Thais. They were born in Thailand. They respect the Monarchy. Their Majesties King and Queen, the Crown Prince and Princesses have been there many times. Even at the height of the tension, Princess Mahachakri Sirindhorn was there for four to five days. The Crown Prince spent a whole week visiting Muslim communities there. The Thai Buddhists and Thai Muslims have been living in harmony for centuries. So, out of two million people, how many are actually involved in a core of separatism or the terrorist activities? The figure that was given to me was no more than fifteen thousand. But even out of these fifteen thousand, how many were really gunning on violence? Thanks to our media, both local and international, every incident in the South was reported to be the result of a terrorist activity or a separatist activity. So, I told the authorities there: you are not that efficient. First of all you cannot, you are not acting like a law-enforcing agency. You cannot take in suspects, you are not able to identify the suspects and bring them to the course of justice. My own personal estimate, after I talked to a number of people, is that no less than fifty per cent of about 1,600 incidents that occurred in the past year and five months, were criminal activities in connection with narcotics, smuggling, gambling and mismanagement of natural resources. So, I don’t read newspapers. Every time you pick up a paper, every incident would be attributed to what we call “Jhon Pak Tai”. (Southern rebels)
The implication was that they were all political activities. They were all rooted in separatism and terrorism. But that was not so. You talked and you all referred to the so-called co-ordinated attack at Hat Yai Airport and the Carrefour, or whatever Department Store. They were all isolated facts! Up to now, not a single organization has claimed that it is responsible for this or that attack. If you compare the situation in the South to that of Iraq, the gap is as wide as the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean. All you have are separate incidents.. a man riding at the back of a motorcyclist either early in the morning or at night time in a remote place in a remote village and shooting to kill, mostly not successfully, but shooting to kill somebody sipping coffee at a roadside caf?. All the arsons you heard. All right, there were some burnings of schools. But most of the burnings were public telephone booths and bus stops. So I think you have to have a more realistic and proportionate appreciation of the scale and dimension of the incidents that occurred.
Quite a number of people told me that there was a rise in the incidents. But if you observe the statistics, there are killing on a daily basis in every province. So, I think that the incident has been grossly exaggerated by the press, including the international press. When you talk about the terrorist issue in Thailand or in the South of Thailand, you must be aware that this a local issue and it can be managed by the locals and by local resources. The worst thing that can happen is that the whole thing becomes internationalized. You can forget or you can overlook now the failure of the past policies. But now it is starting a new chapter, so you must get to the basic fact. It is a difficult task. But not a difficult task in dealing with terrorism of separatism. I have lived in many countries. Wherever I went, whatever I read, there was a degree separatism in every country.
I still remember an incident many years ago, our former Prime Minister, M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, who was educated in England. He was visiting England, and he had a meeting with the British Prime Minister, that was in the 70s. I forget the name of the British Prime Minister. Kukrit was asked: how is your insurgency in the North? And Kukrit, you know, is a good actor. He looked surprised as if it was something he heard for the first time, and his response was : how is your insurgency in Ireland? You go anywhere. You go to Spain, you have the Basques; you go to France, you have the Basques. You go to Russia, you have Chechenya, you go to China, you go to Germany, you go to America, you must go to Texas. You remember the Waco, Waco Incident? You go to Texas, there are still people who want to secede. So, I make the distinction. When you have a separatist issue, it is not a big deal. Try to treat it as a normal activity, provided that it’s a peaceful expression. It becomes a crime when it takes up violence and killing. Look at Great Britain. How many foreigners make a distinction between Britain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic. All along you have separatism; your have a monarchy; you have a unitary state just like Thailand, and yet things were not that normal. Sean Connery, a Scottish nationalist, refused to be knighted by the Queen and he turned down the knighthood. So, what’s wrong with that? But, eventually, there has to be a devolution of power. After so many centuries of resistance, eventually you have to have a Scottish Parliament, a Welsh National Assembly. You have IRA for over twenty years. I don’t know how many tens of thousands have been killed. Eventually you have to talk. And it is a difficult task because, after so many years of violence, this distrust is not something that can be dissipated overnight. You have to nurture the peace process. You have to change your mindset; you have to change your mentality. So, to me, if we recognize that there is a separatist problem, but it can be dealt with. Yes, there is a terrorist activity, but it has to be addressed and it has to be addressed by ourselves, by our own Government. There is no quick fix.
Chance of Success
I said at the beginning that it is a daunting task, and I cannot promise you the moon, but I will do my best. I have to be an optimist, and I have to be reasonably confident of the prospects of succeeding, otherwise why should I spend my time on a lost cause? But I believe strongly that it is very important to our country and to the future of our country, and I believe that the Thais, whatever their mindsets are, whatever their prejudices are, are pragmatic in times of crises.
The reception that the Commission received from the public in general is overwhelmingly positive. Now, can we change the mindset? I think we can, but it takes a lot of education. We hope to have some kind of a master plan that deals with every aspect of peace building, the need to clear up misunderstanding, the need to be aware of the real issues, the need to recognize and respect the diversity of culture, and the need to change the mindset of the so-called unitary state to something which is more multi-cultural and multi-ethnic. That is going to take a long, long time. The need to respect the ethnicity of the people, the need to know who they are, where they come from, and the respect that we must give to people of different cultures, religions and ethnicity.
I often cite an example; why is it that we feel repugnant that a certain group of our people speak a foreign language, Malay? My response to that question is: why should that be a problem? I admit that it is a problem, particularly with government authorities, and I said if you look around the country, do we have problems with the Thai-Chinese who speak Chinese in Chinatown or some Thai-Chinese who speak Chinese among themselves in their families? Do we have problems with the Thai-Lao who speak Lao in the Northeast? Do we have problems with the Thais who live in Burirum or Prachin Buri who speak Khmer? Do we have any problem with the Northern Thais in Chiang Rai who speak Thai Yai? Do we have any problem with the people in the North who speak a northern dialect? Or those in Isan who speak an Isan dialect? Or those in the South who speak a southern dialect?
All we have to do is just recognize that the so-called Malay language happens to be a regional dialect of the people who live in the three southernmost provinces. So, within ourselves, within each individual, we have to reconcile all these contradictions and differences in our mind.
You go to any country. The Scots still speak the Scottish dialect; so do the Welsh. I think we are living at a time when every country, every civilized society, finds that there can be unity in diversity and that there is a greater enrichment in our society if there are people of diverse origins, diverse cultures and diverse religions. Somehow, we have to come around that problem. It is a mental block, but we have to come to the realization that the diversity is an asset, not a liability. So you can see that what we are trying to do is not merely to address the issue of the South, but perhaps, I am overly ambitious in considering it a national agenda. It is a truly national reconciliation within our country. In the future, you never know what other problems of a similar nature may occur in other parts of Thailand. So I believe it is incumbent on us, on the present generation, to look ahead and not to take the trees for the forest. We have to have a macro perspective of our national identity, of our national way of doing things, seeing things and solving things. I always say that this is a local issue, as far as the South is concerned. But, what we are trying to do is to get our society better organized in dealing with problems of this nature in the future. I do not believe that it is an impossible task. I look around, I travel a lot, and I visited many countries. I read foreign journals. I watch intelligent TV shows, TV talk shows. I participate in discussions in various fora. I don’t see that our problem is greater or more serious than the problems that exist in many other countries.
I lived in the United States for twelve years. When I look around as to what the United States has been doing, I am worried for them. I am already dead scared. But this is not to be taken as an unfavorable view of my good friends, the Americans. If we take a good look around Europe, Africa, and Asia. I do not think that our problems are unique.
What if Thaksin is Leaving as a Prime Minister?
I am not worried about Thaksin leaving or not leaving. I think he has a clear majority, whether you like it or not, he is going to be there for a long time. There is nothing permanent as change. I think people change. I hope he has changed, at best in regard to the issue in the South. And I have no reason to doubt that he is not sincere.
Credibility of the Commission Among Muslim Population
I theoretical terms, I am very, very serious about truth, search for truth, and I personally believe that the reconciliation process must be premised on the disclosure of truth, on peace and justice, and on human right. The recent history of our country does not give us much assurance that truth and accountability are items of priority interest. But as far I am concerned, and as far as the Commission is concerned, we will continue to urge the Government to be accountable for all these incidents, particularly, the disappearance of a number of Thais. I confronted this question with Khun Thaksin when I had my first meeting with him, and he did not ignore my question. But I think he, at that time, did not place such importance. He said to me: “Yes, we knew about disappearances, but there were no evidences that we could have gone on that.” Of course, there were no evidences that they were perpetrated by people or individuals in official circles.
When I went down south, I was misreported, and misquoted that I asked the people or relatives of the dead and injured to forget the Tak Bai incident. That was a total misinterpretation. What I said to them was that it is imperative that the Government would address the issue of the dead, the missing and the injured. Yes, compensation must be provided. But that is not sufficient because it takes time to engage in a healing process. You take away one life, intentionally or otherwise, then you must ensure that you give the future to the children of the dead and the injured. But at the same time, people must not remain preoccupied with the event, otherwise they will have no future. I told them of my personal experience that I would never forget what I had to go through. It is indelible in my mind, in my heart. But I will not let that unfortunate event in my life bother me or prevent me from carrying on with my life. So it is not that I asked them to forget. I said I would never forget it. It is something which is unforgettable, and you should not forget it. You must try to learn lessons of that event, of that loss and get on with your life.
Recommendations to the Government Regarding the Military’s Role in Security Issues in Southern Thailand and the Reconciliation Process
If Khun Thaksin wants to be true to his words, and if he wants to demonstrate that he is a changed person, and that her adapts himself to the lines of policies that I advocated and still advocate publicly, then, he has to make sure that his people in the Government follow through his instructions. I do not know what instructions he gave, but I give him the benefit of the doubt, and I think he is committed to the statements made public many times that he is a changed person, and he has admitted the failures of his past policies. That is something unusual for a man like Khun Thaksin who is very proud of his achievements, and rightly so. But he admitted that publicly. I think for the first time in five year that he has been in power, he found it possible to admit the failures of the policies and the inefficiency of the management. But he must persuade his people, be they the army people or police or civil servants, to toe the new line and follow the peaceful resolution method. He has to assure that to the public in the future. I will not change and the direction of the Commission will not change, but I need to enlist his support. I need to enlist his co-operation. I need to enlist his willingness to put his foot down with the authorities under his control. It is as simple as that.
Opposition in the Military or Among the Officials
That is not my problem. If there were any dissenting voices or dissenting statements. It is those people who have problems with the Prime Minister. It is not my problem. They are not accountable to me. They do not work for me and I respect their viewpoints. They can be critical of me and my Commission, but that is not my problem. If they want to say anything, they should say it to the prime Minister.
Is the NRC in Favour of Emergency Law Rather Than Martial Law?
There are three levels of our work. The first level of work is between the Prime Minister and myself. There are certain matters that I do not need to consult the Commission, because it would take up too much time, and there are certain recommendations that I made on my own account, in my own personal capacity. The second level is that there are certain issues discussed with the Commission without any definitive conclusion, particularly in the details. But if I deem it to be of urgency, of great urgency, I would take it up with the Government without waiting for specific conclusions or recommendations of the Commission. The third level is that we have full discussions on the matter within the Commission and we make official recommendations.
Up to now I focus on the first two levels; one-to-one with the Prime Minister, and me as chair having ascertained some viewpoints from the Commission members and I would take it on myself to bring them up with the Government, either with the Prime Minister, with the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, or whoever. Yes, we did discuss the question of martial law. But before we get to the question whether it should be withdrawn or it should be replaced by a less stringent law, I need to point out that the first failure of the authorities is the inability to ensure protection of life in the area, particularly lives of innocent people. I am not trying to say that different lives have different values. But for certain purposes, I think we have two categories, lives of those who work for the Government and lives of innocent people, by-standers or those not involved.
In the past, there had been serious incidents. When I talk about the past, I talk about the past 30-40 years when the targets were mainly Government officers, be they military, police or civil servants. But, of course, in recent years the target list has been expanded to include innocent people, and that cannot be forgiven, But it boils down to the inability of the Government to provide safety and protection for the innocent people. Besides certain elements in the military and police forces, including civil servants, have been engaged in, shall we say, illegal business activities in the area. I would not be surprised if a number of killings in the South were connected with these illegal activities involving individuals who work in or for the Government.
Having said that, rightly or wrongly, I am not here to pass judgments. The Government felt that the presence of police forces were not sufficient, and there was a need to provide additional assistance to the law-enforcement agencies by bringing in soldiers to the area. According to our law, you cannot move soldiers to any area, unless there is, quote-unquote, martial law. But I said to the Prime Minister the martial law normally in most countries have different levels of crisis. You do not jump from the normality to the martial law in one step. In America, you have national disaster area, or areas whatever, that would enable the states to be provided with federal assistance, for example, when you have hurricanes or cyclones or this or that. If you said that you enforce the martial law, the martial law allows the people involved to do so many things. Khun Thaksin explained to me, and the military too, that they did not apply all the provisions of the martial law. All they needed was a legal provision which would allow them to operate in the South. So, I said to them, in such a case, why did you need a martial law? Why did you not have any other legislation? You have the parliamentary majority! He said that a law would allow the presence of military and that should be sufficient. But I stopped at that because I had no idea that there was another bill waiting in the wings and I do not know what that bill is going to cover, whether it is going to be worse than the martial law or whether it is going to be better. But if the purpose is to enable the introduction of the military forces to do things legally in the South, why not have a new law but confined just to that particular aspect. The danger is, of course, that it could be sort of a mess-up. The new law might expand into something which is, perhaps, more dangerous. I do not know. I do not engage myself in speculations. And if you ask me: cant I trust the military or can I trust the police force? It is not whether I trust them or not. But the people in the area do not trust the Government. They do not trust the military. They do not trust the police force. They do not trust Government civil servants.
It is not for me to say whether such a situation is justified, but the Prime Minister and his Government must be made fully aware. The first time I met him he chided me. He said, I was an old man and he was still youngish. I am a computer illiterate. I still write long-hand when I write my speech. Many years ago, I tried to explain to him and he said “Well, you are not digital, you are what….analog.” I did not even know what that meant. I had to go up back to look it up in the dictionary. He said “You still think within the old paradigm.” And I pretended I did not know the term, he used the English word. I pretended that I did not know the meaning of the word “paradigm”. So he stared to explain to me. He said “You know, the old paradigm is that all these problems arise out of injustices, mistreatments, abuse of power, lack of human rights, bad civil servants, corrupt military and corrupt police forces.” He said it had all changed now, it had all changed. Everything is good. The army is good. The police force is good, everything is good. So, I said to myself, that is not a new paradigm, that is an old paradigm!
But I let it go. I let it go because I have been at the business long enough to know that I have to operate with the result-oriented business management.
Chaturon Chaisang’s Plan
Chaturon’s plan was good. It was not comprehensive, but it was good as far as it went. And if it had been implemented in full eight or nine months ago, we would have had some progress towards, shall we say, a comprehensive reconciliation. As it stands now, it has been shelved. The Government says that quite a number of his recommendations were already implemented. I have no way of monitoring whether those plans or those measures were actually implemented. But we have a larger agenda than Chaturon’s plan because Chaturon’s plan was designed to defuse the explosive situation. In our view, we need to go much further than immediate objectives. We have to focus on long-term objectives.
Devolution of Power
You talked about the devolution. This is a very tricky and very sensitive issue. In every Constitution it is stated that Thailand is a unitary state which is indivisible. So it is subjected to a number of interpretations. Of course, when you say it is indivisible, it means indivisible in terms of territory, which is acceptable to me. The trouble with our country is that our language does not catch up with the current thinking or current concepts. Some of you may know that some 60 – 70 years ago, we had to attempt to coin new Thai words to provide for technical terms in science, particularly in modern living. Prince Wan, who was our Foreign Minister, coined many words to cover the political science terms, and he found that he had to resort to the use of Pali and Sanskrit words. Many of the words he coined, are, I would say, unintelligible to the common people. Words like “territorial integrity” he coined, I am sure my daughter doesn’t know that either. The Thai word for “Territorial Integrity” is “บูรณภาพแห่งดินแดน”. I challenge any Thai here who is not in the foreign service to understand such word. In the Thai language the dividing line between “honesty” and “integrity” just does not exist. So, sometimes, he had to coin words which are very long. We do not have a word for integrity even though some may have tried to refer to it by the word “คุณธรรม”, which is not the exact meaning.
We were so successful in coining new words that India had to send her Pali/Sanskrit experts to learn from us. For example, you have in English “telephone”, “television”, “telecommunication”. For “Tele”, Prince Wan once used the term “tora”. So, telephone is “torasap”. “Sap” means to her. Television is “torathas”. “Thas”, means to see. Telecommunication is “toracommanacom”. So, there are some wonderful words that had been coined. But when it comes to more abstract terms for modern living or concepts, we have difficulties. When you talk about devolution, I do not know how the word devolution can be translated into Thai. But leave it aside. We must not use terms or words which could be, I would not say misinterpreted, but I would say would be distorted by the ultra-rightists, or by the extremists. Many times in my life apart from being accused of being a Communist, I have been accused of being a separatist. When we were drafting the Constitution, I was accused of reducing the King’s constitutional power. So, it is nothing new. But when it comes to words like “self-rule” or “autonomy”, we do not have proper translations into Thai. The moment you try to explain to a Thai the word “autonomy”, he would say “Ah, that’s independence”.
So, I warned my Commission members not to bring up this subject publicly yet. But we have to start thinking seriously as to how we could bring justice, as to how we could bring recognition of cultures and ethnicity to our national life. We can only talk about the distribution of power in accordance with the Constitution. That is a by-word, other wise we would be wrongly accused. We cannot use the term “autonomy” because there is no word for “autonomy” in Thai, and if you use the word “autonomy”, people will say you are talking about independence of the three southernmost provinces. And even the term “self-rule” can also be distorted. So, for the time being, I would say, yes, the direction would be along that line.
I think, in a way, if you look at the history of Thailand, unfortunately, we are victims of our own successes. We have history, recorded events, but we do not have history books which explain why such and such events took place, and what impact or what consequences came after those events. During King Narai’s reign in Ayudhya, we had a Prime Minister who was a Greek named Falcon, and the highest courtier in the Ayudhya Dynasty was a descendant of Sheik Ahmed from Persia. And we had a Chinese, a high-ranking mandarin at the court. But after that we forgot who we were and where we came from. During the drafting of the Constitution, I was very much criticized and, I would say, vilified for being a part of the movement to stop the public call for making Buddhism the state religion. I think it is important that we have to think about the need of the people in the area to be able to govern themselves. If it is a federal structure, it is easier. The Brits have left many bad legacies after their departure. The Chinese often say that wherever the Brits went, and when they left, they made such a mess. They should have made Burma into a federal state. They left India, subcontinent India, in such a big mess too, not to talk about what they left in China after the Opium War.
So you can blame the legacies of the past colonialism, western colonialism. We do not forgot history, but what can we learn from history? Definitely, Thailand cannot be a federal structure. It is a unitary structure. But we can distribute power; we can give authority following the principles of governance, principles of participation. They should have certain powers to administer. You can leave the defence, you can leave foreign affairs, you can leave security, to the central government. But that is, perhaps, the direction that we may have to think to take in the future if we can get consensus.
We, unfortunately, are victims of our successes because we had been able all along to assimilate the Chinese, assimilate the Lao, assimilate the Khmer, assimilate the Mon. And 50 – 60 years ago, there was a Government that wanted to assimilate the Thai Malays. But circumstances are different. When the Chinese came here, they came without their wives; they fled from poverty and impoverishment. They left their wives back home. They came here, they looked alike the Thais; they married the Thais. After three generations, they are more Thai than the Thais themselves. We assimilated the Lao, the Khmers, some Burmans. We cannot follow the same path to of assimilate the Thai Malays. We have to integrate them. We cannot translate the word “to integrate” the people into our national life. So, we do have problems with the language.
Composition of NRC
Out of forty-nine, I included six politicians and a Member of Parliament in Yala who is a Buddhist. There were 18 – 19 persons from the area. There were about sixteen Muslims, so I included two or three Buddhists from the area. I think the Democrats are well represented. But mind you, I did not choose them because of their party label. I chose them in their individual capacities and basis. It is not a problem of one political party, but it is a national problem that we have to tackle.
Question : You mentioned earlier that you felt better intelligence and better law-enforcement were needed. I was wondering whether you could expand on that a little bit. How is it possible after such a long period of protracted, if low-level, violence that the governing authorities only seem to have the vaguest idea and contradictory ideas about who is responsible and have caught so few people for the multiple attacks that have taken place? How can the police and the army be doing such a bad job?
Better Intelligence and Better Law Enforcement
I told you that the intelligence is very weak. You asked me how to improve it. I cannot answer because I am not familiar with the organization. I am not, and I have no authority to speak on behalf of the intelligence people.
What Went Right During Your time on Intelligence.
What do You Think has Changed in that Time?
I hope you do not take my response seriously. But I can tell you that in my short stint, even twice, in my lifetime as Prime Minister, the first time for about fifteen months, or sixteen months, and the second time for four months, I ignore all intelligence.
How to Handle or Reconcile If the root cause of the Violence is Unknown?
You do not need much intelligence. Either way, to know the root causes of the problem, I would rather use individual intelligence and collective intelligence, not the intelligence you are referring to.
NRC’s Mandate : A Complete Roadmap for Government?
I was hoping, and I am still hoping that, by the end of this evening, my initial statements and my answers to your questions would clear any doubts in your minds as to what our mandate is, and what our responsibilities are. There is a clear dichotomy between what the Government has to do and what we are planning to do. Some of the questions that were posed to me tonight could be directly addressed to the Prime Minister, partly to put a pressure on him to ensure that his current moves and his current policies would be in line with the long-term approach of the work of the Commission. Obviously, there is still a lot of misconception as to what we are supposed to do, what we are about to do, and what we are capable of doing.
I did stress many times that we are not a law-enforcement agency. We are not an intelligence community. We have no executive authority. So, if people come to me and ask : why is it that the Commission has been set up for three months now and there seems to be no improvement of the situation? My answer would be : that has nothing to do with the Commission. The question should be addressed to the Government. All I want to ensure is that the Government is now working in tandem with us. I cannot force the Government to do anything or to carry out any interim measures. I am not accountable to the Government, but I am accountable to the people in Thailand at the end of the day.
My Commission cannot be held responsible for or accountable to a day-to-day event, to any explosion, or to any killing or whatever incident. It is an obvious commentary on the efficiency of the policy or on the validity of the policy and efficiency of management of the Government authorities, in its inability to dispose of the unrest in the South. I am sorry if you feel that my answer is something that you are not looking for, but I think you have to know the limits of our Commission. We are not the Government! Many of the questions posed to me by the Thai press and by some of you here could be better addressed to the Prime Minister or to the Government authorities.
Public Participation and Support on Reconciliation
Yes, and I even asked my Commission members to go around the country and talk to the people at private or public fora. I encouraged Commission members to write articles, to talk to as many people as possible, not only in the South, but all the rest of the country. My whole intention is to somehow generate a kind of debate that we had when we were drafting the Constitution. When I was given the opportunity to chair the Drafting Committee of the Constitution, I made sure that it would be a transparent exercise, and it had to involve the participation of the people. So, from the very first day, I declared that our meetings would be public. Press people or anybody could walk in to our meeting rooms and listen to the whole discourse. We had many meetings for six or seven months.
There was only one off-the-record meeting and confidential session. It was when we debated among ourselves the pros and cons of making Buddhism a state religion, because it was such a sensitive topic that we did not want our discussions to be misconstrued.
This time I was also thinking of that type of open discussion, but I am afraid that there are quite a number of issues which would be too sensitive to let in the public from the beginning. But, indirectly, I would encourage open debates. You will find that not only I, but a few other member who may disagree with me on certain points, would speak up and would write articles. You can read articles in the newspapers “Matichon” or “Phoochadkarn”, or whatever.
My whole idea is that the success of the Commission is not on the report. The success of the Commission would be on the positive reception, acceptance and support of the public of our report. Only then would the Government move. And I am talking about any Government. I do not believe that this issue is a unique one in Thailand, and I do not view it as an issue that involves only the people, the two million people in the South. I view it as an issue that has to be debated and has to be discussed and resolved by consensus by the entire society. Thai is how I view the seriousness of the issue. And in this, I need the support of the objective press, of the factual press, and I do not want to see the press engage in sensational or in exaggerated versions of the true events.
Outsider Influences on the Southern Violence
The Causes of the Southern Violence
I shall answer the longer question first. I think the attention that the Thai public paid to the situation in the South is the direct result of the failure of the policies. I think there are misunderstandings and misperceptions of the causes. The Thais are very gullable people. They are very simplistic and, they tend to be swayed very easily one way or the other by propaganda or by rumors, or by plain lies. It is not a society which is given to search for the truth. I think that if I were to identify flaws of our character, it is not a society, it is not a learned society. It is not a society which is determined to search for truth, at least not as a matter of conscience or principle. So, on the other hand, the upside of this lack of curiosity for truth is that they can also be swayed more easily if we can get the truth up to them. It is an arduous task, but it is still a possibility.
To come back to your first question, you have to identify what you mean by “outsiders”? Distant outsiders or near outsiders? Well, I deal with the near outsiders first. The near outsiders, of course, are our neighbouring countries, those with a large Muslim population. I have full confidence in the policies of the Government of Malaysia including that of the Prime Minister, and their authorities, and that includes also the PAS government in Kelantan too. I have full confidence that they would not do anything intentionally to harm or to add injury to the already bad situation in the South, or to harm the long-term interest of Thailand. Definitely, they have certain viewpoints and, perhaps, they have different ways of dealing with the problem of a similar nature if it were to occur in their countries. But the advantage they have over us is that they are a Muslim nation, or the majority are Muslims and they have a Government which is Muslim. So, they have more leeway in dealing with the Muslim problems and in many cases, in a much more straight-forward and much more, I would say, strict manner than we can afford because we are a Buddhist Government. Anything we do could be easily misinterpreted as being harsh on the Muslim minority.
But the paradox of the situation is that here you have three southernmost provinces with two million people and with roughly 1.7 or 1.8 Muslims. So, they are a majority in the area, and yet they live in the country in which Muslims are not a majority. And yet, again, they live in a region, Southeast Asia region, of which, the Muslims are a majority. So, you have to strike a good balance.
In whatever treatment we deal with the question, we can not proceed on the basis that we have to be favourable to one group or the other, or to be partial, to please on group or the other. We have to be seen to have a balance set of policy measures and to be objective with our exercise. So we are walking on a tight rope.
Dissolvement of the SPBC
I think that the issue was magnified out of proportion. Yes, there were people who regretted the fact that the old Unit, whatever the acronym, was dissolved and a new Unit was formed. But I can assure you that there are not much differences between the two Units. And I talked to the person who would know because I talked to the chief of the old Unit and he said he regretted it was dissolved. The new Unit could also be a replacement. I do not think it is that serious. More has to do with the way the people in the area operate. Definitely, for whatever reasons, they were still not able to regain the trust of the people in the field, and it is difficult to pass judgement on the situation which prevailed a year ago, three years ago, four years ago.
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11: Mr.Anand Panyaradhun and the Press
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Towards
Recovery: A Time of Renewal and Partnership Speech
by H.E. Mr. Anand Panyarachun Former Prime Minister of Thailand at a Joint
Meeting of the U.S.-Thai and the Thai-U.S. Business Council The Shangri-La
Hotel December 2, 1998 It is a great pleasure and honor for
me to have the opportunity to address this joint meeting of the Thai-U.S. and
U.S.-Thai Business Council. Looking around the room, I am delighted to be amongst
friends and colleagues, for, if anything, it reminds us of the important role
of the Council, or to be more precise, the two councils, have played in serving
as a bridge linking not only our business communities but the peoples of our two
countries in ever stronger ties of friendship and partnership.
Of course,
these days the word partnership has become an all-too-familiar cliche-used and
abused so frequently that it has come to have a hollow meaning. But I believe
that for our two countries, although very much different in terms of history,
size, power and level of development, our partnership has been one of the most
enduring legacies of our long-standing relationship. Certainly, it is not
difficult to recall the many instances in the past in which our two countries
have gone through thick and thin together, be it the Korean war, the Vietnam conflict
and even our small but all-important role in the Gulf War. More recently, we have
worked to bring peace, stability and freedom back to Cambodia and to strengthen
the foundation of a peaceful, stable and prosperous regional order in Southeast
Asia and in Asia and the Pacific as a whole. And, importantly, we both share a
commitment to the cause of democracy, free enterprise and economic liberalization. Indeed,
our partnership has been subjected to the test of both good times and bad times.
And so I, for one, see the current economic crisis we are going through not only
as a challenge but, moreover, as an opportunity for our two countries to reinvigorate
our partnership - not only to make it stronger but also to make it relevant to
the demands of changing times in which nations and economics are interacting and
integrating ever more closely. No doubt, only those who are foolhardy would
still cling to the notion that this is an Asian or East Asian economic crisis.
Its implications for the global economy is all too evident. Its impact has certainly
gone beyond the realm of economics, as we all have witnessed from the events that
have transpired whether in this region or beyond. Already, much has been
said and much has been written about the crisis. I am sure that we will have to
leave it to historians and economists to have the final say. I am also sure that
all of you have already been bombarded with the latest facts and figures regarding
current economic developments in Thailand and in the region. With so much information
and literature available, it is not easy to distinguish between real analyses
and mere conjectures, and between myths and realities. To be sure, the crisis
is a complex phenomenon in which many diverse factors come into play and certainly
does not lend itself to sweeping generalizations. Some have cast the blame on
too rapid economic liberalization. Others have pointed an accusing finger at the
problem of so-called crony capitalism. While many others have placed the responsibility
on rogue financial traders and the volatile global financial markets. Perhaps
there are elements of truth to all these points of view. But the plain and
simple truth of the matter is that if we want to move towards the path of achieving
recovery as early as possible, then it is incumbent upon us to start out from
the premise that we have no one to blame but ourselves. I am certainly no
expert and have no theory to advance. But I do believe that if there is one common
factor, one common thread that runs throughout this yet unfolding drama, it is
the sense of complacency on the part of all of us. That is why what at first originated
a few years back as a financial crisis has turned into a crisis of confidence.
The fact of the matter is that most of us were under the illusion that somehow
and some way the crisis would work itself out or that somehow or some way we could
remain an island of prosperity in a sea of turmoil. Obviously, that is far
from the realities we are confronted with -- the realities of globalization and
the realities of our interdependence. For us in Thailand, if anything good
has come out of this crisis, it is the fact that it has woken us up to the realities
of the challenges facing us, the realities of what needs to be done, particularly
the reforms that should have been taken some time ago but were not taken because
we all had become too complacent and too self-indulgent. So I believe that waking
up to the harsh realities that we are faced with is the first and most crucial
step towards recovery. It is for this reason that Thailand's financial crisis,
as many have observed, is a blessing in disguise. Its greatest blessing, I believe,
is that it has compelled us to become more introspective. Now that we have leaned
first-hand the realities of the global market, we should be able to muster the
will and the determination to correct the weaknesses in our system that were left
untended during our high-growth days. If I were to put it simply, our economic,
political and social institutions failed to keep up with the rapid pace of our
economic development. Our development became lopsided as extravagance and unbridled
spending spree took precedent over good and solid management, high growth became
more important than equitable income distribution and quick profits became the
over-riding concern rather than sustainability. The path towards early and
sustained recovery will depend on how successful we are in seizing the opportunity
presented by the crisis to undertake real and meaningful reforms and restructuring
not only in our ailing financial sector but, no less importantly, in the way we
manage our economy and in the way we conduct our politics. Indeed, one does not
have to be an expert to realize that our economic downfall was not simply due
to the failure of our financial sector, but also due to the failure of our economic
management and the failure of those in power to provide the anchor of good governance
that was sorely needed when signs of the coming crisis began appearing. In
saying this, it is not my intention to criticize anyone or any party because,
as I noted earlier, all of us are to be blamed in one way or another. Now is the
time for all of us to rally together in order to move forward in the process of
reform and renewal. Let me at this juncture emphasize that I hold no government
position and certainly cannot speak on its behalf, officially or unofficially.
And perhaps it is still too early to pass judgment or draw any definitive conclusion
on the record of this government. I believe that the present administration should
be given credit for making an earnest and determined effort to push for and put
in place a process of reform and restructuring in our economic, political and
social structures that I very much hope will last beyond its life-time. I
am sure that most of you are already familiar with the specific measures that
have been taken to date, some of which have actually gone beyond what has been
prescribed by the IMF. They include, as you well know, the early adoption of a
fiscal austerity and discipline, the closing down of insolvent financial companies
and banks, allowing foreign investors to hold majority shares in banks and finance
companies, the strengthening of prudential supervision of the financial sector,
increasing transparency in the way our banks and financial firms are run and the
forthcoming revision of cumbersome and outdated bankruptcy and foreclosure law
in order to bring them in line with international practices and facilitate investments
in Thailand, both local and foreign. We, in addition, have to make changes
to the so-called Alien Business Law whereby a much greater range of businesses
and occupations will be open to foreigners and foreign investment. On top of this,
we have also relaxed restriction on foreign ownership of land and condominium
units in Thailand. Some of these reforms are of course still subject to
approval by the Thai parliament and undoubtedly you can expect some of the specific
points to be discussed and debated vigorously. That is to be expected in a democracy.
To me what is significant in these reform measures, above and beyond the specifics,
is the fact that underlying them is our commitment to an open economy and to continuing
economic liberalization, but of course with greater discipline and closer supervision
this time. Of no less significance is that the fact that these reforms, to one
degree or another, are meant to build into our system the concept of good corporate
governance, greater transparency and accountability with a view to raising the
standard by which business activities are conducted in Thailand. Reforms
of our financial and corporate sector are only part of the answer. The other side
of the same coin is the need for political reform. We aspire to promote good governance
within the public and private sectors at one level, and their relationship and
interaction with the public at another level. To this end, I am glad to note that
the political reform is very much part and parcel of the process of recovery and
self-renewal that we are undergoing. I am also pleased to note that last
year we passed a new constitution that, for the first time in Thai history, was
drafted with the full participation of the public. As someone who played a part
in the drafting process, I hold out considerable hopes for this constitution.
I like to think that over time, it will transform Thailand into an open, democratic
society, where transparency and accountability are the norm rather than the exception.
I like to think that the provisions of the constitution will ensure that human
rights and civil liberties are better protected and enforced. I like to think
that the changes the constitution makes in the electoral process will reduce money
politics and corruption, and that the check and balances it provides will result
in greater accountability on the part of politicians. Of course the constitution
is not a panacea that will cure all of society's ills overnight. All sectors of
society must embrace the ideals behind it before it can make a difference. But
we have truly made a major step forwards. In the midst of such a crisis,
as we become engrossed and immersed in all the figures and statistics, there is
the danger that we can lose sight of the fact that development is not about growth
per se. For in the final analysis, development is all about raising the quality
of life of our peoples, promoting social justice and total human development.
And so our path to recovery must also be centered on the people by ensuring that
adequate social safety nets are in place to cushion the social impact of the crisis
and ensuring that we continue to invest in our human resources -- our most precious
asset. Investment in our people is indeed an investment in our own future. Therefore,
I find it most gratifying that this government has placed the issue of social
safety nets and human security on the top of its recovery program. What
then are the prospects ahead? I have no crystal ball that would enable me to project
into the future. But I like to think that we are able to learn from our past mistakes,
if we can stay the course of reforms that embraces all segments and aspects of
the Thai society in a process of renewal, then, I have every confidence that the
path to recovery is within our reach. Already, there are signs, however,
faint, that the Thai economy is bottoming out and growth, however small, can hopefully
return by the end of next year. It is all the more necessary for us to move forward
with greater vigor and determination, recognizing that the path ahead will bring
more pains and require larger sacrifices, for sure. I still firmly believe that
our relative success in the past was not simply due to luck. We were able to do
the right things and make the right choices, though in the end we became a victim
of our own success. Much will indeed depend on the choices we make in the days
and months ahead. Our economic fundamentals remain strong, especially our agricultural
sector and agro-based industry, as well as our tourism industry. Our people are
hard working and our continued investment in our human resources will ensure that
our workforce is equipped with the skills and training needed for us to remain
competitive. Moreover, the Thai society has always been marked by a sense
of resiliency and underlying stability. Our reforms reflect our irreversible commitment
to an open economy and economic liberalization. Our geographical location makes
us a key player and a key link in the widening network of regional and sub-regional
economic activities and cooperation. As we move on the road to recovery,
what is most essential is maintaining faith in ourselves and in our ability to
bring about the needed reform and renewal. We also need the confidence and
the support of our friends and partners especially our long-standing friend, the
United States of America. If Thailand can succeed in our economic and political
reforms, we can indeed inspire others that open economy and open societies are
the surest path towards recovery. Perhaps, Thailand might not return to
the days of double-digit high growth of the past. That in itself should not be
our goal. The goal of our recovery strategy should be one of sustainable development--sustainable
in terms of income distribution and full development of the human potential, in
terms of good governance in both the corporate and public sector and in terms
of protecting our natural resources and the environment for our posterity. To
this end, reform, renewal and partnership lie at the heart of the path to our
recovery from the crisis. Provided we make the correct choices, we hope to emerge
not only stronger and healthier but a little bit wiser as well. |
Thailand
and the United States - Old Friends Seeking a New Relationship
by Mr. Anand Panyarachun The Inaugural Phillips Initiative Address
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill April 6, 1995 It is a
great honor to be at the University of North Carolina to speak at the inaugural
Phillips Initiative Symposium, particularly because it gives me the opportunity
to look at the future of the relations between Thailand and the United States. It
was almost exactly 200 years ago, I am told that the first student came to Chapel
Hill to study at this, the first public university in the United States. This
student, one Hinton James, was two weeks late for the official opening because
he walked the entire distance from Wilmington. It is a sign of the immense changes
in the world that I have been able to come from the other side of the globe in
far less time than Hinton James took to come from Wilmington. But of course I
did not have to walk. Still, it was a long journey for me, and one that
I would not have undertaken without good cause. The Phillips Initiative
is a generous and imaginative effort on the part of Mr. "Phil" Phillips,
who serves with me on the board of the Asian Institute of Technology, to help
shift that relationship to a new level. The focus of the Initiative on relationships
between universities is, I believe, a perceptive one. As we head into the next
century it will be our ability to learn and to teach, that will determine whether
our increasingly close-knit world society will survive the changes that are coming
at us with bewildering speed. I would like to spend a few moments talking
with you about some of the implications of these changes for our countries, once
so far apart, but now separated by much less a journey than traveled by the first
student at this great university. In that year of 1795 both our countries
were building anew after difficult wars of independence. The United States had
freed itself from Britain. Thailand, then known as Siam, had just driven out the
Burmese army after years of invasion and occupation. These struggles demonstrated
the fierce desire of both our peoples to be independent. Over the years,
this common desire for independence has brought together our very different countries
as allies, trading partners and friends. When the tide of European colonialism
rolled over Southeast Asia in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, Thailand was
the only country in the region to remain independent. Thailand and the United
States had occasional contact, but it was not until 1833 that the first formal
Treaty of Amity and Commerce was signed. So friendship, from the early days, was
based on mutual commercial interest rather than politics or international security.
Not, I would argue, a bad way to start. Our relations developed slowly over
the next several decades, and travel between our countries still meant weeks of
hardship. Following World War II, however, we faced together the challenges of
what was called "The Cold War". Sadly, in Asia, it was a very
hot war. First there was Korea and then Vietnam. In both conflicts, Thai troops
fought alongside Americans. The war in Vietnam not only brought 50,00 American
servicemen to Thailand, it joined our countries as allies in a confusing conflict
that is still debated in both countries. Now, however, the region and the
United States, are moving to a new era of peaceful cooperation and partnership.
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, once threats to Thailand and to other U.S. allies
in the region, are actively seeking trade, investment and friendship. Where Thailand
was once the front-line state against Indochina, it is now the doorway to these
countries, as they try to reform their economies and build a vibrant private sector. This
regional change is the first reason that it is time to find a new model for Thailand's
old and friendly relationship with the United States. Under external threat, Thailand
relied on the United States for training, equipment, material support and emergency
help. That relationship has changed. Without that threat, Thailand continues to
cooperate with the United States. There are annual joint military exercises. The
security relationship is, however, no longer a dependent relationship. Thailand
pays for its own security and determines its own policies. The second reason
is economic development. In this area too, Thailand has changed beyond recognition.
When I first served as Ambassador to the United States in the 1970s, our major
exports included rice, tin and rubber. Now they comprise computers, hard disk
drives, chemicals, integrated circuits, jewelry and other manufactured goods. I
was pleased and proud during my two terms as Prime Minister to be able to enact
a great deal of new legislation that improved the tax structure, that liberalized
the financial sector and trading regime, that provided for better protection of
the environment and that opened much more of the government decision-making process
to outside scrutiny. Although my government was able to push these reforms further
and faster than other governments, many of these improvements were already under
development by my predecessors. Nearly all of them have been supported by my successor. So,
for businessmen, there is great stability behind the headlines in Thailand. The
current elected government is currently well into its third year in power. More
important for the underlying stability of the nation, His Majesty King Bhumibol
Adulyadej, will soon complete his 50th year on the throne. His Majesty has provided
not only a deeply stabilizing influence, but a marvelous model of concern for
the poor and for the general well being of the nation. Policy stability,
national unity and strong foreign investment have combined with our highly trainable
work force to spark rapid economic growth. The pace of this growth accelerated
in the mid-eighties, and has now averaged about 10% for the past seven years.
GDP growth continues this year at about 8.5% per year, with export growth above
20%. This has transformed the business scene. Where once we had only small
trading firms dealing in basic commodities, we now have major companies, including
some Thai-based multinationals. The CP Group, which once sold seeds from
a shophouse, is now a $4 billion a year company that has operations in Europe
and the United States. CP is the largest single foreign investor in China with
operations in 23 provinces that stretch from feed mills and aquaculture to motorcycle
manufacture, tele-communications and satellites. Bangkok Bank has become
the largest bank in Southeast Asia. The Shinawatra Group, has expanded from
computers to cable television to telecommunications. It has launched the first
two Thai-owned satellites. The Siam Cement Company has diversified its original
base in construction materials to produce more than 20,000 different products,
including petrochemicals, auto parts, machinery and paper. It is Thailand's oldest
and largest industrial company. These companies are not rare exceptions.
More and more Thai companies are reaching the point where they are major players
on both the national and regional level. These companies provide opportunities
for American firms to find strong partners in Thailand and in the region. The
private sector and the hundreds of successful foreign-Thai joint ventures have
provided the dynamism that continues to drive economic development. With that
success, of course, comes even greater responsibility. The private sector must
help find ways to address key problems such as education, environment and infrastructure,
if for no other reason than to provide the basis for sustainable business development.
So the private sector must play a major role in the new development relationship
with the United States. Thai culture is old and strong, but its origins
lie in situations in which it was important for leaders to bind their people to
them with benefits in return for loyalty. So Thai society was held together by
relationships of patron and client. That also became the model for the relationship
between the United States and Thailand for much of our modern history. In security,
in international politics, in trade and investment, the United States was the
patron and Thailand was the client. Much that was good and beneficial to
both came out of that relationship. The United States, through the U.S. Agency
for International Development, spent more than $1 billion on infrastructure, technology
transfer and training in Thailand. Some of that was useful, some was wasted. Given
the changes that have taken place, however, the patron-client relationship, the
donor-recipient relationship is no longer appropriate or beneficial for either
country. It has already begun to change, USAID will close its doors in Thailand
in a few months. We should not regret this. We should welcome the change, but
we should not abandon decades of cooperation. We must not overlook continuing
development needs. The challenge is to move on and find a new model for our relationship. Much
progress has already been made, particularly in business. Having worked in the
private sector now for more than 15 years, it is clear to me that this is the
most important area of our relationship. Two-way trade between the United States
and Thailand last year grew 23% to more than $15 billion. Thailand still has a
trade surplus with the United States, but last year Thai imports of American goods
grew by nearly 30% and the gap is narrowing. The United States is still Thailand's
leading market. There are lots of reasons for Americans to do business in
Thailand. We have been prudent and conservative managers of our finances. Our
currency has been stable relative to the dollar. We have been careful to spend
within our means. In fact, the government has run a cash surplus for the past
seven years. Thailand is opening up new opportunities for the private sector.
We have begun to privatize the electric power industry where demand growth of
up to 14% per year is expected. (I know officials from the North Carolina company
Duke Power were in Thailand only a couple of weeks ago). We are liberalizing our
financial sector, offering new bank licenses and providing offshore banking opportunities.
The fast-growing stock market and the newly developed debt market need American
financial skills and services. Thailand can provide American businesses
with a gateway into Indochina. Thailand is also a key member of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations - a market of 350 million people with more than $450
billion in GNP. As road and rail links are built, Thailand will provide land access
into Southern China. Cultural kinship has already given Thai businesses a head
start in the booming China market. Operations in Thailand provide American companies
with a base for expansion into China as well as the rest of the region. Thailand
is happy to do business with people from all countries, but Americans enjoy a
special advantage. Under the 1966 Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, U.S.
investors are exempt from many of the restrictions imposed on others. Americans,
for example, can hold 100% of their Thai companies while other nationalities are
restricted to 49%. Despite the recent surge in Asian investment in Thailand,
the United States still accounts for about 20% of all foreign investment. Although
North Carolina businesses may not be widely known in Thailand, it is interesting
to note that the current president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Thailand
is from North Carolina, and so were his two predecessors. I am told there are
a growing number of businesses and investments that carry the good North Carolina
name of Kenan. I am sure the hi-tech industries of North Carolina, such as those
at the Research Triangle Part, will find ready markets and capable partners in
Southeast Asia. The rapid economic growth of Thailand, however, does not
mean we no longer need American development cooperation. In fact, rapid industrialization
has actually increased needs in those critical areas I mentioned earlier: infrastructure,
education and the environment. Industrial development has driven up incomes,
but industrial waste now threatens the rivers and canals which irrigate the fertile
fields that make Thailand the world's leading exporter of rice. Hazardous wastes
and municipal garbage create health problems for all, but particularly for the
urban poor. Air pollution in Bangkok is another threat to health. None of
these problems are unique to Thailand. Many have already been addressed in the
United States. So you can provide some of the technology and expertise we need.
But we do not need it on the basis of handouts. Our rising incomes and our
rising pollution problems create potentially lucrative new markets for U.S. environmental
products and services. The barriers of distance, language, culture, law and simple
unfamiliarity, however, sometimes prevent needed linkages from being made. As
chairman of the Kenan Institute of Asia, I am pleased that the Kenan Institute
is working to overcome those barriers through management of the U.S.-Thailand
Development Partnership. And it is doing this in a way that provides a new model
for foreign cooperation, not foreign aid. The differences between this new
"Partnership model" and the old "handout model" are clear. At
the Partnership, an experienced staff of bilingual Thais and Americans work to
develop and communicate needed information on markets and technology. They use
business skills to create partnerships that focus on a public need, but have private
sector mechanisms to keep them going. Funds are available, but they are
only provided if the Thai and the American companies share the costs. This reduces
the burdens of oversight because the parties involved are using their own money.
It simplifies project development because few dead-end projects can ever get started.
It provides for long-term sustainability by meeting market needs and making profits.
Perhaps most important, there is a mutual benefit. Thailand gets proven
technology and U.S. company get quality business partners and a fast-growing market.
The relationship is therefore no longer one of donor and recipient. It is not
patron-client. It is a relationship of equals. It is a business relationship that
directly benefits Americans - be it business firms or labor force. There
are also opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation on infrastructure.
The Kenan Institute is working with the Thai private sector and government to
create a new kind of infrastructure for 21st century manufacturing and logistics:
the Global Transpark. This idea, developed by Kanan Institute's Jack Kasarda,
has caught the attention of businessmen and planners who see the need for overcoming
infrastructure bottlenecks as the demand increases for speed to world markets. With
the rapid economic development, Thailand also faces the need for more education
at all levels. Our education has historically been geared to producing the governing
elite. Now the needs of our growing economy is for engineers, technicians, doctors
and managers. We need to move towards the admirable concentration of educated
brain power that the Raleigh Durham area has achieved. It may be some time before
we have 25% of our work force with university degrees as you do in this area,
but we must move in that direction. Here too, there is a mutual advantage
in working together. As Dean Paul Fulton often says, business must be international.
That means that top business schools such as the Kenan-Flagler School, must provide
an international education. With huge markets developing in Asia, your graduates
need to learn our ways of doing business, just as our young managers need to master
the tools and techniques developed in the United States. Several Kenan programs
address these needs: ท The CitiBank International Fellowship Program brings
top Asian scholars to the Kenan Institute each year to carry out advanced research. ท
The Kenan-Flagler Business School is recruiting more top students from Thailand.
I understand there are at least 13 Thais here now. ท The MBA summer internship
program brings about 20 students to work in Thai businesses each year. ท
An executive education program has started. I was pleased to open the first pilot
Kenan program in executive education in Thailand just last month. The program
was an intensive course in the strategy of transnational technology cooperation.
With some seed funds from the Phillips Initiative, the program brought together
the University of North Carolina, the Asian Institute of Technology, and Thammasat
University, Thailand's second-oldest university. It was an important step towards
expanded university-to-university cooperation that focuses on the real needs of
business. There is much more that can be done and should be done. But it
must be done on the new model of cooperation, not donation; of sustainable activities,
not quick fixes. We need to harness the private sector to the work of solving
public problems. The creation of this new "Partnership model"
of international cooperation will benefit the new relationship between Thailand
and the United States. It goes even beyond that. The United States needs to find
ways to help world development and help itself at the same time. There are many
countries, particularly in East Asia, where the dynamism of the private sector
offers the potential for far greater effect through the Partnership model than
could ever be achieved through the traditional model of foreign aid. There
is little doubt, the next century will be the Pacific Century, but it is not enough
to trumpet the changes so clearly coming. There are still barriers of culture,
history and understanding that must be overcome. There is much that can go wrong.
But there is also a lot we, here in this room, can do to build the kind of relationships
that serve the needs of all the Pacific countries. We, in Thailand, look
forward to developing this new mutually beneficial relationship, working closely
with American universities, government, businesses and the American people. Together,
I believe we can make a difference that will benefit all of us. |
Remarks
by Mr. Anand Panyarachun at The First Meeting of the Thai-U.S. Leadership
Council Bangkok, Thailand March 7, 1993 Mr. Chairman, Distinguished
Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen
I am honoured to have this opportunity
to address the first meeting of the Thai-U.S. Leadership Council. It is gratifying
to see so many dear friends and make my acquaintance with distinguished experts
and opinion leaders on the subject of Thai-U.S. relations. The Thai-U.S.
Leadership Council is meeting at a most opportune time. Thai-U.S. relations stand
at an important juncture. The basis of our relations have evolved from security
considerations into a complex tapestry in which trade and investment figure most
prominently. The trend in our bilateral relationship is by no means unique.
Unprecedented successes in economic development have transformed Southeast Asia
- and the Asia Pacific region in general - into one of the most dynamic regions
in the world. Lured by exceptional opportunities and profit, trans-pacific trade
and investment has grown spectacularly. In fact, your trade across the Pacific
is now almost 40 percent larger than trade with Western Europe. It would not be
an exaggeration to say that the Asia Pacific region will be the world's fastest
growth center well into the 21st century. Precisely because of this remarkable
growth, I cannot help but be struck that U.S. policy towards Southeast Asia over
the past five years is one of "benign neglect". In the rest of the world,
momentous changes have compelled U.S. attention, including the break up the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe along with the crises in the Persian Gulf and Africa.
Perhaps in its preoccupation with these important challenges the U.S. may have
been too distracted to notice and take advantage of the fact that Southeast Asia
has been growing quietly but rapidly towards prosperity and political stability.
For whatever reason, it appears that Southeast Asia has been put on the backburner
of U.S. foreign policy, and under servedly so. The new Administration
of President Clinton, elected on a platform of change, has articulated many new
policy initiatives. President Clinton has emphasized his strong belief in democracy
and human rights which will accordingly become an important component in the Administration's
foreign policy. More recently, President Clinton presented his international economic
policy, encapsulated in a five-point plan. He must be praised for emphasizing
domestic economic reforms and priorities as a primary means for reviving U.S.
economy and its competitiveness, and for arguing against a retreat into protectionism.
President
Clinton made clear that trade is a priority element of American security. He called
on trading partners not to expect something for nothing, and insisted that U.S.
trade laws be strictly enforced. These policy initiatives raise worrisome
questions. President Clinton's pledge to support democracy is welcome, but there
is a fine line between support and intrusion. Is the U.S. about to move on the
path of self-appointed righteousness? It would appear that the U.S. will be less
hesitant to impose its own standards and models in the area of democracy, human
rights or the proper conduct of trade policy. There also seems to be a greater
willingness on the part of the U.S. to dictate, coerce and take unilateral actions.
I question the appropriateness and wisdom of policy based on these presumptions. There
is no doubt that trade and economic interests assume greater importance in the
post-cold war era. Yet, the interests of nations and their relations cannot be
defined by trade alone. Other dimensions of a relationship cannot be ignored.
National interest is multi-dimensional and trade must surely be but one important
part of the total package. I have said earlier that Southeast Asia and the
wider Asia Pacific region's dynamism and growth potential will make it more important
to America economically. The continued presence of the United States in this region
with greater emphasis placed on economic matters is welcomed and in keeping with
global changes. Yet, America should be careful. Its trade problems with
this region - by its own admission - is partly caused by the U.S.'s economic shortcomings
at home. If we wish to apportion blame, then clearly the U.S. cannot afford to
cast the first stone. Moreover, the region is undergoing an economic and
political transformation for the better. We are making progress, and this should
be allowed to occur at a pace that we in the region consider appropriate and feasible.
I strongly question the wisdom and effectiveness of an U.S. policy that would
try to dictate the pace of change from the outside. In the same manner, trade
issues must be viewed as a part of the total relationship and in the context of
broad mutual interests. In fact, as the world grows more interdependent
and the U.S. faces a relative decline in its economic standing, the appropriate
policy would be partnership and consensus rather than dominance and unilateralism.
Indeed, there is much that the U.S. can do with this part of the world in a way
that would encourage current trends and promote common interests. To do
this, the U.S. must first re-focus its attention on the region and recognize it
as an entity which has its own needs and constraints. Bearing this in mind, the
U.S. may wish to define its overall interest and map out a strategy to strengthen
its presence in Southeast Asia, a region that the U.S. readily admits to being
behind other economic powers. In particular, U.S. exports and investment
in Thailand lag behind other countries. The U.S. government and business community
must ask themselves several related questions. First, does the U.S. have a comprehensive
plan of action to enhance her presence and competitiveness in Thailand and Southeast
Asia? Second, does she have a clearly defined strategy to exploit growing commercial
opportunities in Thailand and in Thailand's neighbouring countries". What
about possibilities for working WITH Thailand in third markets? Moreover,
I am sure that an overture by the U.S. side would receive enthusiastic response
from its Thai counterparts. It is time to put an end to the narrow and legalistic
focus on issues that divide, and concentrate anew on those that bring our two
countries closer together. Deliberate "activism" in Thai-U.S.
relations to promote mutual interests is timely, worthwhile and necessary. Surely
a market that has been growing and will continue to grow at the rate of about
8 percent per year should not be ignored. Yet, apart from a call by USTR over
a decade ago for an ASEAN-U.S. Free Trade Area which was overshadowed by the Uruguay
Round, the U.S. has still to formulate her policy agenda - or a "vision"
- for its economic relations with the region for the remaining years of this century
and beyond. The time seems right for new styles, new approaches, new initiatives
and plans of action. Such activism need not be confined at the bilateral
level. Many worthwhile initiatives can be undertaken with ASEAN countries now
well on their way to the creation of a free trade area. Moreover, a forum, where
new "activist" ideas can be explored, already exist. I am referring
to the ASEAN-U.S. dialogue which will soon meet in Brunei Darussalam. I
have long been a supporter of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation or APEC, while
in the private sector and in government. In line with the new "activist"
approach and especially with the U.S. as the Chairman of APEC, the new U.S. Administration
should find it beneficial to work urgently with other APEC member countries to
further develop this potentially beneficial regional organization. After all,
APEC comprise an area of immense potential, which already accounts for more than
half of the world's GNP. I have not dwelled on security issues, apart from
saying that tensions have eased both globally and regionally. There is no doubt
that conflict remains in the region. The United Nations is having difficulty implementing
the Paris peace accords on Cambodia and durable peace in that unfortunate land
still seems elusive. As one of the most extensive and costly United Nations
operations, UNTAC's performance will have a far-reaching impact on the prospects
of peace and development through cooperation in our region. In the emerging new
world order, an expanded United Nations is expected to play an important role
in the resolution of conflict. The United Nations and other countries, including
the U.S., should therefore redouble their efforts to bring peace to Kampuchea,
although agreement and trust among the Kampuchean factions are also fundamental.
The South China Sea is another pending issue for the region which will
require delicate handling by the parties concerned. In view of this and other
regional security concerns, there have been calls for the establishment of some
sort of regional security framework. Further calls have also been made for the
U.S. to maintain and reshape its presence in the region. I subscribe to these
ideas and to the notion that active U.S. presence in broader terms will indeed
be a stablizing influence in the region. As Prime Minister of Thailand, I also
suggested last year that APEC may well be a useful regional framework for the
discussion of non-economic issues. I would like to conclude by wishing
the Thai-U.S. Leadership Council every success in its important endeavour to further
improve and enhance Thai-U.S. relations. We live in exciting times of rapid political
and technological changes. These changes have opened up a new era, where durable
peace and economic prosperity lie within our grasps. I am hopeful that, with the
help of the Leadership Council, Thailand and the U.S. will develop a broad-based
partnership that will play an active and positive part in fulfilling the promise
of peace and prosperity in the new world order. |
Keynote
Address by Mr. Anand Panyarachun Executive Chairman of Saha-Union Corp.,
Ltd. on "The United States and Asia; Changing Perceptions" Hilton
Hotel, Bangkok July 11, 1985 Asia, in its historical past,
was often perceived by the United States as a land of mystery and inscrutability,
while the United States in turn was invariably perceived as a new world and a
land of hope and opportunities. These historical perceptions still hold true to
a certain extent, but new factors - political, security and economic, have come
into play and have gradually and perceptibly altered the thinking on both sides
of the Pacific.
The immediate post World War II period and the entire Fifties
and Sixties were a straightforward scenario - the good guys versus the bad guys,
good versus evil, democracy versus communism, allies against foes. In a way, it
was a simplistic attitude and concept. The United States was regarded as
an omnipotent, omnipresent and omniscient power. Their stance in the Korean peninsular
confirmed this impression. Those Asian countries that felt threatened by the aggressive
communist forces gravitated towards the American orbit. Their natural fear, fueled
by the American evangelical zeal and single-minded purpose, governed their policies
and actions which appeared to be subservient to the leader of the Free World,
so much so that the unequal partnership was seen as a patron-client relationship. At
the same time, the Asian communists, inspired by their own intense nationalism
and ideology and fortified and supported by their allies and friends in the Third
World, engaged in a war of attrition. They proved to be invincible on the battle-field
and so adept in turning around the public opinion in the United States. Eventually,
Asian allies of the United States were portrayed as corrupt and decadent military
oligarchies who were more interested in preserving their privileged status rather
than defending their homeland and national interests. The seventies turned
out to be the watershed period, beginning with the seating of the People's Republic
of China in the United Nations in 1971. The United States' military withdrawal
from Southeast Asia, culminating in the communist victory by default in South
Vietnam and subsequent communist dominance in Laos and Kampuchea, the emergence
of the revitalised ASEAN, the growing economic power and stability of the Asian
newly-industrialized countries (NICs), the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, China's
moderating role and stabilizing factor in the maintenance of peace and security
in the region, incipient formation of triangular strategic cooperation between
China, Japan and the United States all contributed to the fundamental changes
of the geopolitical picture of Pacific Asia. China is no longer seen as
an Asian bully. The United States retreats from its "world policeman"
role. Japan is showing signs of readiness to assume its proper role as a responsible
major Asian power, both in economic and political-security areas. NICs are fast
catching up with Japan in their pursuit of economic goals. The Korean situation,
in spite of occasional erratic and violent manifestations of North Korea, remains
relatively calm - particularly in view of the apparent desire of China, Japan,
the Soviet Union and the United States to maintain the present uneasy truce and
even to work for the reduction of tension and eventual normalization. The successful
outcome of the latest round of the Red-Cross talks between the two Koreans should,
however, be balanced by the North Korean's recent pro-Soviet tilt. The ASEAN
political harmony and cohesion have also been important factors not only in regional
politics but also in the international arena. The national and regional resiliency
of the ASEAN nations, buttressed by their fast-growing economies and political
maturity, help to strengthen their self-confidence in dealing with their adversaries.
That Asia-Pacific is the fastest growing region in the world is generally recognized,
and the world's attention is focussed on this area as a landmark for the Pacific
Century. The United States, stunned by its dismal failure in Vietnam, disparaged
by its allies, disenchanted with Southeast Asia and facing its own internal trauma
was, in the Seventies, turning its back on Asia. That was not for long. Common
sense finally prevailed and the United States was determined to play a constructive
and more realistic role in Asia. Learning from past lessons, the United States
appears to tread more cautiously. Knowing its limitations, it is no longer acting
like a bull charging into a China shop, upsetting everything. While it is prepared
to counter the growing Soviet military presence in the area with its military
might, the United States is also espousing a more balanced perception of its own
and its allies' strategic interests and is more inclined to use diplomatic and
economic tools to attain its objectives. The Vietnam syndrome is still there,
but it is no longer one which exclusively dictates the United States' policy in
this region. The United States, having adjusted its role in Asia and being
more conscious of the limitations of its power and resources, is now inclined
to adopt a more realistic, balanced and multi-faceted policy. The Asian nations,
in particular the ASEAN countries, have also broadened their perceptions of national
security and well being. Their perspectives of the regional scene take on a longer-term
character. Their close and cordial relations with the United States are no more
focussed only on security issues. They indeed have expanded into the vital areas
of trade, investment economics, and science and technology. The cooperative spirit,
long cherished by both sides, is still the order of the day. But inevitably, frictions
and disagreements do set in, especially in the trade and related fields. That
is, however, not a discouraging sign, but a mere reflection of an increasingly
multi-dimensional relationship. Indeed, the present intercourse is healthier and
the relations become more mature and substantive. The dialogue has become relatively
a two-sided affair. At the same time, the United States, burdened by the
huge trade and budget deficits, the over-valued dollar and Japan's closed economy,
is starting to behave in a defensive and short-sighted manner. Its strong protectionist
mood and a series of restrictive measures relating to some export products of
developing countries in Asia severely undermine its traditional role and image
as champion of free trade. Declarations by the President and statements by Cabinet
members begin to sound unconvincing. The draft on Textile and Apparel Act 1985,
or the so-called Jenkins Bill, sponsored by a substantial number of Senators and
Congressmen and wisely opposed by the Administration, threatens to disrupt international
trade in textiles and gravely endangers the economies of so many Asian nations. Such
actions, actual or contemplated, have added new sources of tension to American-Asian
relations and partnership. Its use of power is put to question - whether it has
displayed its preference for short-term gains over long-term interests. Whereas
the United States was once seen, unfairly in my view, as a failure in its use
of military power in Southeast Asia, let us hope that in its wisdom it will not
be perceived once again as a failure in the indiscriminate use of its economic
power. Whether such perception by Asians is fair or not is debatable but for practical
purposes it is irrelevant for our present exercise. |
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